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Scholars have evaluated the causes of clergy political preferences and behavior 
for decades. As with party ID in the study of mass behavior, personal ideological 
preferences have been the relevant clergy literature’s dominant behavioral predictor. 
Yet to the extent that clergy operate in bounded and specialized institutions, it is 
possible that much of the clergy political puzzle can be more effectively solved by 
recognizing these elites as institutionally-situated actors, with their preferences and 
behaviors influenced by the institutional groups with which they interact.  
I argue that institutional reference groups help to determine clergy political 
preferences and behavior. Drawing on three theories derived from neo-institutionalism, I 
assess reference group influence on clergy in two mainline Protestant denominations—
the Presbyterian Church (USA) and the Episcopal Church, USA. In addition to their 
wider and more traditional socializing influence, reference groups in close proximity to 
clergy induce them to behave strategically—in ways that are contrary to their sincerely 
held political preferences. These proximate reference groups comprise mainly 
parishioners, suggesting that clergy political behavior, which is often believed to affect 
laity political engagement, may be predicated on clergy anticipation of potentially 
unfavorable reactions from their followers.  
The results show a set of political elites (the clergy) to be highly responsive to 
strategic pressure from below. This turns the traditional relationship between elites and 
masses on its head, and suggests that further examination of institutional reference 
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The causes behind the political preferences and behavior of the American clergy 
represent an important, and not fully solved, puzzle. Though clergy lead influential 
political institutions (Vidich and Bensman 1968; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988), and though 
they enjoy great discretion in using particular frames of reality to influence parishioner 
views and behavior (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Wuthnow 1987; 
Olson and Carroll 1992; Roof and McKinney 1987), the causal story concerning why 
clergy think and behave the way they do politically has not been fully fleshed out. I 
suggest that moving toward a more complete representation of the causes of clergy 
preferences and behavior requires an examination of the relevant institutional 
environments in which these religious elites operate.  
In order to gain leverage in this enterprise, I consider clergy and their relevant 
professional environments through a neo-institutional lens (Hall and Taylor 1996). I ask 
three general theoretical questions in so doing. First, in what ways do institutions, via 
their role as agents of socialization, implant enduring and sincerely held political 
preferences in clergy? Second, do institutions, through their role in generating social 
networks and nodes of group identification, shape, over time, clergy political 
preferences and behavior? Third, do institutions shape the incentive structure that 
confront clergy such that clergy are compelled to strategically adopt behavior that is 
consistent not with their sincere political preferences, but with the preferences of the 
proximate reference groups that they encounter?  
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To address these questions, I utilize three institutions-based theories, which are 
drawn from the sociological institutionalism and rational choice literatures. The first 
focuses on the role of educational institutions (specifically, seminary) as agents of 
clergy socialization. It assesses whether these institutions have formative and lasting 
impacts on clergy attitudinal development (Pillari and Newsome 1998; Meyer, Boli, and 
Thomas 1987). The second, following Durkheim’s (1933) and Mosca’s (1939) theories 
of group salience in shaping member preferences, examines group influence in shaping 
clergy political preferences over time. Different from the first theory while remaining 
steeped in the sociological tradition, the second suggests that as clergy contact time 
with their proximate reference groups increases, clergy will begin to take on the groups’ 
fundamental political preferences. In this respect, clergy preferences will conform more 
to influences found in their contemporary group settings rather than to the socializing 
effects from institutions of prior significance (i.e., seminary).  
The third theory, steeped in rational choice assumptions, considers institutions as 
constraining and incentivizing forces on clergy political behavior. These forces compel 
clergy to behave strategically. As such, clergy will engage in behavior that comports 
with the expectations of specific institutional reference groups that they encounter 
(Antonio 2004; Alba and Moore 1978), but that differs from how they would behave 
according to their sincerely held preferences. The institutional constraint on clergy is 
represented by the professional sanctions reference groups can impose on those not 
behaving in accordance with group preferences. Group incentives are provided through 
the opportunity for professional advancement and financial well-being.  
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Empirical testing of hypotheses steeped in the sociological and rational choice 
frameworks represents an important extension of the relevant clergy politics scholarship 
in the United States. At the very least, if American clergy are found to eschew strategic 
behavior in favor of acting on their sincere political preferences, I will have addressed a 
largely-overlooked topic of importance to political scientists, especially given the role 
that clergy play as political elites. If, on the other hand, reference group influence and/or 
strategic motives are found to impact clergy political behavior, these findings will 
represent an important empirical breakthrough that will set the stage for future research. 
 
The Political Importance of American Clergy 
Most intriguing to earlier religion and politics scholars, and arguably the reason 
clergy constitute an important concern for political scientists, is the role that they may 
play in shaping parishioner political behavior, and how this behavior may translate into 
public policy (Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1993). Interestingly, the existing record shows 
that clergy influence may be muted. For example, Vidich and Bensman (1968) found 
that clergy could serve as effective nodes of political influence, but that their ability to 
shape parishioner opinion and behavior was conditional, and based on factors related to 
their dexterity with their congregations. At issue may be whether clergy make full use of 
available church resources as political goods. In addition to their obvious institutional 
authority, Wald (2003) found that the clergy control important institutional tools, 
including the church building (and the capacity to display political literature in prominent 
areas), the church bulletin and other forms of regular communication that can contain 
political information, and even transportation vehicles that can be used to take 
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parishioners to gatherings of political significance. Clergy who are less inclined to use 
these institutional resources may be generally less influential over their parishioners’ 
political views and behavior.  
While a step-by-step causal process by which clergy shape parishioner political 
views was not elaborated in these earlier works, several recent scholars have made 
important strides in this regard. Specifically, Crawford and Olson (2001) and 
Buddenbaum (2001) found that clergy-to-congregant influence is based on the clergy’s 
ability to highlight those issues to which parishioners should pay particular attention. 
Often, parishioners are found to take these recommendations to heart, especially when 
they coincide with issues of current personal salience (Djupe and Gilbert 2002). At the 
same time, Jelen (2003) discovered that clergy influence can go beyond the mere 
changing of congregant opinion, and move into the realm of encouraging activism. This 
has important consequences for political scientists, especially since ANES data 
continue to show that religiously affiliated voters remain a substantial electoral bloc. Yet 
despite the importance of these empirical breakthroughs on the clergy-parishioner 
relationship, much remains to be discovered. For thirty years, the lion’s share of the 
religion and politics literature has placed clergy on the right side of any causal model. 
Clergy have been cast as the catalysts behind a variety of religio-political phenomena 
(Penning and Smidt 2000). Yet even when their behavior has been the dependent 
variable, seldom has it been viewed as contingent on the interplay between clergy and 
the institutional contexts (including specific reference groups) in which they operate.  
To bridge this gap, I expand upon the extant literature to assess whether clergy 
political preferences and behavior are the products of not only their sincerely held 
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preferences (as found in Guth et al. 1997 and related scholarship), but of a desire to 
avoid professional sanction from certain of these groups. In doing so, I follow a trail 
blazed by Ammerman (1981), Iannaccone (1995), Young (1997), Gill (1998), and, more 
recently, Olson (2000) and Djupe and Gilbert (2002, 2003) in referencing contextual 
effects and/or rational choice in the study of religion and politics. These preceding works 
introduced the concepts of institutional and contextual effects on clergy political 
preferences and behavior, and, as such, set the foundation for the approach taken in 
this dissertation. The difference between these earlier studies and my research is that I 
utilize a series of specific measures that empirically account for institutional influences 
on clergy across two national clergy samples. Another difference is that I test theories 
particularly related to how institutional contexts may directly shape clergy preferences 
and behavior.  
Arguably, institutional crosspressures on clergy are no better observed than in 
American mainline Protestantism (Chaves 1993; Miller 1997; Wuthnow 2002). Mainline 
denominations, and the broader traditions from which they are derived, have helped to 
define American Christianity since the first British settlements were established in the 
early seventeenth century. Given their longevity, the mainline Protestant churches have 
accrued an important degree of political influence in the United States. At the same 
time, the mainline’s collective status as the second largest religious tradition in America 
(second only to Roman Catholicism) contribute to their political importance, given the 
large number of parishioners with whom mainline clergy have regular contact (Jones et 
al. 2002).1 Institutional crosspressures on clergy preferences and behavior are arguably 
                                            
1 This contention is based on aggregating membership figures from all mainline Protestant denominations 
in the United States, and comparing them with aggregate counts of other traditions according to data 
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more observable in mainline Protestantism because these denominations underwent 
significant changes in their systematic theological and political identities during the early 
twentieth century (Roof and McKinney 1987; Marty 1990). The result was that the 
denominations became homes to disparate groups holding often-opposing preferences 
on theological and political matters. This heterogeneity exists not so much between the 
denominations as within them, with the generally more liberal clergy serving 
parishioners positioned largely to their right (Weston 2003). Given their historical 
importance as mainline denominations, their level of intra-denominational heterogeneity, 
and their structural similarities, I elect to examine the causes of clergy political 
preferences and behavior in both the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (PC (U.S.A) and the 
Episcopal Church, USA (ECUSA).  
 Since the institutional rules that provide structure to both denominations include 
provisions for the laity to hold leadership positions (especially in the local congregations 
and parishes), the PC (U.S.A.) and ECUSA serve as natural backdrops for assessing 
the explanatory power of the sociological and rational choice theories. Given their 
proximity to clergy and their relative institutional power, I posit that these lay leaders 
serve as the reference group of greatest consequence for clergy in both denominations. 
Internal denomination studies show that lay leaders are generally more politically 
conservative than clergy (PCUSA Office of Research Services 2002, 2004, 2006; 
ECUSA Research and Statistics 2003). The combination of lay leader institutional 
authority and preference differences with the clergy suggests that clergy may encounter 
                                                                                                                                            
complied by Jones et al. (2002), and published in the American Religion Data Archive. I acknowledge, 
however, that inaccuracies in these data may exist, and that counting procedures may bias outcomes in 
favor of the more established, and usually mainline, institutions. Alternative sources dispute the size 
advantage of mainline denominations. For instance, according to the methodology used by Kohut et al. 
(2000), evangelicals are the largest single group within Protestantism. 
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reference group incentives to 1) rely on lay leader preferences to develop their political 
positions or 2) strategically mask their sincerely held preferences out of concern that 
they will encounter a negative reaction from their lay leaders if they do not.  
Importantly, there are other reference groups of potential consequence in 
determining clergy preferences and behavior. Most obvious is the collection of 
professional peers and institutional superiors with whom clergy interact. Since 
Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy must also answer to district superiors in carrying out 
their responsibilities, these supervisors, logically, function as alternative reference 
groups. I hypothesize, however, that supervisor influence will be generally different from 
what may exist for lay leaders. Since the overall preferences of mainline clergy should 
be more naturally in-line with their institutional superiors’, including the denominational 
bureaucracy (Wald 2003), I suggest that influence from these supervisory groups will, 
overall, tend to reinforce the clergy’s sincerely held (liberal) preferences.  
The empirical findings detailed in chapters 5 and 6 suggest that the political 
preferences and behavior of Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy are largely influenced by 
reference group ideology, and the pressure that clergy perceive from these groups to 
behave strategically. These findings confirm the explanatory importance of both the 
sociological and rational choice theories, and have important implications. First, 
explicitly testing for the influence of institutional forces on clergy political behavior adds 
contextual qualifiers to our understanding of what makes clergy tick as political elites 
(Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Guth et al. 1997; 
Crawford and Olson 2001; Djupe and Gilbert 2002, 2003; Leege et al. 2002; Wald 2003; 
Brewer, Kersh, and Petersen 2003; Smith 2005). By gaining a fuller understanding as to 
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why clergy think and behave in specific ways politically, scholars might be better able to 
predict the kinds of effects that clergy may have on their parishioners’ political 
preferences and behavior. Since results show that clergy preferences and behavior are 
influenced, in part, by lay leader ideology, future research might also delve into the 
specifics of the clergy-laity relationship in greater detail.  
Second, knowing that there is a causal relationship between reference group 
ideologies, strategic pressure, and clergy political behavior, scholars have reason to 
probe more deeply into group perceptions of clergy. One of the limitations of existing 
clergy studies, and the broader religion and politics research in general, is that there is 
no explicit connection made between clergy and those with whom they regularly interact 
as institutional elites. Indeed, scholarship has tended to look at the preferences and 
behavior of either parishioners or clergy (and mostly the latter), but never both in the 
same study, at least not at the national level. Through the contributions of this 
dissertation, it is clear that contextual influences add explanatory value, and that future 
research must find a way to incorporate these influences as regular model components.  
In order to more properly appreciate the manner in which this dissertation fits into 
the existing clergy politics scholarship, chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature. Chapter 
3 provides a brief historical account of polity and political controversies in the 
Presbyterian and Episcopal denominations. Chapter 4 delineates the theory of clergy 
political preferences and behavior. Chapter 5 explicitly tests hypotheses related to the 
sociological foundations of clergy political preferences. Chapter 6 examines sociological 
and strategic influences on items related to clergy political behavior, while Chapter 7 




PREFERENCES AND CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON  
CLERGY POLITICAL POSITIONS 
 
Since the political behavior of religiously affiliated Americans can be linked, at 
least indirectly, to clergy influence (Djupe and Grant 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993; Putnam 2000; Wood 1999), it is important to broaden our understanding of what 
makes clergy believe and behave as they do politically. This inquiry is made at a time 
when American politics is becoming increasingly characterized by cultural and religious 
division. Often, and as Fiorina et al. (2006) suggest, it is political elites, including the 
American clergy, who are responsible for creating and perpetuating political 
polarization. Clearly, then, political science should be interested in the effect that 
institutions-based theories and contextual variables may have in both constraining and 
incentivizing clergy political preferences and behavior.  
A survey of the prevailing literature shows an almost exclusive focus on clergy 
political preferences as the primary determinant of their behavior. Though this line of 
research has produced robust results, scholars have tended to overlook the relational 
dynamic that may affect actor behavior in any highly institutionalized setting. This 
dynamic is created and perpetuated, in large part, because clergy are dependent on 
relationships with key institutional reference groups for their professional success. 
Hence, while the extant literature’s focus on clergy preferences is important, my 
purpose is to assess whether clergy rely not only on their sincere preferences to guide 
their political behavior, but may also alter their behavior based on expectations of how 
relevant reference groups will react to what they do. The basic question from the 
rational choice perspective is whether clergy sometimes behave strategically—in ways 
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that, according to their general ideological preferences, they should not. According to 
theoretical expectations, this is as much a possibility as institutions socializing clergy 
into long-lasting political preferences that guide their behavior. If support for the rational 
choice theory is found, it would suggest that clergy may tailor their political behavior to 
please specific reference groups of institutional consequence, even as they continue to 
hold personal preferences that are distinct from their behavior.  
As with members of Congress who confront the competing demands of different 
constituencies and institutional goals, clergy encounter reference groups consisting of 
the laity and their elected leaders in local churches, and peers and supervisors in their 
respective denominational hierarchies. It is reasonable to suspect that these different 
reference group actors represent a unique mix of sanctions and incentives on clergy. 
Encountering these sanctions and incentives might mean the difference between clergy 
relying on their sincerely held preferences to determine their political behavior (reflecting 
a sociological explanation), or undertaking a strategic masking of these preferences 
(reflecting a rational choice explanation). Regardless of whether the sociological or 
rational choice theories return the greatest explanation in this assessment, the basic, 
institutions-centered, focus of this investigation is that clergy political preferences and 
behavior are the product of institutional factors.    
Since 27-37% of the American public attends church weekly (Smith 1998), it is 
clear that clergy are in a plum position to influence the wider political process, if they so 
choose. Importantly though, the literature is mixed on the question of just how influential 
clergy are at effectively shaping parishioner preferences and behavior (Cleary and 
Hertzke 2005; Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Smidt et al. 2003; 
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Smith 2005). The consensus from this scholarship is that clergy possess a general, but 
not exclusive or absolute, political influence over their flocks. This begs the questions as 
to why clergy influence should be inconsistent. One possibility is that the cost of 
compliance with reference group expectations, and the strategic behavior that may 
accompany it, short circuits clergy efforts to manipulate parishioner behavior. Hence, 
instead of political influence spreading from the pulpit outward, this influence might exist 
on an inverse path. In some cases, the choir could, in fact, be preaching to the clergy, 
so to speak.  
Of course, it is also possible that for those clergy electing to “learn the ropes” in 
terms of what is (and is not) acceptable behavior in her/his institutional context, there 
may be many who do not. Thus, it is important to test for whether strategic behavior 
plays a significant role in shaping the way clergy engage in the political process. If it 
does not, then the extant literature’s finding that socialized preferences tell most of the 
causal story should be considered all-the-more robust. If, however, reference group 
influence and/or strategic behavior are found to be part of the clergy political puzzle, a 
provocative vista of future research opportunities will have been opened. There is good 
reason to suspect that the latter may be the case. After all, if clergy never adapt to the 
exigencies of their professional contexts, including the avoidance of career-threatening 
controversies with key reference groups, churches in the United States would likely be 
facing extraordinary clergy turnover. That this is not occurring hints at the possibility that 




I employ a neo-institutional approach (Hall and Taylor 1996) in this dissertation. 
Doing so helps to account for the possibility of reference group influence and/or 
strategic pressure on clergy political behavior, while concurrently testing for the impact 
of institutional socialization on clergy preferences. Admittedly, an institutional focus on 
clergy behavior is not new in-and-of itself. Scholars have already documented the 
existence of certain institutional effects on clergy. This has been especially true in the 
research on clergy behavior as a response to a congregation’s community status 
(Morris 1984; McGreevy 1996). It has also been found in Ammerman’s (1981) work on 
the role of church bureaucrats as alternative sources of support for clergy. More 
recently, Djupe and Gilbert’s (2002) study of the determinants of clergy public speech 
suggests that clergy are more likely to engage in this activity when they believe that 
their congregation suffers from a limited community voice. Hence, there is existing 
evidence that clergy are influenced by institutionally-based constraints and opportunity 
structures.  
As such, the time is ripe to expand the institutional focus in assessing whether 
and how clergy are subject to the influence of group norms, expectations, sanctions, 
and rewards in determining their political preferences and behavior (Snow et al. 1986; 
Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Olson and Cadge 2002; Roof and McKinney 1987). 
Institutions consist of the rules governing relationships between actors and groups (see 
North 1981). Institutional rules distribute power to specific references groups by granting 
groups the ability to impose rewards and sanctions. Some rules also detail hierarchical 
relationships between reference groups, known in a religious denomination as polity. At 
the same time, rules create perceptions of group influence on individual actors. It is 
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often through the perception that actors have of group influence on their preferences 
and behavior that institutional influence can be detected.  Readers should refer to the 
vast literature on American legislative behavior for examples of using elite-based 
perceptions as an analytical basis for understanding institutional influence on their 
political behavior (e.g., Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kingdon 
1977; Dodd and Oppenheimer 2001; Oldmixon 2005). 
Based on the neo-institutional framework, I pose three broad questions relating 
to the role of institutions and their influence on clergy. First, in what ways do institutions, 
through their role as socialization agents, create enduring and sincerely held political 
preferences in clergy, which then serve as the basis of their political behavior?  Second, 
do institutions, through their role in generating social networks and points of group 
identification, shape, over time, clergy preferences? Third, do institutions shape clergy 
incentive structures such that clergy are compelled to adopt behavior that is based not 
on their sincerely held preferences, but on a desire to avoid sanction from specific 
institutional reference groups? 
Three institutions-based theories are used to help address these questions. The 
first focuses on the role of institutions as socializing agents, and assesses whether 
these institutions have formative and lasting impacts on clergy attitudinal development 
(Pillari and Newsome 1998). It assumes that clergy, through institutional contact, 
develop sincerely held and durable political preferences that dictate their behavior. The 
second regards the primacy of group identification in shaping clergy preferences. 
Different from the first theory while remaining steeped in the sociological tradition, this 
second theory suggests that, as a clergyperson’s length of contact time with her/his 
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most proximate reference group increases, s/he will be more likely to take on the 
fundamental political preferences that the group holds. In this respect, clergy 
preferences will conform more to influences found in their contemporary group settings 
rather than to the socializing effects from institutions of prior significance (including 
seminary). The third theory is molded from a rational choice lens, and considers 
institutions as constraining and incentivizing forces that help to shape clergy political 
behavior (Alba and Moore 1978). Constraints are represented by the interpersonal and 
professional sanctions that specific reference groups can impose for a clergy’s lack of 
conformity with group expectations (be they formal or informal). Incentives for strategic 
behavior are found in a clergy’s rational desire not to encounter sanctions that might 
impede their professional longevity and well being.  
If the socializing impact of institutions is the most influential, then congruence 
should be found between the values these institutions instill and clergy political 
preferences and behavior. It might also be that clergy end up agreeing with the 
preferences held by their proximate reference groups over time, which also reflects the 
socializing impact of institutions. At the same time, institutions may provide incentives 
for clergy to behave strategically. Clergy for whom these incentives are salient should 
be found to behave in ways that are contrary to their ideological preferences. To 
consider these possibilities in greater detail, I move to a more specific consideration of 





Clergy and the Socializing Impact of Institutions 
Institutions—economic, familial, social, and political—provide meaning and 
regulation to personal and social activity (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1987; Pevalin, 
Wade, and Brannigan 2003). As socializing agents, institutions provide the constraints, 
rules, myths, and norms that shape personal preferences and behavior (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Drawing from sociological institutionalism in 
the tradition of March and Olsen (1983) and Hall and Taylor (1986), I assume that 
institutions function as socializing agents for mainline clergy as well. Such socialization 
creates sincerely held political preferences in these religious elites. Perhaps the most 
important socializing institution clergy encounter is the seminary (Finke and Dougherty 
2002). The literature has made great strides in understanding this institution as a critical 
influence, and one that is usually a liberalizing force for mainline clergy (Charlton 1987; 
McKinney and Finke 2002). However, the literature does not inquire as to whether 
clergy rely on their seminary experiences to form their contemporary political 
preferences. This is problematic since it is important to know whether the preferences 
developed in seminary remain salient throughout a clergy’s career. It might be that more 
recent institutional influences have taken precedence over seminary-based values, 
thereby lessening this institution’s importance as a socializing force. This possibility is 
considered via the second of the sociological theories examined in this dissertation. 
While seminary represents a punctuated socialization experience, the influence 
of contemporary institutional reference groups in creating sincerely held preferences is 
ongoing, and may alter clergy preferences over time. The nature of this influence is 
addressed through both the sociological and political science scholarship. In the 
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sociological literature, Durkheim (1933) linked social group interaction to the creation of 
personal identity. Mosca (1939) later expanded on this notion by locating a 
psychological attachment between the individual and the dominant beliefs within one’s 
primary group. Hollander (1958; 1964) posited that personal status in a group or 
organization was dependent on an individual’s degree of conformity to group 
expectations. He further suggested that conformity is an important behavior that 
individuals use to signal their desire for group belonging, guidance, and reward 
(Hollander and Julian 1970). 
Political scientists from the Columbia School of voting behavior expanded on this 
group-based framework by suggesting that social reference groups are causally 
responsible for individual political behavior (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Katz and Lazarsfeld 
1955). Later, others, including Lane (1959), developed theories concerning the 
conditions under which individual political participation flourishes. Among them were the 
frequency of individual contact with certain primary groups, and “the salience and 
unambiguity of his groups’ preferences” (189). Verba (1961), asserted the importance of 
face-to-face group influence on the individual (4), while Key (1961), and Merton (1957), 
explored the primacy of reference groups in maintaining personal political opinions.  
Wald, Owen, and Hill (1988) brought the collective wisdom of these literatures 
into the context of the local religious congregation. They found “a strong association 
between the predominant theological temper within congregations and the political 
views maintained by church members” (545). The authors went a step further: “Once 
personal and congregational theology were disentangled, the evidence suggested that 
the collective outlook of the church was more politically influential than the worldview of 
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the individual church member” (545). This finding is critical in understanding the 
immense power of group-oriented influence on clergy political behavior.  
Of course, Wald et al. (1988) examined the influence of “group think” on 
parishioners. There is no reason, however, to assume that mainline Protestant clergy 
are themselves immune from such influence. As suggested previously, it might be that, 
at least in some circumstances, clergy behave more like elected representatives—
consciously aware of their key constituents’ preferences, and willing to rely on those 
preferences in determining their own political preferences and behavior for the sake of 
career preservation. This possibility represents intriguing parallels with the 
congressional behavior scholarship (see especially Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978), and 
may help to redefine how clergy are perceived in the literature overall.  
 
Strategic Behavior: Institutional Location  
and Reference Groups 
 
Recall that the third theory is assessed through a take on institutions that derives 
from the conception of clergy as strategic actors. Rather than acting sincerely on 
institutionally socialized beliefs, clergy are believed to respond to incentives and 
sanctions that impact their current and future well being as institutional elites (Antonio 
2004; Johnson et al. 2002; Roberts et al. 2001). This is a rational choice institutional 
argument grounded in March and Olsen’s contention that “political institutions . . . define 
appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations” (1989, 160). Under 
this view, incentives and constraints influence how clergy behave, but not what they 
truly prefer politically. This is the key distinction between the rational choice emphasis 
on strategic behavior and sincere preferences instilled through institutional socialization 
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that is either past or ongoing. However, the distinction between the two does not mean 
that the sociological and strategic explanations are unrelated. In fact, socialized 
preferences have an important role to play in the strategic calculus. After all, clergy 
must evaluate their own preferences in relation to those held by specific reference 
groups. It is only after discovering incongruities between the two that clergy may be 
motivated to behave strategically. 
Under the rational choice assumption, clergy will undertake strategic behavior 
when they perceive that doing so is necessitated by the institutional context in which 
they operate. This reality is captured well in Olson’s (2000) argument that “All clergy 
must reconcile the institutional rules and expectations of the organizations they serve 
with their own goals and preferences when they decide whether to include political 
involvement as an element of their official roles as clergy (1).” Olson is hinting at the 
broad effects of institutional location—the position that clergy occupy in a 
denominational organization—and reference groups—the collection of peers and other 
relevant parties that clergy encounter professionally—on clergy political behavior. 
Regarding institutional location, Finke (2004) suggested that elites who are less 
responsible for organizational administration (usually represented by the congregational 
clergy) are freer to act as innovative forces within their institutions. In the context of a 
mainline Protestant denomination, such innovation frequently means the expression of 
polarizing political preferences and behavior that follows suit. Finke’s conclusions 
coincide with Johnson and Figa’s (1988) claim that “The greater the organizational 
distance from the center of ecclesiastical authority, the greater the likelihood for 
politicized church activities” (43-44). In other words, because clergy are responsible for 
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only a single church within their larger denominations, they have the latitude to engage 
in political behavior that other institutional elites may not. Yet while institutional location 
may afford clergy this freedom, the preferences of, and pressure from, relevant 
institutional reference groups may function as a constraint on clergy acting with carte 
blanche.   
The influence of institutional location and reference groups on ecclesiastical 
elites was prevalent in Levine’s (1981) research on the Roman Catholic Church in Latin 
America. Differences in how the church episcopacy in Columbia and Venezuela dealt 
with the political needs of local populations highlighted the disparate nature of the 
institutional contexts in which the bishops operated. Later work by VonDoepp (2002) on 
Presbyterian and Catholic clergy in Malawi provided additional insight. He found that 
congregational elites are constrained by the degree to which their institutional locations 
provide behavioral autonomy. And, though not studying religious elites in the American 
context, Gill’s (1998) research on the Catholic Church in Latin America explicitly applied 
rational choice assumptions to the behavior of the region’s bishops and their support of 
authoritarian rule. Gill made use of the prevailing political and institutional contexts to 
outline the behavioral choices available to church leaders, and posited that bishop 
political behavior was based on their calculation of which actions would produce the 
most advantageous professional outcome. These calculations were often made as the 
result of elite contact with specific reference groups.   
Returning to the subject of the American clergy, if reference groups and 
institutional location exert critical pressures such that clergy may behave strategically, 
what is the nature of these pressures? Campbell and Pettigrew (1959) found that they 
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include clergy termination for not complying with group expectations. However, there 
are also less extreme examples, which are perhaps more common in the layered 
institutional contexts of mainline denominations. For instance, Wood and Zald (1966) 
discovered that church attendance and financial contributions decrease when clergy 
take positions on political issues. Perhaps not surprisingly, Hadden (1970) concluded 
that congregants are generally not supportive of clergy political activity. Yet, as Winter 
(1973) found, not all reference groups necessarily restrict clergy political behavior  
Clergy in more congregationally oriented denominations are less insulated from 
lay resistance than those in the more hierarchically organized churches. Thus, 
denominational leaders are, as Wood (1970:1064) finds, “more likely to press for 
policy in controversial areas when they have formal authority insulating them 
from member resistance.” Furthermore, it should be noted that obviously not all 
parishes oppose the prophetic or reformist activities of their pastor. 
  
 Winter’s (1973) finding suggests that reference groups in the same institutional 
location may have very different effects on clergy behavior. This is especially true in the 
congregational setting, where some congregations may expect public political behavior 
from their clergy, while others actively discourage it (Fowler, Hertzke, and Olson 1999).  
At the same time, reference group influence may cross between institutional locations 
and provide alternative incentives for clergy political behavior. One example of this was 
found in Ammerman’s (1981) work on support for civil rights legislation among seventy-
two white clergy in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. She found that clergy activism was strongly 
influenced by bureaucratic elites in the denominations to which the Tuscaloosa clergy 
belonged. The bureaucrats functioned as an alternative reference group that helped 
encourage clergy support of civil rights policies, even as the clergy’s more proximate 
reference group—the congregation, was much less supportive. Apparently, then, clergy 
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political behavior can be influenced by the preferences and expectations of both 
proximate and less proximate reference groups.  
In considering the competing causal mechanisms in the socialization and rational 
choice theories, it is important to remember the generally prevalent theme found 
throughout the literature: clergy behavior is multi-layered and multi-faceted.2 Part of 
appreciating this reality involves examining the perception clergy have of the various 
actors and conditions in the institutional locations of critical importance to them. Since 
rational choice assumptions play a key role in this consideration, it is necessary to 
delineate specific goal orientations for clergy. Much of the literature previously reviewed 
suggests that job security might be the most salient reason mainline clergy elect to 
comport with reference group expectations in their political behavior (Smith 1973). 
Clearly, clergy have incentives to adopt strategic behavior that furthers their 
professional well being, even if such behavior is out-of-step with their sincerely held 
political preferences.  
This does not mean, however, that clergy necessarily calculate the probability of 
being shown the door each time they undertake behavior that might be at odds with 
their reference groups’ expectations (or, more accurately, their perception of group 
expectations) (Nelson, Yokley, and Madron 1973). Indeed, a singular focus on job 
security as the prevailing motivation for clergy is fairly unrealistic. This is because most 
mainline Protestant clergy, by virtue of denominational polity, are somewhat insulated 
from direct reference group retaliation in the form of job loss. Instead, there are other, 
                                            
2 Porter and Miles (1974) identify the following variables as salient motivators in organizational settings: 
individual characteristics (including personal interests, security, and achievement) and work environment 
characteristics (including immediate work environment consisting of peers and supervisors, reward 
practices, and individual climate).  
 22 
perhaps more common, sources of strategic motivation. To the extent that clergy are in 
the business of moral suasion, it stands to reason that an equally powerful reference 
group sanction would manifest as general disregard for what clergy have to say, thereby 
resulting in a loss of clergy influence over their groups.   
For mainline clergy, motivational factors pertaining to their need to influence their 
flocks are especially interesting (Mueller and McDuff 2004). Nauta (2002), based on 
Bloom (1971) and Meloy’s (1986) exploratory work, posited that clergy are in a 
perpetual state of needing to assist their parishioners as part of their professional self-
actualization. Most of the time, clergy are not interested in being efficient in doling out 
their assistance, as bringing resolution to serious problems would mean that their 
vocational justification is attenuated. Whether one accepts Nauta’s thesis fully, it is 
possible to extract from his work the notion that clergy have a desire to be wanted by 
those they serve. As such, the specter of congregational ire, or even indifference, may 
compel clergy to do what it takes to avoid this outcome. The possibility of losing 
influence over their most proximate reference groups makes clergy risk averse, and 
potentially willing to undertake strategic behavior. This outcome can be effectively 
modeled as a sequential game in which clergy make decisions based on a ranking of 
their preferred outcomes, as well as their anticipation of how the other relevant actors 
(represented by the key reference groups in question) will behave. Strategic behavior is 
manipulation in that clergy are consciously electing to misrepresent their true 
preferences so as to secure a preferred outcome. The manipulation of represented 
preferences within groups is described in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. 
According to Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) 
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Assume a group G of at least three individuals and a set A of at least three 
alternatives. Also assume that any member of G may have, as his or her true 
preferences, any preference ordering over A (universal domain). Then every 
nondictatorial social choice procedure, F, is manipulable for some distribution of 
preferences (153). 
 
Despite the possibility for coercion between reference group members, there is 
very little possibility for dictatorship of individual choice. As such, the possibility exists 
for at least one actor in each group to reveal her/his preferences strategically. An actor’s 
strategic preferences can be represented through the following technique. Supposing 
that the sincere preference ordering of group members G over the alternatives found in 
A are P1, P2, . . . PN, one can then look at Actor One’s (the clergy’s) revealed 
preference in the group setting where s/he is (theoretically) expected to reveal her/his 
sincere preferences to see whether revealed preferences (represented as Q1) are the 
same as sincere preferences (represented as P1). If Q1 ≠ P1, then it can be assumed 
that clergy are behaving strategically (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). Using the findings 
of the socialization-based literature (see especially Guth et al. 1997; Smidt et al. 2003) 
regarding clergy preferences as a baseline, behavioral deviation from a clergy’s sincere 
preferences will denote strategic behavior in the empirical tests in chapters 5 and 6.  
Having delineated the basic components of the three neo-institutional theories, it 
is now appropriate to consider in greater detail the specific Protestant clergy that will 
serve as the subjects in this study. The decision to examine mainline Protestant clergy 
is based, in part, on the rich preference differences between these clergy and the 
reference groups with which they interact. These differences are based on what Marty 
(1970) described as the “two-party system” of American Protestantism (179). Though it 
has been criticized as too blunt a characterization of the Protestant community, the two-
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party approach remains a helpful heuristic, especially given its overlap with partisanship 
in secular politics. According to this characterization, Protestants fall into either the 
mainline group, in which clergy and denominational elites are informed by more 
modernistic approaches to practicing and interpreting their faith, or the evangelical 
group, in which elites are largely orthodox in orientation (Kellstedt and Green 1993). 
  Of course, and as with any broad characterization, there are exceptions to the 
rule. Ironically, this is perhaps no more evident than in mainline Protestantism where, 
despite the concerted transition toward modernism over the last century, there remain 
pockets of evangelical-minded clergy and congregations who purport themselves to be 
moderate-to-conservative on theological and political matters (McKinney and Finke 
2002; Smidt 2004). Given the institutional diversity they confront, mainline clergy find 
themselves embroiled in controversial debates that may be largely the product of an 
inability to find common ground within their institutional contexts. These clergy are 
center stage in contemporary debates over gay rights, Middle East politics, and other 
highly divisive political issues.  
While it is true that almost all religious communities have elites, mainline 
denominations are perhaps the most reliant on the professional clergy for several 
reasons. The first regards the mainlines’ institutional connectivity. Though not as 
hierarchically organized as the Roman Catholic Church, mainline Protestant 
denominations consist of a myriad of administrative layers, including denominational 
agencies and district and regional governing bodies. The institutional maturity of most 
mainline denominations, and the long history of intra-denominational accountability 
between clergy and denominational leaders, makes mainline denominations much more 
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reliant on the ordained clergy than comparably younger, and less institutionally mature, 
religious groups. At the same time, the relatively high socio-economic characteristics of 
mainline parishioners suggest a higher level of reliance on professionalized leadership, 
as educational attainment and standardized vocational competence are de jure 
expectations within these more affluent communities (Iannaccone 1990).  
Mainline denominations occupy a unique position in the American religious 
community. They are not, by definition, part and parcel of the Christian Right (Wilcox 
2000), but neither are they so monolithic that scholars should consider their clergy and 
congregants unsympathetic to calls for moral and religious traditionalism (Smidt 2004).  
While the intellectual heritage of most mainline denominations is located in the 
American north, which, by the 1930s, was turning increasingly to modernism and 
science to interpret religious belief (Wald 2003), the reunification of the denominations’ 
northern and southern branches in the mid-to-late-twentieth century created new 
institutional structures that joined both progressive northern values and more traditional 
southern preferences under single denominational tents. Hence, while mainline 
Protestants may not have been carrying the more aggressively conservative political 
banners of their evangelical and fundamentalist brethren over the last thirty years 
(Smidt 1988; Wilcox 2000; Wald 2003), there are significant conservative constituencies 
in these denominations, most of which occupy pew space on Sunday mornings.      
It is the potential tension created between the generally conservative laity, the 
generally liberal denominational leaders, and the clergy placed in between these groups 
that provide a compelling hook for this investigation. The influence of less proximate 
reference groups in the denominational hierarchy, combined with the general 
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conservatism of the laity and their elected leaders in the local churches (representing 
the clergy’s most proximate reference groups), creates a very unique institutional 
context that may compel mainline clergy to vacillate between acting on their sincere 
preferences and masking these preferences through strategic behavior. This outcome 
would be reflective of clergy balancing the competing demands of their closest 
constituents with their concurrent desire to receive approbation and increased prestige 
from less proximate, but more institutionally powerful, groups.  
    
The Institutional Contexts 
Though the theoretical and empirical questions I examine in this dissertation are 
well grounded in the mainstream political science literature, the institutional contexts in 
which clergy in this study operate—the Presbyterian and Episcopal Churches—are not 
necessarily well known to readers. As such, I delineate certain of the historical, political, 
and institutional developments that have characterized the Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.) and the Episcopal Church, USA from their 18th century roots to the present. To 
be clear, the exploration of both denominations is not devised as a comprehensive or 
definitive account of either tradition. After all, this is not a project on church history.  
The explorations of the Presbyterian and Episcopal Churches in the following chapter 
are devised instrumentally. Their joint goal is to provide the reader with 1) a basic 
understanding of Presbyterian and Episcopal polity, and 2) a general overview of the 
most contentious, contemporary political debates within the denominations, including a 
delineation of the relevant actors involved. Based on this information, a clear foundation 
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from which to launch into an evaluation of both the sociological and rational choice 





 THE PRESBYTERIAN AND EPISCOPAL CHURCHES AS  
POLITICAL CONTEXTS  
 
The PC (U.S.A.) 
 
The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (PC (U.S.A.) and its clergy make good 
candidates for examination in this dissertation for two reasons. First, there is arguably 
no other mainline denomination (except perhaps for the Episcopal Church!) as divided 
over contentious political issues. The second reason regards the denomination’s 
organizational structure, or polity. Unlike the organizational systems in most of its sister 
mainline denominations (including the Episcopal Church), the PC (U.S.A.) has only one 
rank of ecclesiastical officer—elder. It is only appropriate, therefore, that the 
Presbyterian tradition takes its name from the Greek word for elder: presbuteros. It is 
various collections of elders that constitute the specific legislative bodies that create 
policy at all levels of the denomination. As Stockton (2006) described it, Presbyterian 
polity resembles a federated hybrid of the Westminster system. It has the equivalent of 
a national parliament (the General Assembly), but decision-making authority is shared 
between bodies at the local (congregational), district, regional, and national levels. 
Presbyterian polity places tremendous formal emphasis on representation. Elders are 
elected by specific constituencies to serve in their positions (each with varying 
limitations on terms of office and institutional responsibilities).  
As hinted, all ordained Presbyterian ministers (known officially in the PC (U.S.A.) 
as Ministers of the Word and Sacrament) are elders in Presbyterian polity. There are 
also those elected officers who are not Ministers of Word and Sacrament, and are part 
of the laity. These are known simply as elders. All elders (be they Ministers of the Word 
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and Sacrament or lay persons) are considered ordained (which is the basis of their 
theoretical equality), although virtually all PC (U.S.A.) ministers go through a series of 
examinations from a presbytery following the completion of a three-year seminary 
degree, and many more have also obtained a doctorate or other terminal degree 
(Presbyterian Church, Office of Research Services 2002).    
The combination of the Ministers of the Word and Sacrament and elders in a 
local Presbyterian congregation constitute the session. According to Presbyterian polity, 
all elders are equal in their role as session members. Though there are other positions 
in a local Presbyterian church, including the office of deacon and other professional, 
semi-professional, and volunteer staff positions, it is the session, and only the session, 
that exercises governing authority over the congregation. In addition to its 
representativeness and single officer rank, Presbyterian polity is also unique in its 
connectedness. There are four types of governing or legislative bodies in the 
Presbyterian system, each comprised of elders, each having a clerk and moderator, and 
each with a specific set of institutional responsibilities. The first, already identified, is the 
session. The second is a district level body known as a presbytery. Presbyteries have 
authority over congregations; they are also charged with ordaining and overseeing the 
conduct of congregational clergy within their boundaries. Presbytery officers with both 
voice and vote consist of all ordained ministers in the district, and an equal number of 
elders from the congregations (with the number of elders from a local congregation 
based on a congregation’s membership size). Synods have oversight of three or more 
presbyteries, and work with the presbyteries to select and oversee their leadership, as 
well as to develop presbytery capacities to carry out mission and ministry programs. 
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Synod officers are selected from members of presbyteries within synodical jurisdiction 
(Gray and Tucker 1999). 
The highest legislative body in Presbyterian Church is the General Assembly, 
which holds jurisdiction over all church-wide concerns. All of the upper three governing 
bodies have several agencies and administrative organs that assist in their oversight 
functions. The higher governing bodies have direct oversight over those directly below 
them. The General Assembly, which meets every two years (a change from annual 
assemblies was enacted in 2004), consists of commissioners elected from the 
presbyteries, not the synods, as the hierarchical pattern might suggest. As Stockton 
(2006) explained 
The General Assembly has two major officers, a professional Stated Clerk who 
handles polity issues and speaks for the denomination, and a Moderator who 
serves for two years and interacts mostly with the congregations. As anyone who 
knows organizational behavior would guess, commissioners are highly 
dedicated, involved, and committed to the organization and its principles. This 
means that there is an inevitable disconnect between those in the pews and 
those who adopt resolutions at higher levels (4). 
 
Stockton’s (2006) point about the dedication of assembly commissioners is 
important—the commissioners do not generally mirror the median preferences of the 
rank-and-file laity. This is likely because commissioner selection is controlled by specific 
presbytery committees, not the laity. Though the General Assembly can take 
administrative action that affects any of the bodies under it, almost all business 
conducted at the assembly is proposed by individual presbyteries through overtures 
(Stockton 2006). Some overtures may propose that the denomination express a specific 
political view. They may also request a change to the denomination’s constitution. Any 
revisions made to the constitution, known as the Book of Order, in addition to majority 
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passage by the General Assembly, require ratification from 2/3 of the presbyteries. This 
is why the PC (U.S.A.) has been described as organized from the presbyteries out, 
rather than according to more hierarchical or grassroots polity models (Weston 1997, 
2003). 
 
  Presbyterianism Divided 
It was the introduction of Higher Critical views of the Bible that began circulating 
in Germany, and made their way to American seminaries in the 1870s, that helped set 
the stage for the PC (U.S.A.)’s current level of internal conflict. The first and most 
important proponent of the Higher Criticism was Charles Briggs, a professor at Union 
Seminary in New York City. Briggs’ views opened the door to changes in the way the 
Presbyterian Church, and what became mainline Christianity in general, conceived of 
itself, its theological identity, and, most importantly for purposes here, its political 
mission (Jeschke 1969). Briggs, like many of his contemporaries, believed that the 
distinctives of any denomination must ultimately give way to overarching Christian unity. 
At the same time, and much to the consternation of Presbyterian conservatives, Briggs 
believed that all doctrine was the product of historical circumstances and human 
development, not necessarily divine inspiration. He, therefore, stressed life experiences 
over traditional doctrine in determining the church’s role in society. Not surprisingly, 
Briggs was highly ecumenical, becoming a priest in the Episcopal Church, and also 
cultivating ties with Roman Catholics (Weston 2003).  
 To counter Briggs’s efforts, conservatives, led by Princeton Seminary professors 
Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield and J. Gresham Machen, sought to have certain 
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fundamentals of Christian belief made essential and necessary for ordination in 
Presbyterianism (Weston 2003).3 These fundamentals were approved by the church’s 
General Assembly in 1910. Though this appeared to be an institutional victory for 
conservatives, it precipitated an unexpected reaction from what Weston has termed 
“Presbyterian loyalists” (2003, 24). It was these loyalists who were instrumental in 
assisting conservatives in sanctioning and removing Briggs from the ministry in the 
1890s. These same loyalists, however, became concerned that, in adopting the five 
fundamentals, the General Assembly had violated one of Presbyterianism’s basic 
values—personal interpretive liberty.  
In 1925, a special commission was established to examine the causes of the 
Presbyterian Church’s own version of the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy. The 
committee’s final report, crafted by commission loyalists, endorsed the importance of 
toleration among believers 
The principle of toleration when rightly conceived and frankly and fairly applied is 
as truly a part of our constitution as are any of the doctrines stated in that 
instrument. . . . Toleration as a principle applicable within the Presbyterian 
Church refers to an attitude and a practice according to which the status of a 
minister or other ordained officer, is acknowledged and fellowship is extended to 
him, even though he may hold some views that are individual on points not 
regarded as essential to the system of faith which the Church professes (1925, 
19-20). 
 
 The commission placed responsibility for discerning what was, and was not, 
essential to the faith in the hands of each presbytery. According to Weston (2003), this 
approach represents the most institutionally loyal strategy for the PC (U.S.A.) to abide 
by. It also, in Weston’s view, presents the best chance of averting institutional schism. 
Of course, Weston’s views are mere conjecture. Objectively, there is nothing that makes 
                                            
3 These became known as the five fundamentals, and consisted of the inerrancy of Scripture, the virgin 
birth of Christ, Christ’s vicarious atonement, Christ’s bodily resurrection, and Christ’s miracles.  
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the loyalist view of institutional polity (to the extent that it is effectively articulated) 
necessarily able to avert a denominational collapse. Regardless of the effect these 
loyalists and others in the denomination have on clergy, it is clear that the PC (U.S.A.) is 
a unique environment in which to assess reference group influence in determining 
clergy behavior, be it sincere or strategic. There are several contemporary and 
controversial issues that may compel Presbyterian clergy to undertake strategic 
behavior in order to avoid difficulty with key reference groups. Certain of these 
controversies are discussed in the sections that follow.  
 
   Gay Ordination 
One of the most rancorous and contemporary debates within the PC (U.S.A.) 
regards whether non-celibate homosexuals can be ordained as clergy. The 1996 
General Assembly set the framework for the current controversy. Its Human Sexuality 
and Ordination Committee proposed a fidelity and chastity amendment to the 
denomination’s constitution (Weston 2003). The committee’s decision was based, in 
large part, on the reasoning that if the presbyteries were given a local option in deciding 
whether homosexuality is (or is not) an essential standard for ordination, the 
denomination’s connective fabric would be in grave jeopardy. Hence, the committee 
recommended, and the 1996 General Assembly passed, a constitutional amendment 
that prohibits the ordination of those who do not pledge to abide by “fidelity within the 
covenant of marriage of a man and a woman . . . or chastity in singleness” (Presbyterian 
Church (U.S.A.) Book of Order 2001).   
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The presbyteries began voting to ratify or reject the amendment in late 1996. The 
amendment passed on March 18, 1997 with 97 presbyteries for, 75 against (Weston 
2003). At that time, the amendment became part of the Book of Order as section G-
6.0106b. Though the prohibition against gay ordination was covered by the adoption of 
G-6.0106b, church liberals were undeterred in their attempts to either overturn or 
significantly modify the standard. Several overtures were sent to successor General 
Assemblies seeking a local option, or some other accommodation, that would open the 
door to gay ordination. Each attempt, including another round of votes by the 
presbyteries in 2001 and 2002, was met with a preference for the status quo—no 
ordination of sexually active homosexuals in the PC (U.S.A.).  
The continued controversy led to the establishment of the denomination’s 
Theological Task Force. It presented its findings in 2005. Most explosive was the 
recommendation that, while the denomination’s constitution, including G-6.0106b, not 
be changed, each presbytery should be allowed to decide how it might interpret the 
ordination standard—meaning it can decide not to enforce it if it so decides. Since the 
task force’s recommendation centered on issuing the General Assembly guidance to 
change church interpretative standards, no ratification by the presbyteries would be 
required. The change would be the equivalent of an Executive Order that determines 
how the church bureaucracy operates, but does not go through the standard legislative 
process. Ironically, instead of settling the ordination issue, as many had hoped, the 
report has likely set the stage for a renewed season of conflict between sides in the 
debate. Approved by the 2006 General Assembly in June, the vote was met with veiled 
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discussion by some conservative groups of leaving the denomination (Walker 2006), 
although, as of spring 2007, no serious attempt to do so has been mounted. 
                                              
Deciding to Divest 
Another contentious conflict within the PC (U.S.A.) was generated by the 2004 
General Assembly’s decision to explore a denominational divestment from companies 
that have enabled what the denomination perceives to be Israeli mistreatment of the 
Palestinians via territorial occupation. Importantly, and as with gay ordination, the 
divestment issue has been festering for years. Though one can argue that the PC 
(U.S.A.) has taken an affirmative stance in regard to Israel, especially through its strong 
admonition of Anti-Semitism and Middle East terrorism, as is often the case in the world 
of zero-sum political conflict, any attempt to support the goals of both parties is often 
viewed by one or both sides as a posture of non-support. This is likely the case with the 
PC (U.S.A.) and Israel, especially since the denomination’s initial involvement in the 
region came in the form of educational opportunities for Arabs (the Presbyterian Church 
founded both the American University of Beirut and the American University of Cairo in 
the early twentieth century). Concomitantly, the PC (U.S.A.) has been a strong advocate 
for the Right of Return and a two-state option for Israel and Palestine, neither of which 
are favored policies among conservative Jewish groups (Stockton 2006).  
For a state whose very existence creates enmity among its closest neighbors, it 
is not difficult to see how the denomination’s divestment policy would be viewed with 
suspicion and outrage by Jewish groups and their allies. After almost two years of 
encountering fallout from the controversy, the denomination attempted to change 
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course. By a vote of 438 to 28, the 2006 General Assembly adopted a revised 
resolution, crafted by its Peacemaking and International Issues Committee, that 
replaced the term “divestment” with a commitment that denominational investments in 
Israel and the Palestinian territories be directed toward peaceful interests. The 
assembly also apologized for whatever pain its 2004 policy caused the Jewish 
community. However, and as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly Clifton Kirkpatrick 
later mentioned at a news conference, the new resolution does not overturn the 2004 
policy itself. If anything, the 2006 resolution hints that divestment, to the extent that it 
occurs, will be broadly aimed at realigning denominational investments in the region 
(Stockton 2006). Given that economic and international business investment in Israel is 
much higher than it is in Palestine, it is likely that divestment decisions will invariably 
affect Israeli interests more than Palestinian ones. This likely makes the divestment 
issue a continuing concern among Presbyterian clergy and their relevant reference 
groups.  Of course, the PC (U.S.A.) is not the only mainline denomination embroiled in 
political controversy. A strong case can be made that the Episcopals may even surpass 
their Presbyterian brethren in this regard. 
 
Episcopal Church Controversies  
 
 The Episcopal Church, USA (ECUSA) has made banner headlines with some of 
its recent institutional decisions. Most notable are the ordinations of the first openly non-
celibate homosexual bishop in 2003, and the election of the denomination’s first female 
presiding bishop in 2006. The latter of these is perhaps far less controversial in the 
United States, where ECUSA has been ordaining women as priests and bishops since 
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1976. However, the new primate (the ecclesiastical distinction given to the presiding 
bishop of an Anglican province), Katherine Jefferts Schori, faces opposition to her 
institutional legitimacy among the majority of the 38 provinces that constitute the 
Worldwide Anglican Communion. With the exception of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand, no other Anglican provinces recognize the 
ordination of female priests, let alone bishops. Hence, it is unclear whether and how 
Jefferts Schori will be able to work effectively with her fellow primates during her nine-
year term. Nor is it clear what the election will mean in terms of the continued relational 
strain between ECUSA and the majority of its territorial counterparts. 
 This tension is largely attributable to the 2003 election and consecration of 
Bishop V. Gene Robinson. The Bishop is an openly gay, divorced, father of two, who 
has been living with his current partner for over a decade. Though openly gay priests 
have been ordained in ECUSA for decades, the American church, and the Anglican 
Communion in general, appeared willing to tolerate these aberrations because of their 
localized nature (Gill 1998). However, to supporters of Robinson’s election, his 
ecclesiastical elevation was justified in part by ECUSA’s willingness to allow the 
ordination of openly gay priests. Robinson’s proponents may have been shocked by the 
response incurred after the 2003 election. Though he won a comfortable majority in 
both the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies (the chambers constituting the 
bicameral, triennial General Convention of the Episcopal Church), the election produced 
a vociferous response from ECUSA and Anglican bishops opposed to Robinson. It also 
garnered objections from the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Most Rev. Dr. Rowan 
Williams, who stated that he would not recognize the Robinson consecration, or allow 
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him to exercise ecclesiastical authority in the Church of England. Clearly, the American 
church has undertaken a course of inclusiveness that places it at odds with both 
elements of its own episcopacy, and the wider Anglican Communion. The factors 
leading to this situation are best understood in the context of ECUSA’s polity and 
history. 
 
ECUSA Polity and History 
  ECUSA polity is similar to the PC (U.S.A.)’s in two important ways. First, it has a 
federated structure that establishes connection between local parishes (headed by 
vicars or priests), dioceses (heading by a bishop), and the afore-mentioned General 
Convention, which is ECUSA’s national legislature. Second, Episcopal laity have an 
active role in determining both local and national church policies. At the same time, 
ECUSA is different from the PC (U.S.A.) in one important way—it is officially part of a 
worldwide body of denominations with linkage to the Church of England.  
A vast majority of the Anglican Communion, including the American church, was 
established through British colonization. The Anglican Church in the new colonies held 
its first services in 1607 at the Jamestown settlement in what is now Virginia. Anglican 
congregations were found throughout the colonies by the latter half of the seventeenth 
century, with the largest concentrations existing in Maryland and Virginia. In 1789, the 
Anglican Church in the American colonies was disestablished from the Church of 
England, and organized as an independent episcopacy (Zahl 1998). The Archbishop of 
Canterbury is the spiritual leader of the Church of England only (Queen Elizabeth II and 
future monarchs maintain the title of Supreme Governor of the Church of England, 
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Defender of the Faith). The Archbishop is only the titular head of the Anglican 
Communion. As such, he has few available institutional mechanisms to compel 
communion members to conform to specific doctrinal or political positions (hence 
ECUSA’s ability to ordain women and sexually active homosexuals). There are, 
however, semi-regular meetings between primates and the Archbishop (imitating 
somewhat the meetings that the Pope has with Catholic archbishops). In addition, the 
Anglican primates gather together every ten years for the Lambeth Conference, hosted 
by the Archbishop. During this time, primates meet to consider resolutions pertaining to 
matters of theological, social, and/or political concern. Conference resolutions express 
the sense of the Anglican Communion regarding particular issues, but are not binding 
on the individual provinces (Kater, Jr. 1999).   
The term episcopal is a reflection on the church’s polity in which overseers or 
bishops (taken from the Greek word episkopoi) are the responsible administrative class. 
It is the bishops who have the ecclesiastical authority to decide on issues concerning 
church doctrine and the ordination of priests. However, it is not accurate to characterize 
ECUSA polity as wholly episcopal in the traditional sense. Unlike the Roman Catholic 
Church, which vests total institutional authority in its ordained elites, ECUSA, perhaps 
reflecting its ties to the democratic spirit of the American Revolution, established a polity 
that blends the episcopal and presbyterial forms. As such, lay representation and 
participation in decision-making are critical denominational characteristics (Cross and 
Livingstone 1997).  
As in the PC (U.S.A.), ECUSA parishioners elect their parish’s local governing 
board, known as the vestry. The number of vestry members depends on the size of the 
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local parish. Unlike the PC (U.S.A.), there is no office of elder. Vestry members take the 
place of the elders. Just as the presbytery is responsible for clergy ordination in 
Presbyterianism, so is the local bishop in episcopal polity.  Hence, all priests must meet 
with a bishop’s approval before being placed in a diocesan parish. Candidates must 
also incur the favor of the local vestry prior to installation, which is similar in 
arrangement to the Presbyterian procedure. The office of bishop assumes many of the 
presbytery’s jurisdictional roles. Just as the Presbyterian Church has the General 
Assembly to consider denominational policy at the national level, ECUSA convenes its 
triennial General Convention. The House of Bishops, as its name suggests, is 
comprised of the denomination’s active bishops. A presiding bishop is elected to lead 
this chamber. This bishop also has authority over the national church bureaucracy, 
including the General Council, comprised of bureaucrats serving as the church’s central 
authority when the General Convention is not in session.  
However, the presiding bishop is not like a Roman Catholic archbishop. S/he 
does not have jurisdiction over a specific diocese, nor does the presiding bishop have 
hierarchical authority over any diocesan bishop. The presiding bishop is truly a first 
among equals. The House of Deputies, which serves as the lower chamber of the 
General Convention, is comprised of deputations from each diocese, with each usually 
containing four to eight members. Membership is comprised of four lay and four clergy 
delegates. As with the U.S. Congress, both General Convention chambers must 
approve denomination policies by a majority vote in order for them to take effect. 
Though there are clear differences in their institutional structures, it is clear from this 
basic polity overview that ECUSA, much like the PC (U.S.A.), contains a very rich set of 
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institutional relationships that likely help to structure and incentivize the political 
preferences and behavior of ECUSA priests. 
   
ECUSA Controversies 
 While the PC (U.S.A.) is dominated by two major controversies—divestment and 
gay ordination, ECUSA’s continued institutional viability is wrapped up mainly in one—
human sexuality. Hence, while the divestment issue has some importance to ECUSA, 
the lion’s share of attention in the following discussion focuses on the sexuality debates 
taking place within the denomination. Relative avoidance of the divestment controversy 
occurred, in part, because ECUSA had the benefit of witnessing the negative publicity 
the PC (U.S.A.) received when it became the first mainline denomination to pursue  
divestment in 2004. As such, ECUSA managed to avoid following its Presbyterian 
brethren into the tricky waters of Middle East politics.   
In contrast, ECUSA’s struggle with sexuality issues is robust, and traces its roots 
to the denomination’s late nineteenth century identity transformation. The end of the 
Civil War, and the tremendous social, political, and economic changes created by the 
onset of industrial capitalism in the final decades of the nineteenth century, presented 
ECUSA with an opportunity to expand its ministry into the burgeoning urban areas. 
Ironically, ECUSA, which was the spiritual home to many “robber barons” of the era, 
opened parishes that catered to the flux of new immigrants seeking a better life in the 
New World. Some parishes even went so far as to offer services in the immigrants’ 
native languages (May 1949). Through the encouragement of reform-minded elites, 
ECUSA began to position itself as a champion of both economic justice and civil rights. 
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As it did so, however, the scope of social groups included under its civil rights agenda 
broadened. No longer were civil rights concerns limited to the right of racial minorities to 
vote. Women and homosexuals begged attention for equality of opportunity, political or 
otherwise. Having come a long way from its high church, patrician roots, ECUSA was 
poised to take up the cause of these newly recognized minorities.  
By the 1960s and 1970s, both American society and ECUSA were faced with 
serious challenges to conventional understandings of gender, social, sexual, and 
political norms. In response, ECUSA allowed women to serve as deputies for the first 
time at the 1967 General Convention. Importantly, that convention also approved 
women to serve as deacons and vestry members. In 1976, women became eligible to 
serve as priests (Lewis 2001). Having accorded women these institutional roles, the 
critical question confronting the denomination became whether sexually active 
homosexuals wishing to take part in church governance should also be allowed to do 
so. Unlike the gender controversy, human sexuality, and homosexuality in specific, are 
more complicated issues. This is because the primary characteristics of those in 
question—sexual preference and behavior—are not considered by some to be 
immutable. Since the medical and academic communities have not been of one mind 
concerning why some wish to engage in same sex behavior, the door is open for 
opponents to claim that homosexuality is actually a condition, and, as such, can be 
corrected (Rimmerman 2002). This was, in fact, the position of the American Psychiatric 
Association until it revised its views in the 1970s. Once behavioral scientists began to 
seriously consider the possibility that homosexual orientation could be an inherited trait, 
the socio-political battle lines were drawn (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 1997).  
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This was no truer than in the mainline Protestant churches, which, despite 
clinging to a basically orthodox view of homosexual behavior as sinful, sought to provide 
comfort and ministry to their gay parishioners. At the same time, politically conscious 
denominations, such as ECUSA, began to view civil rights issues from both a 
theological and political schema. Homosexuals, as the 1969 Stonewall riot helped 
crystallize, began to be seen as an oppressed group clearly in need of support from 
friendly institutions (D’Emilio 2000). Hence, the stage was set for decades of theological 
and political debate on just how inclusive ECUSA should be in terms of sexuality.  
Most of the institutional changes in ECUSA regarding homosexuality began at 
the 1976 General Convention. There, a group of Episcopalians, known as Integrity, 
began lobbying for the inclusion of gay Christians in positions of denominational 
leadership (Lewis 2001). On its face, Integrity’s position was not unusually radical, 
especially since ECUSA was already lobbying for gay civil rights protections. In addition, 
the truly thorny issue of 1976 was women’s ordination, which overshadowed whatever 
agenda Integrity was attempting to further. In an effort to gain publicity, and move the 
issue of gay rights within ECUSA to the fore, the Bishop of New York ordained a lesbian 
to the priesthood in 1977. This produced a sharp outcry throughout the denomination. 
So, the 1979 General Convention passed a resolution backing traditional marriage, and 
withheld its support of gay ordination (Sedgwick 1996). 
Though it did not have the effect of institutional enforcement, the 1998 Lambeth 
Conference was significant in its condemnation of homosexuality. ECUSA and its 
similarly-minded sister denominations in Canada and New Zealand were found to be 
largely out-of-step with the vast majority of Anglican primates, especially those 
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representing developing states in Africa. The African leaders took an especially 
conservative stance against homosexuals in the communion. Many of them stated 
publicly that gays must not only be kept from leadership roles, but must also repent of 
their sexual deviancy so as to avoid eternal punishment (Bates 2004).  
Matters were not helped by Newark Bishop John Shelby Spong’s presence at the 
conference. Spong’s full-throated advocacy for a reformulation of Christian doctrines 
made both liberals and conservatives uncomfortable (Bates 2004). Spong had 
previously suggested that “Unless theological truth can be separated from pre-scientific 
understanding of reality, the Christian faith will be reduced to one more ancient 
mythology that will take its place alongside the religions of Mount Olympus” (1991, 31). 
His perspective had not changed by 1998, and Spong was seen as a catalyst for the 
acrimony between Western and African bishops. However, in the end, the African 
archbishops and their conservative allies in the West, including Dallas Bishop James 
Stanton, carried the day. The conference passed a resolution that advised against the 
ordination of non-celibate gays and the blessing of their relationships.  
This brings the consideration back to the election of V. Gene Robinson as Bishop 
of New Hampshire in 2003. ECUSA conservatives were bolstered by their Lambeth 
gains, but were under no delusions that the ECUSA debate was over, especially given 
the strength of gay rights interests within the denomination. In response to Integrity and 
other similar advocacy groups, conservatives established the American Anglican 
Council in 1996. Its goal was to act as an organizing force for traditional ECUSA 
parishes and bishops. Both sets of interests were heavily lobbying for their preferred 
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outcome at the 2003 General Convention, where Robinson was elected by 
approximately a 2/3 majority in both houses (Bates 2004). 
 The response among ECUSA conservatives was swift. Almost immediately, 
primates in over twenty Anglican denominations declared that Robinson was not 
welcome in their territories. Several went so far as to break their official ties with ECUSA 
entirely. The Archbishop of Canterbury appealed to ECUSA to be sensitive to the 
responses from the other churches in the communion, while ECUSA conservatives 
mounted a response of their own. They organized the Anglican Communion Network, 
whose initial national meeting in Plano, Texas in 2003 was a widely covered media 
event. The conservatives’ efforts received public support from officials throughout 
Christendom, including then-Roman Catholic Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. Since most 
conservatives viewed the Robinson election as an event affecting not only the New 
Hampshire diocese, but all of ECUSA, the network members, led by Pittsburgh Bishop 
Robert Duncan, sought a program of alternative oversight by which conservative 
parishes might find relief from any backlash from what they considered to be apostate 
overseers (Bates 2004).   
   In response to the network’s request, the House of Bishops offered a program 
of Delegated Episcopal Pastoral Oversight, whereby the diocesan bishop could request 
that another bishop minister to alienated parishes. However, for many of the parishes 
concerned, the plan did not go far enough in offering institutional security. Under the 
plan, parishes would still remain under the oversight authority of their own, 
geographically designated, bishop, who could terminate the relationship with the outside 
bishop at any time. Very few parishes requested the plan due to its perceived 
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inadequacies. Given that the 2006 General Convention came and went without any type 
of apology for Robinson’s election, or a moratorium on the election of gay bishops 
(concessions that conservatives were looking for), it is not unreasonable to consider the 
possibility of denominational schism.  
However, much as with the PC (U.S.A.), the decision of individual parishes 
and/or dioceses to pull out of the denomination rests in large part on the status of parish 
and diocesan property. The Rt. Rev. Leo Iker, Bishop of the Diocese of Fort Worth, 
which is perhaps the most conservative in ECUSA, offered that “I think we could avert a 
schism and avoid more congregations departing . . . if a provision were to be made 
whereby conservative parishes could be transferred to conservative dioceses, but I do 
not see the establishment allowing this to happen. The institutional response to the 
crisis may force conservative dioceses to defy the canons in this regard” (Personal 
interview with Calfano 2006).   
Whether such an outcome would occur remains to be seen, especially since all 
parties involved would risk tremendous financial loss and formal disciplinary charges 
against the instigating bishops themselves, including Iker, Stanton, and Duncan. 
According to Iker, “A bishop may be brought up on charges before the House of 
Bishops for violating canons or for an open renunciation of the doctrine, worship and 
discipline of the church.  The case is heard before an ecclesiastical trial court, and if 
found guilty, the bishop may be deposed and removed from office. . . . I am aware that 
my opponents may well choose to pursue this option at some time in the future” 
(Personal interview with Calfano 2006). 
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ECUSA clergy are quite obviously subject to institutional crosspressures as it 
concerns gay rights and bishop oversight concerns. The exact nature of this 
crosspressure is part of ongoing developments. On June 27, 2006, The Dallas Morning 
News reported that Christ Church in Plano, Texas, the largest ECUSA congregation in 
the United States in terms of active members, was leaving the denomination (Weiss 
2006). This sets up an intriguing dynamic for both Bishop Stanton and Christ Church 
itself. As with PC (U.S.A.) congregations, ECUSA parish property is held in trust for the 
benefit of the entire denomination. A stumbling block for many parishes looking to leave 
ECUSA is that their diocesan bishop is not sympathetic to their reasons for wanting to 
do so, especially if it concerns the Robinson election. Hence, bishop discipline, ranging 
from a removal of the priest, to the parish community being physically locked out of the 
church by diocesan officials, can be implemented at any time.  
It only requires a cursory examination of the current controversies in both 
denominations to see that, from an institutional standpoint at least, ECUSA is in far 
more peril than the PC (U.S.A.). Indeed, when entire dioceses are scheduling votes on 
whether to depart from the denomination, as the Diocese of San Joaquin voted to do on 
December 2, 2006 (Burke 2006), it is clear that Episcopal clergy exist in a much more 
difficult set of institutional circumstances than their Presbyterian counterparts, at least 
for now. As such, it will be interesting to see whether systematic differences between 
how Episcopal clergy respond to their vestry and parishioners exist, and whether they 
are more likely to pursue strategic behavior to navigate these difficult professional 
circumstances.      
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Having delineated some of the most critical aspects of both Presbyterian and 
Episcopal polity, as well as the most controversial issues currently threatening the 
institutional health of both denominations, it is now possible to turn to a consideration of 
the theoretical explanations offered for clergy political preferences and behavior in the 
PC (U.S.A.) and ECUSA. Chapter 4 also helps to crystallize the theoretical expectations 
associated with the role that reference groups play in determining clergy preferences 
and behavior, while setting the stage for the research hypotheses explicitly tested in 




THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CLERGY  
POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND BEHAVIOR 
 
Chapter 3 details several instances in which denominational political 
controversies might make the job clergy have as institutional elites more difficult. Given 
the internecine conflict engulfing the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (PC (U.S.A.) and the 
Episcopal Church, USA (ECUSA), it is clear that clergy political behavior might carry a 
heavy price, at least in certain circumstances. This is because clergy, through their 
political behavior, may invite negative reactions from the reference groups with which 
they must regularly interact, and on which their professional well-being depends. 
Compounding the problem is the reality that clergy often hold strong ideological 
preferences, and seek to share these preferences with those around them (see 
especially Guth et al. 1997). These twin conditions set up a dynamic in which clergy 
may be forced to choose between expressing their sincerely held political preferences, 
and subordinating those preferences through strategic behavior. This chapter fleshes 
out the specific theoretical relationships between institutional influences and their effect 
on clergy.   
Recall that I ask three general theoretical questions to help tease out the causal 
influences behind clergy political preferences and behavior. First, in what ways do 
institutions, via their role as agents of socialization, implant enduring and sincerely held 
political preferences in clergy? Second, do institutions, through their role in generating 
social networks and points of group identification shape, over time, clergy preferences 
and behavior? Third, do institutions shape the incentive structure that confront clergy 
such that clergy are compelled to strategically adopt behavior that is consistent not with 
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their sincere political preferences, but with the preferences of the proximate reference 
groups that they encounter?   
To address these questions, I outlined three institutions-based theories in 
chapters 1 and 2. Two are drawn from the sociological institutionalism scholarship. The 
third is based on the rational choice literature. The first, reflecting the assumptions of 
sociological institutionalism, focuses on the role of educational institutions (specifically, 
seminary) as agents of clergy socialization. The theory assesses whether these 
institutions have formative and lasting impacts on clergy attitudinal development (Pillari 
and Newsome 1998; Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1987). The second theory follows 
Durkheim’s (1933) and Mosca’s (1939) discoveries concerning the salience of group 
identification in shaping member preferences. It assesses group influence in molding 
clergy preferences over time. Different from the first theory while remaining steeped in 
the sociological tradition, the second suggests that, as clergy contact time with their 
proximate reference groups increases, clergy will begin to take on the groups’ 
fundamental political preferences. In this respect, clergy preferences will conform more 
to influences found in their contemporary group settings than to the socializing effects 
from institutions of prior contact (i.e., seminary).  
The third theory considers institutions as constraining and incentivizing forces on 
clergy. These forces compel clergy to adopt strategic behavior that comports with the 
expectations of the proximate institutional reference groups that they encounter 
(Antonio 2004; Johnson et al. 2002; Alba and Moore 1978). The institutional constraint 
is represented by professional sanctions that reference groups can impose on clergy for 
not behaving in accordance with group preferences. Group sanctions include the denial 
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of professional advancement and well-being for clergy who do not behave in 
comportment with group expectations.  
The purpose of this chapter is to take the three theoretical questions and weave 
them into a causal explanation as to why clergy political preferences and behavior 
should be affected by both sociological and strategic factors. At the heart of this 
consideration are the institutional contexts that clergy encounter on a regular basis. 
These contexts consist primarily of the reference groups with which clergy interact. The 
importance of reference groups is based on the underlying neo-institutional 
assumptions of both the sociological and rational choice theories (Hall and Taylor 
1996). As such, I develop theory around the role that reference groups play in 
determining clergy political preferences and behavior.   
 
The Role of Reference Groups 
Institutional reference groups are theorized to play two types of roles regarding 
clergy preferences and behavior. According to the sociological perspective, groups 
shape the sincere preferences that clergy hold. Acting as points of reference, the 
groups hone clergy perception of their sincerely held preferences in relation to those 
held by the group. One group of particular professional importance is the seminary. It is 
a sociological context that represents a potentially long lasting institutional influence on 
clergy. As such, I characterize seminary’s anticipated role as an educational experience 
that has a significant and ongoing effect on clergy political preferences and behavior.  
As the Durkheim (1933) theory suggested, reference groups may also change 
clergy preferences over time. Specifically, longer exposure to these groups, and their 
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preferences, should have a significant influence on clergy by transforming their 
sincerely held preferences to match the groups’. However, a corollary of the 
socialization theory, and one that seems inherent in the notion that institutions socialize 
clergy preferences, is that reference group influence may shape clergy preferences 
even without time being a factor. Specifically, it may not take clergy a significant amount 
of time to sincerely adopt a reference group’s preferences. This might be especially the 
case if clergy have previously existed as political blank slates. Indeed, there may be no 
need for clergy to take on the characteristics of their relevant reference groups by 
updating existing beliefs, especially if such beliefs were non-existent in the first place.  
Arguably, the socializing function that reference groups play is far less 
controversial than their role in convincing clergy to subordinate their sincerely held 
preferences through strategic action. I suggest that any strategic behavior in which 
clergy engage can be attributed to a process-based outcome in which an environment 
of relevant actors and forces play distinct and influential roles. In this case, the process 
includes clergy assessment of whether behaving sincerely or strategically will provide a 
preferred professional outcome. Clergy who engage in strategic behavior are theorized 
to believe that said behavior is in their best interest professionally. I further theorize that 
reliance on strategic behavior depends on the perceived importance of specific groups 
to clergy in facilitating certain professional goals, including vocational security and 
professional advancement (Wald 2003). It is realistic to expect that if denominational 
polities present clergy with an array of reference groups with which they must cooperate 
to secure their professional well-being, clergy will find a way to simultaneously satisfy 
the differing expectations these groups have. I suggest two ways in which clergy might 
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do so. Both involve clergy assessment of relevant reference groups in an attempt to 
obtain information about the groups’ political preferences. The first involves clergy 
assessment of the relative ideological positions of specific groups in determining their 
behavior, and engaging in behavior that comports with group positions. The second is 
for clergy to gauge any group pressure to behave strategically in undertaking political 
behavior.  
Though there are multiple reference groups of institutional importance to clergy, I 
make the basic distinction between a clergy’s proximate and less proximate reference 
groups, and will maintain this distinction throughout the analysis chapters to follow. The 
proximate groups for clergy consist of their parishioners and their elected lay leaders on 
the session or vestry. The less proximate groups include those at the district 
supervisory level, specifically the presbytery and diocese. This leads to the question of 
why clergy should be concerned with preferences and pressures from multiple groups, 
and I borrow from Kingdon’s (1977) goal-oriented model of legislative behavior to 
provide explanation. I theorize that the pursuit of institutional goals functions as the 
causal mechanism behind clergy concern over group preferences and strategic 
pressure. Clergy will take group political preferences and strategic pressure into 
account in determining their political behavior because doing so allows them to pursue 
specific institutional goals.   
Importantly, there is substantial similarity between Kingdon’s goals of “satisfying 
constituents” (see also Mayhew 1974 and Fenno 1978), intra-institutional influence, and 
“good public policy” (246-247) and those that clergy may wish to achieve—namely, job 
security and denominational influence. That said, too much concern with the 
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preferences of one reference group might alienate others, especially if the mean 
ideological preferences between these groups is dramatically different. This will be 
problematic for clergy if the alienated group is in close proximity. Rational clergy will 
want to keep their most proximate reference groups (consisting of the laity and their 
elected leaders) satisfied as much as possible because clergy must interact with these 
groups on a regular basis. Given the collaborative relationship between lay leaders and 
clergy in both denominations, it is appropriate to refer to clergy concern with what these 
proximate groups prefer, and any strategic pressure they impose, as pursuit of the 
“collegial goal.” While both congregants and lay leaders jointly constitute the clergy’s 
most proximate reference groups, it is the lay leaders who are elected to operate the 
local churches in conjunction with clergy. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
clergy look to these lay leaders as colleagues in church affairs. Hence, maintaining 
good relationships with session elders in the PC (U.S.A.) and vestry members in 
ECUSA is of utmost professional importance for clergy.     
 Yet since clergy must also cultivate good relationships with less proximate 
groups, they will be concerned with the preferences of these groups as well. In so 
doing, clergy may be seen as pursing goals related to increased denomination 
influence, good denominational policy, or both. Since these “non-collegial” goals are 
successfully realized by effectively appealing to the views of their institutional 
supervisors, it is important for motivated clergy to calibrate their public political behavior 
according to their perception of what those in their presbyteries or dioceses might 
prefer. To not do so would likely mean that aspiring clergy wishing to move up the 
institutional ladder could be prevented from doing so.   
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I suggest that the important causal triggers in the strategic behavior decision for 
clergy are 1) differences between clergy and group political preferences, and 2) 
perceived pressure from these groups on clergy to behave strategically. Ideological 
differences between clergy and their most proximate reference groups may be found to 
push clergy into undertaking political behavior that is the opposite of what they sincerely 
prefer. If this is the case, clergy can be considered to be strategic actors as a result of 
reference group influence. I further theorize that the sociological and rational choice 
influences on clergy preferences and behavior are direct.  Figure 1 provides a visual 
depiction of the influence these factors have on clergy.   
 
FIGURE 1: 
Sociological Institutionalism:             Rational  Choice: 
Socialized preferences                              Strategic pressure from group   
 
             Clergy political preferences and behavior   
 
 
Reference group ideology          Reference group ideology  
  
Importantly, the direct relationships visually depicted in figure 1 suggest that 
reference groups play an essential role in determining clergy political preferences and 
behavior. However little, if anything, can yet be said about the direction of these effects. 
To fill this gap, I transition now to a consideration of preliminary data that evaluate the 
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role of reference groups as both socializing and strategic forces on clergy. It appears 
that in the PC (U.S.A.) and ECUSA, and mainline Protestantism more generally, clergy 
occupy a delicate institutional space between the laity’s general conservatism, and the 
general liberalism of denominational leaders (Tamney, Burton, and Johnson 1989). 
What remains to be unpacked concerning reference group influence is the degree to 
which clergy are aware that these groups represent important nodes of institutional 
influence over their professional conduct, and, as such, seek to maintain constructive 
relationships with them either through sincere or strategic behavior. The most 
appropriate way to lay the foundation for more elaborate testing of both theoretical 
frameworks is to first assess the basic perceptions that clergy have of the reference 
groups with which they interact. The issue at hand is not whether clergy are aware that 
they interact with specific reference groups, for this is a given of their professional 
responsibilities. Instead, the concern regards whether clergy are found to react to the 
groups in such a way that points to either sociological or strategic (or perhaps both) 
factors as influential on their political preferences and behavior.  
 
Group Influence on Clergy Preferences and Behavior: Interview Data 
The best way to explore the clergy-reference group relationship is to begin with 
an examination of clergy interview data. Obtaining a sense of how clergy perceive their 
reference groups of consequence is an important part of testing the sociological and 
strategic theories. In order to facilitate this assessment, I conducted a series of personal 
interviews with Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy between 2004 and 2005. All five 
clergy were senior pastors or rectors at churches in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. They 
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agreed to sit for interviews in the fall of 2004 and spring of 2005. Clergy and 
congregation names are not published in keeping with the wishes of each respondent 
and IRB guidelines. Though the interviewees are distinguished by their denominational 
affiliations, I suggest that an even more appropriate point of difference is the degree to 
which each appears affected by the sociological or strategic influence of their relevant 
reference groups.   
 The first interviewee can be considered affected by strategic influence. He was 
quite open about feeling constrained in expressing his “complete and true feelings” on a 
variety of issues—a sure indication that he perceives pressure from reference groups to 
behave strategically. This pastor chalked up his hesitation in expressing sincere 
preferences to the fear that doing so would significantly alienate portions of his 
congregation (Personal interview with Calfano 2004). For example, he believed that if 
he took a decisive position on the denomination’s gay ordination standard (he supports 
the current restrictions discussed chapter 3) it would please some in the congregation, 
while alienating others. The clergy predicted that by taking a public position on the 
issue, a good portion of his congregation would leave the church, reduce its monetary 
contributions and volunteer involvement, or some combination thereof. When asked 
why he thought this was a possibility, the clergy offered that he presides over a diverse 
congregation. Despite that the majority of his congregants hold conservative 
preferences, this clergy perceived enough diversity in both the congregation and 
session to make consensus building on controversial issues difficult. Given these 
institutional conditions, this clergy does not openly express his sincerely held 
preferences on gay ordination in the PC (U.S.A.).  
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At the same time, the clergy was asked whether he supports specific affinity (or 
interest) groups within the PC (U.S.A.). These groups, much like political interests in 
secular politics, lobby for particular changes in denominational policy, especially at the 
General Assembly level. As in secular politics, some groups are single-issue oriented, 
while others support a systematic agenda along an ideological dimension. The certain 
sign that this clergy is more of what Weston (1997) termed a loyalist in chapter 3 came 
in his response: “I view almost all affinity groups as schismatic. We are one 
Presbyterian Church, and there should be no effort to divide the denomination along 
policy lines” (Personal interview with Calfano 2004). These lines include topics ranging 
from relations with Israel to denominational divestment to gay rights.  
Finally, in terms of the influence of less proximate reference groups on his 
political positions, the clergy identified his presbytery as an “on-again, off-again” 
influence (Personal interview with Calfano 2004). Its salience depended on whether he 
believed that presbytery concerns were worth paying attention to on a particular issue. 
Though he discussed the liberal tendencies of the denomination’s bureaucracy, this 
clergy declined to mention that these leaders in any way influenced his political 
behavior. In sum, his responses reflect the institutional influence of three specific 
reference groups—his congregation, session, and presbytery. From what this clergy 
described,  both proximate and less proximate reference groups have a significant 
impact on his decision not to express sincerely-held political preferences. This 
constitutes evidence that reference groups may encourage strategic behavior among 
clergy.       
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The second Presbyterian interviewee made statements similar to first as it 
concerns choosing his public words carefully on controversial issues. Unlike the first 
interviewee, however, this clergy is a member of several conservative affinity groups 
within the PC (U.S.A.) (Personal interview with Calfano 2004). Despite his own 
conservative views, this pastor perceived his session as being even more politically 
conservative than he, a condition that reflects the findings of various denominational 
panel studies on the subject (PC (U.S.A.) Office of Research Services 2002; 2004; 
2006). As a conservative brandishing public credentials in several denominational 
interest groups, the clergy is cognizant that his preferences and conservative affiliations 
may cause problems with his reference groups. This might be why he admitted to 
choosing “his battles wisely” at session meetings (Personal interview with Calfano 
2004). If this is not an indication of strategic behavior, it is at least a reflection of the 
impact that reference groups have on clergy and their public behavior. So, as with the 
first clergy interviewee, anticipation of negative reference group reaction is a causal 
influence on behavior.  
The third Presbyterian clergy interviewed stands in contrast to the first two. First, 
he may be characterized as a liberal (Personal interview with Calfano 2005). Second, 
there is evidence that he undertakes behavior that is in accord with his socialized 
preferences. Importantly, and unlike the first two clergy, this third interviewee was less 
likely to hide his true preferences on political matters from his congregation and 
session. This might be due to the homogeneity of his particular church. Most of his 
congregants are openly gay, and the pastor tailors church ministries to serve this 
constituency. As such, he likely meets far less resistance in expressing his sincere, 
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generally liberal, views on an array of political issues. This is not to suggest that gay 
congregants are in lockstep with liberalism on all issues. It is, however, fairly safe to 
assume that because those electing to openly express a homosexual orientation 
challenge traditional notions of sexuality, they would be much more likely to lean toward 
political liberalism (Oldmixon 2005).   
Importantly, the liberal clergy identified both his seminary experiences (which 
neither of the previous subjects mentioned) and presbytery as important influences on 
his political preferences and behavior. This is interesting because the same presbytery 
licenses all three interviewees, and all agree that their presbytery generally takes liberal 
political stands (Personal interviews with Calfano 2004, 2005). However, the liberal 
pastor, unlike his counterparts, finds encouragement among like-minded actors in his 
reference groups of critical import. This suggests an influence on clergy preferences 
and behavior that reflects the institutional socialization of seminary, and, potentially, the 
socializing group effect outlined in the Durkheimian theory. In contrast, the first two 
clergy appear caught in the process of navigating the complex currents of dealing 
effectively with disparate reference groups. Each group represents a specific set of 
institutional responsibilities and ideological preferences, and each contributes to 
strategic behavior in these clergy. What is ironic about the liberal pastor is that his 
situation is somewhat anomalous in a denomination where clergy are systematically 
more liberal than their congregations and sessions (PC (U.S.A.) Office of Research 
Services 2002, 2004, 2006). In most PC (U.S.A.) congregations, the liberal pastor would 
be facing the same strategic pressures confronting his two counterparts.    
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Lest this consideration devolve into a one-sided assumption that clergy exist only 
to have their political preferences and behavior determined by institutional reference 
groups, it is important to note that all three PC (U.S.A.) interviewees stated that they try 
to find ways to influence the political views of their congregants and session colleagues 
(Personal interviews with Calfano 2004, 2005). Admittedly, this is much more difficult to 
do in the heterogeneous congregations headed by the first two clergy. However, that it 
remains a goal nonetheless adds an important dimension to the pastor-reference group 
relationship. It seems that clergy remain interested in shaping the views, political or 
otherwise, of their congregants and lay leader colleagues, even as clergy are, 
themselves, subject to reference group influence. 
Turning to the ECUSA interviews, it appears that the distinct sociological and 
strategic reference group effects influence clergy in that denomination as well. In 2004, I 
conducted an interview with one of the clergy leading a major Episcopal parish in the 
Dallas-Fort Worth region. During the interview, this clergy suggested that he and the 
parish were more than willing to leave ECUSA if circumstances dictated (Personal 
interview with Calfano 2004). He also expressed confidence that his local bishop would 
support this decision, in part, because this bishop did not support the Robinson election 
and, in this clergy’s words, “we have a good personal relationship with him” (Personal 
interview with Calfano 2004).  
According to the rector, his parish believes that it has more in common with 
conservative congregations in other denominations than it does with most other ECUSA 
parishes and bishops. As such, this clergy and his parish are willing to forge strong 
relationships with congregations they consider to be “partners in the mission of bringing 
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Christ’s good news to . . . the world” (Personal interview with Calfano 2004). An obvious 
boost to the rector’s confidence is the endorsement he receives from his proximate 
reference groups of critical import—the vestry and parishioners. Though an anomaly in 
a denomination with a generally liberal political posture, it is clear that the reference 
groups with which this clergy interacts reinforce his sincerely held preferences in a 
manner that reflects sociological influence. Indeed, he apparently has no motive to 
behave strategically given the overlap in preferences with his proximate groups.  
Of course, there are other parish clergy in ECUSA who do not function in these 
broadly supportive circumstances. An interview with a liberal clergy in the same diocese 
revealed that, in addition to the parishioners and vestry, a priest’s relationship with the 
bishop matters greatly (Personal interview with Calfano 2004). According to him, it is not 
important who holds the distinction of liberal and conservative in the relationship. 
Whenever leaders in the church differ on salient and volatile political issues, there is a 
need for the lower ranking official to behave strategically. This clergy stated that while 
he has never had a confrontation with his more conservative bishop directly, he has 
encountered certain “resistance” to some of his programmatic ideas for the parish from 
the bishop (Personal interview with Calfano 2004). The rector believes that he is in a 
difficult position as he tries to maintain a good relationship with his parishioners and 
vestry, many of whom are conservatives, while attempting not to draw negative 
attention from a conservative bishop. Interestingly, there is symmetry between the 
various reference groups of institutional importance to this clergy, but there is 
dissonance between the groups and his sincerely held political preferences.   
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Overall, these interviews are noteworthy in that they show that clergy in both 
denominations identify the need to be responsive to the perceived ideological 
predispositions of various institutional reference groups. It is striking that almost all 
respondents made mention of the importance of their most proximate reference 
groups—their congregants and lay leader colleagues, in affecting their political 
behavior. Also mentioned by these clergy was the influence of their less proximate 
groups, specifically those at the presbytery/diocesan level. Given their differences in 
proximity to clergy, it is possible that reference groups have different degrees of 
influence on clergy preferences and behavior. Those groups closest to the clergy in 
terms of proximity and frequency of contact are arguably more important because of 
these factors. One cannot forget, however, that chapter 3 describes a delicate 
relationship between both proximate and less proximate groups, and their unique 
institutional importance to clergy. Hence, all institutional reference groups should matter 
to clergy in some way, even as group effects may differ.  
Based on information from these interviews, it is possible to classify the direction 
of reference group effects. Since the rational choice theory deals strictly with clergy 
political behavior, and not the formation of preferences, figure 2 concentrates on the 
effect of both theoretical frameworks in determining clergy political behavior (with the 
assumption that institutional socialization has a direct and positive influence on clergy 
preferences). Given these interview data, it appears that reference groups can reinforce 
the clergy’s socialized political preferences, thereby suggesting a positive and 
symmetrical relationship between group preferences and clergy behavior. At the same 
time, and as was found in a majority of the interviews, reference groups pressure clergy 
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to modify their political behavior so that clergy behave in ways not in keeping with their 
sincere preferences. This indicates a negative group effect on clergy political behavior. 
Finally, and though it was not well represented in these interview data, it stands to 
reason that, under rational choice assumptions, differences between clergy and group 
political preferences have a negative influence on clergy behaving sincerely.   
 
FIGURE 2: 
Sociological Institutionalism:             Rational  Choice: 
Socialized preferences                              Strategic pressure from group   
                                        +                                                                _ 
       Clergy acting on sincerely held political preferenc es   
   
                                     +                                                                   _  
Reference group ideology          Reference group ideology  
  
Though we can now estimate the direction of group effects on clergy behavior, 
the next step is to better ascertain the mechanism by which clergy perceive group 
preferences and/or strategic pressure. From the interviews, it appears that clergy 
perceive signals from their reference groups to change the way they express their 
sincerely held preferences. However, it is not yet clear how clergy perceive these 
signals—do they approximate a cue, or is a more subtle reading of group ideology 
and/or strategic pressure involved? The next section aims to shed light on these 
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questions by assessing whether clergy rely on group cues in determining their political 
views.  
 
Group Cues and Clergy Goals 
The interview data suggest that clergy look to their relevant institutional reference 
groups as both strategic guides and sociological reinforcements for their existing 
preferences. The task in this section is to determine how clergy pick up on group 
expectations in the first place. At the heart of this examination is the possibility of clergy 
reliance on reference group cues. As stated previously, reference group influence on 
clergy conjures comparison to Kingdon’s (1977) model of legislative voting in which 
members of Congress function as goal seekers who rely on group cues to pursue 
specific outcomes.  
Though the analogy between members of Congress and mainline Protestant 
clergy is not entirely direct, I suggest that more similarity exists between the two than 
might be first assumed. For instance, clergy, like congressional representatives, must 
be concerned with how their core reference group constituents—those in closest 
proximity to them—evaluate their performance in office (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; 
Mann 1978; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Though 
congregants do not usually get to “re-elect” their clergy at specified intervals, most 
American Protestant denominations, including the PC (U.S.A.) and ECUSA, accord 
congregations, through the local session or vestry, the right to initiate clergy removal. 
The most provocative linkage between legislators and clergy is the latter’s potential 
reliance on group cues to determine their political preferences. Through the five 
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interviews, clergy demonstrated an awareness of reference group preferences, but it is 
not yet clear the extent to which clergy may go so far as to rely on group cues in 
developing their political views. 
The theoretical importance of group cues is based on the premise that cues 
provide clergy the information necessary to successfully navigate their professional 
responsibilities and pursue institutional goals. Depending on the circumstances, group 
cues may function as both sociological and strategic influences. This may be no more 
the case than with group socialization of clergy preferences over time (as suggested in 
the second sociological theory). For instance, if clergy hold vastly different preferences 
from the group, group cues may initially function as strategic guideposts. Yet as group-
to-clergy socialization occurs, the cues may actually begin to inform clergy preferences, 
thereby becoming sociological in nature. However, if the sociological process is 
incomplete—meaning that clergy and group preferences are closer than before but not 
completely in sync, cues may vacillate between functioning as both sociological and 
strategic influences. 
 Because of the ambiguity of their influence, I suggest that the best way to 
discern when group cues may function as strategic forces is to look for instances where 
clergy rely on cues from both their more and less proximate reference groups. The point 
here is not that reliance on single group cues necessarily discounts a strategic 
influence, only that it is more difficult to distinguish between sociological and strategic 
effects on clergy with a single group cue. By contrast, clergy reliance on multiple group 
cues, especially from groups in different institutional locations, moves more toward the 
strategic explanation. This is because, based on existing denominational panel studies 
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(PC (U.S.A.) Office of Research Services 2002, 2004, 2006) and the interview data 
presented above, the proximate and less proximate reference groups clergy encounter 
often hold opposing ideological preferences. Therefore, it would be difficult to conclude 
that clergy look to multiple groups to develop their sincerely held preferences when the 
groups themselves possess vastly different views. Realistically, the group holding 
preferences furthest from the clergy’s should be the one that clergy deal with 
strategically. Clergy should change their political behavior to suit this group, while 
keeping their sincerely held preferences intact, perhaps with the assistance of cues 
from the group with which they are in greater ideological agreement.     
Before moving to a consideration of clergy reliance on multiple group cues, it is 
important to assess whether clergy admit to using reference group cues in the first 
place. The surveys conducted for this dissertation asked respondents to identify which, 
if any, professional reference groups they rely on to determine their “public political 
views.” Admittedly, there may be some perceived difference between one’s political 
“views” and “positions,” especially if views may be kept private. However, that the 
survey item inquires about a respondent’s “public” views means that the preferences 
must be expressed, and, therefore, constitute a form of behavior. This should alleviate 
any problems with the survey word choice.    
Respondents were instructed to list up to three reference groups on whose 
political cues they rely. There were five groups from which clergy could pick. These 
were the seminary clergy attended, denominational bureaucrats, congregants, their 
presbytery or bishop, and their session or vestry. When a respondent identified cue 
reliance on a particular group, that group was coded “1.” Table 1 provides the initial 
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breakdown of the percentage of respondents who listed each of the five reference 
groups. Respondents may be counted more than once in these tables because of their 
latitude in listing more than one group.  
 
TABLE 1:  Frequency Distribution for Clergy Relianc e on Reference Group Cues 
(Expressed as Percentages)           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 389) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 454) 
Seminary  10 23 
National Bureaucrats  21 28 
Congregants  22 19 
Presbytery/Bishop 17 45 
Session/Vestry  51 43 
 
 Certain differences manifest between Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy.  By far, 
Presbyterians rely the most on their session colleagues in developing their public 
political views. A healthy number also indicate taking cues from their presbytery and 
denominational bureaucrats. Episcopal priests are also reliant on their proximate 
reference group colleagues, but a slightly higher percentage take cues from their local 
bishop. This suggests that both a clergy’s proximate and less proximate reference 
groups are important political influences, as the interview data suggested they would be. 
This evidence of cue taking is, in itself, a novel addition to the clergy politics literature, 
as no existing studies have asked clergy about this aspect of their relationship with 
institutional reference groups.  
Yet it is not clear whether cue reliance tells us anything about the institutional 
pressures at work on clergy. Neither does it indicate whether the cues are specifically 
sociological or strategic influences. As stated, it is reasonable to expect that in order for 
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cue reliance to indicate strategic behavior, clergy should be found to use cues from 
reference groups in different institutional locations. The general liberal/conservative 
ideological distinctions between one’s proximate and less proximate groups should 
introduce competing ideological crosspressures that would be impossible for clergy to 
resolve by sincerely adopting both groups’ preferences.  
In order to assess whether clergy rely on cues from multiple reference groups, I 
run a series of tabulations that compare every combination of group cues that 
respondents listed. I also include a coefficient for Fisher’s Exact Test, which is a 
measure of association similar to Pearson’s r, but is more appropriate for items with 
expected values below ten. The various group cue parings, and the p value for Fisher’s 
test of association, are listed in table 2. The numerical counts represent the percentage 
of instances where respondents indicated that they rely on cues from both groups in the 
pair. Highlighted pairs show reference groups with expectedly distinct ideological 
preferences, and are instances in which clergy might engage in strategic behavior to 










 TABLE 2:  Frequency Distribution of Group Cue Pairs  (Expressed as Percentages 
with Fisher’s Exact Test p Value) 
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 389) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 454) 
Seminary & Session/Vestry Cues 02 (.000) 09 (.500) 
Bureaucrat & Session/Vestry Cues  01 (.000) 12 (.090) 
Congregation & Session/Vestry Cues 10 (.230) 11 (.090) 
Presbytery/Bishop & Session/Vestry 02 (.000) 17 (.540) 
Seminary & Bureaucrat Cues  01 (.130) 05 (.200) 
Seminary & Congregation Cues  N/A 01 (.000) 
Seminary & Presbytery/Bishop Cues 02 (.480) 07 (.010) 
Congregation & Bureaucrat Cues 02 (.000) 06 (.290) 
Congregation & Presbytery/Bishop 09 (.000) 08 (.300) 
Presbytery/Bishop & Bureaucrat 02 (.050) 07 (.000) 
 
 Across most of these pairings, the Fisher’s coefficient is highly significant for the 
Presbyterian respondents, but is not so for the Episcopals. Hence, for some 
Presbyterian clergy at least, the possibility exists that reliance on cues from groups in 
both proximate and less proximate locations creates strategic pressure on clergy 
(although the existence of pressure cannot be directly confirmed by this test). 
Unfortunately, the relative numbers of clergy claiming cue reliance on any group pair is 
quite small, especially for Presbyterians. The largest percentage is in the ECUSA 
column, with 17% of respondents claiming dual cue reliance on both their bishop and 
vestry. While this is intriguing, it still represents less than 1/5 of ECUSA respondents.  
The lack of evidence of reliance on multiple group cues raises the possibility that 
clergy are not subject to institutional crosspressures brought on by distinct reference 
groups. This might also mean that clergy are less likely to be motivated to behave 
strategically. Yet reference groups are not necessarily unimportant because there is 
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limited evidence that clergy rely on multiple group cues. This section of the chapter has 
shown that the majority of Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy rely on cues from at least 
one reference group. This, in itself, suggests that clergy are willing to take group 
concerns into account when developing their public political views. What table 2 
demonstrates is that clergy are unwilling, or perhaps unable, to provide a detailed 
ranking of the group cues on which they rely. There may be any number of reasons for 
this, not the least of which might be the clergy’s own lack of recognition that they 
intentionally take cues from the reference groups with which they interact. In fact, none 
of the interviewees explicitly suggested that they rely on group cues to determine their 
political preferences or behavior. They did, however, mention a general awareness of 
their key groups’ ideological preferences. Hence, it might be that when asked about 
cues, clergy are willing to identify a single group, but are hesitant to list multiple groups 
because they do not think in terms of multi group cues.   
  In order to effectively isolate cue reliance as strategic and/or sociological 
influences on clergy, models controlling for clergy and reference group ideology would 
be necessary. However, the propriety of using the multiple cue variables in any 
statistical model is in question when so few respondents indicate multiple cue reliance. 
Coupled with the limitations of the cue measure itself (i.e., it is not clear how 
respondents use the cue, even if they admit to relying on it), an alternative approach to 
testing for the sociological and strategic influences of reference groups on clergy is 
needed. As such, I focus on more indirect clergy assessments of group expectations. 
These indirect measures are based on clergy perception of reference group ideology, 
and the pressure to undertake strategic behavior. Ideology and the perception of 
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strategic pressure are potentially more fruitful measures in that they focus specifically 
on clergy perception of group characteristics. In order to begin teasing out the 
influences that these indirect measures of group influence may have, chapter 5 
introduces a series of models designed to assess whether institutions and reference 
groups effectively socialize clergy into holding specific political preferences. The chapter 
begins with a summary description of the survey instruments used to collect data from 




















THE SOCIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CLERGY POLITICAL PREFERENCES  
 
As indicated in chapters 1 and 2, my goal is to ascertain the role that institutions 
play in determining clergy political preferences and behavior. The extant literature has 
found clergy political preferences to be the dominant player in determining behavior. In 
contrast, we know little about the role that reference groups and/or strategic influence 
may play in the process. In order to test for a possible reference group or strategic 
effect on clergy, the following two chapters 1) assess the role that institutions play in 
creating clergy political preferences and behavior, and 2) evaluate whether various 
clergy-reference group interactions create incentives for clergy to behave in ways that 
depart from their sincerely held preferences.  
In this chapter, I address the first two major research questions outlined in 
chapter 1. Specifically, I assess whether institutions, through their role as socialization 
agents, implant enduring and sincerely held political preferences in clergy. Second, I  
evaluate whether institutions, via their role in generating social networks and points of 
group identification, shape, over time, clergy political preferences. Drawing from the 
sociological framework, I develop models that enable the teasing out of institutional 
influences on clergy preferences. The primary dependent variables in this chapter’s 
models measure clergy political preferences both generally, and on two issues of 
political importance for the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (PC (U.S.A.) and the Episcopal 
Church, USA (ECUSA). However, prior to moving to the empirical discussion, I discuss 
the survey instruments used to test the theoretical propositions.  
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Surveying the Clergy 
Two original surveys have been employed to collect data from Presbyterian and 
Episcopal clergy. The first survey was directed at congregational ministers in the PC 
(U.S.A.), with the second for parish priests in ECUSA. The Presbyterian clergy surveys 
were developed with the generous assistance and collaboration of the denomination’s 
Office of Research Services. PC (U.S.A.) researchers provided detailed input into how 
to strengthen survey design and delivery techniques so as to maximize response rates 
from this specialized population. Their input has assisted the development of question 
wording and survey layout, both of which are important in order to achieve as high a 
response rate as possible. Though ECUSA has a far less developed research services 
department, the vast similarity between the denominations’ polity, and the surveys 
themselves, helps to ensure the quality of the ECUSA instrument.  
In seeking to maximize responses, I relied on two methods of instrument 
distribution. The most obvious, and traditional, was the mail-based approach. In order to 
make the data gather process more technologically sophisticated and efficient, I also 
deployed Internet-based versions of both surveys. Though Internet surveys are 
becoming more common in political research, the requirement of computer hardware, 
an Internet connection, and a basic level of competence in operating Internet software, 
contribute to a moderately high possibility of selection bias among clergy respondents. 
This possibility is especially apparent when considering that the PC (U.S.A.) national 
office in Louisville, Kentucky, does not have an e-mail address for approximately 30% of 
the denomination’s congregations! As such, the congregational clergy survey for both 
denominations is administered through a combination of regular mail and Internet 
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survey formats, or what Parackal (2000) referred to as the hybrid approach. Parackal 
found that data collection using this hybrid strategy compensates for response biases, 
and actually improves the overall response rate compared to the use of a single 
collection method alone.   
The most recent nation-wide survey of PC (U.S.A.) congregational clergy was 
Weston’s 2000-2001 effort as part of the Cooperative Clergy Project (see Smidt 2004). 
Weston, after various follow-ups, obtained a final response rate of 41%. His 
methodology relied on a random sample of 1,000 PC (U.S.A.) ministers taken from the 
total population (at that time) of the roughly 8,700 denomination ministers holding a 
congregational post. I follow Weston’s basic approach with certain modifications. First, 
the clergy samples drawn here are based on a stratified random sample that accounts 
for differences in local church membership. The vast majority of PC (U.S.A.) 
congregations are not “mega” churches. Owing to the denomination’s historically rural 
roots, around 70% of the PC (U.S.A.) congregations have a membership of 375 or less 
(and 40% have less than 250 members). Of course, this says nothing of weekly 
attendance rates, which are often lower than the official membership figures (PC 
U.S.A.) Office of Research Services 2002). 
Given the centrality of theories in this research pertaining to clergy interaction 
with their proximate institutional reference groups, it is necessary to account for 
systematic, size-based distinctions between congregations so as to control for size 
differences within the reference groups themselves. In this case, the size of one’s 
proximate reference groups would be best controlled through the stratified sample. This 
is important because it is quite possible that clergy in larger congregations, where 
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greater size might mean increased heterogeneity among the congregants and session, 
will perceive any reference group influence quite differently from those leading much 
smaller congregations. Another departure from Weston’s methodology is found in the 
drawing of the stratified random sample from the existing population of PC (U.S.A.) 
congregations (as provided by the denomination’s Office of Research Services). 
Weston created his sample from a published denominational directory of Presbyterian 
ministers. However, there are inherent benefits in drawing from the congregational list. 
The most obvious concerns the possibility that ministers may have moved from their 
listed positions between the time of the directory’s publishing and survey distribution. 
Sending the survey to specific churches alleviates this problem, and helps to increase 
the response rate.  
Regarding ECUSA, it is interesting that despite the denomination’s internecine 
political controversies, scholars have been slow to study ECUSA priests. The most 
recent, and perhaps only, Episcopal clergy survey came from the Djupe/Gilbert 
scholarship in 2002/2003, which garnered a 31% response rate (although their original 
sample size was 3,000, thereby increasing their potential n threefold over Weston’s). 
Djupe and Gilbert, like Weston, employed a mail survey that was not stratified according 
to parish size. Hence, this survey of ECUSA clergy represents one of the few conducted 
on this population, and the only to employ the stratified approach. 
The initial round of mail-based surveys for PC (U.S.A.) clergy was distributed to 
respondents on the third week of April 2006. Clergy were mailed a paper copy of the 
survey, which included a self-addressed, stamped return envelope. Clergy on the list 
with e-mail addresses were also e-mailed an electronic link to complete the survey on-
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line, if they so desired. A series of postcard and e-mail reminders were sent to 
respondents on the second week of May 2006, with a second full wave of paper and 
electronic surveys sent to those who had yet to reply on the fourth week of May 2006.  
The first round of ECUSA surveys was distributed the last week of September 2006, 
with follow-up reminders sent out the second week of October 2006. A second full wave 
of surveys was sent in the last week of October to respondents who had not replied.  
In keeping with the University of North Texas Institutional Review Board 
standards, all clergy respondents were anonymous to me. Clergy identity was especially 
guarded because I was relying on congregational mail and e-mail lists with clergy name 
identification deleted. In order to reduce the possibility of respondents returning two 
surveys (one paper, one electronic), respondents were tracked for their participation 
according to their church or parish zip code. While this approach is not as accurate as 
assigning a generated response number to each survey, this zip code tracking method 
provides the respondent a greater sense of anonymity. Follow-up post-card and e-mail 
reminders were sent to those congregations with zip codes not matching codes on the 
returned surveys. Given the sample’s stratified basis, few congregations and parishes 
share zip codes. This cut down on the number of erroneously sent reminder cards, and 
made the respondent tracking system generally effective. The rate of usable responses 
for the clergy surveys (as of April 2007) is just over 38% for the PC (U.S.A.) ministers, 
and slightly over 45% for ECUSA priests. Though one would like the highest response 
rates possible, these are well in line with what is expected for anonymous surveys 
(Weisberg, Krosnick, and Bowen 1996). With the specifics of the survey instruments 
delineated, I turn attention to the development of the research hypotheses that will test 
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the role institutions play in forming, and perhaps altering over time, clergy political 
preferences. 
 
Clergy Political Preferences: The Roots of Liberalism 
Until now, clergy political preferences have been treated as a generic item. In this 
section, I focus on clergy preferences in the form of liberal ideology. Drawing from 
chapter 2’s discussion of institutions as nodes of educational and socializing import, I 
offer two primary and contending hypotheses concerning the development of liberal 
preferences in clergy. The first focuses on seminary’s socializing influence. As the 
literature suggests, seminary is the most important institution in terms of clergy 
professional development. (McKinney and Finke 2002). Unfortunately, studies have not 
assessed whether seminary represents a deliberately selected, ongoing influence on 
clergy once they leave the institution and assume professional responsibilities. While all 
Presbyterian and Episcopal respondents have attended seminary as part of their 
mandatory training, it is not necessarily a given that seminary alums look to their 
educational experiences for contemporary guidance. Since seminary is generally 
presumed to be a liberalizing influence on mainline clergy preferences (Roof and 
McKinney 1987), I link contemporary clergy reliance on seminary to their current 
political preferences by hypothesizing 
H1: The more clergy indicate that their seminary experience serves as a guide 
for their current political preferences, the higher the level of clergy liberalism. 
Hypothesis two focuses on more recent, and proximate, sociological influences, 
in particular the influence of proximate reference group ideology on clergy. As Key 
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(1961) and Hollander (1958, 1964) found, reference groups enjoy conforming influence 
over their members, especially when group proximity to the member is high and 
interaction is frequent. It is, therefore, logical to examine the effect that group ideology 
might have as a socializing effect on clergy political preferences. Specifically, the 
general ideological disposition of the clergy’s most proximate colleagues—the board of 
lay leaders in both Presbyterian and Episcopal churches—is suggested to have a 
contextual influence on clergy political liberalism.   
H2: Increased political liberalism among the clergy’s proximate reference groups 
produces higher levels of liberal preferences in clergy.  
Hypothesis 2 is focused on reference group ideology as a general sociological 
influence independent of the Durkheim (1933) theory concerning change in clergy 
preferences over time. This is because group ideology may have a socializing effect on 
clergy irrespective of the longevity of their relationship with the group. However, 
statistical indication that clergy contact time with their proximate reference groups is a 
significant influence on clergy liberalism will be taken as evidence to support Durkheim’s 
theory (the second of the two sociological theories considered). Another necessary 
qualifier when discussing reference group preferences throughout the rest of this 
dissertation is that all preference measures are the product of clergy perception only. In 
other words, there is no independent measure of group preferences independent of how 
Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy perceive them. Since this is a study of clergy and 
their perception of specific institutional reference groups, these perception-based 
measures are actually of greater usefulness than a more objective measure would be 
(although, ideally, one would have both types of group measures for comparison).  
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 are potentially contending. Both purport to have a direct 
influence over clergy liberalism, even though one sociological agent (the seminary) is 
situated in past experiences, while the others represent current contextual forces. 
Despite being sociological in nature, it is not clear that these different influences should 
work in tandem in contributing to clergy liberalism. In fact, there may be a crowding out 
effect in which clergy are so strongly influenced by either their seminary or proximate 
reference group ideologies that the other sociological actor is pushed out of the causal 
picture. 
 
    Variables and Data 
The dependent variable for the first model determining the sociological causes of 
clergy liberalism is a generic measure of clergy political preferences. It is taken from a 
survey item that asked respondents to identify their current political views: worded as 
“my current political preferences are.” Responses were ranked on a 1-7 scale, with “1” 
representing “strongly conservative” and “7” “strongly liberal.” Table 3 examines the 
clergy liberalism variable according to its arithmetic mean and frequency distribution 








TABLE 3:  Arithmetic Mean and Frequency Distributio n for Clergy Liberalism 
(Expressed as Percentages) 
           
1-7 Scale with “7” “Strongly liberal” PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 387) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 508) 
Arithmetic Mean 4.61 5.18 
“1” Strongly Conservative  05 04 
“2”  13 03 
“3” 10 05 
“4” 14 14 
“5” 19 24 
“6” 26 35 
“7” Strongly Liberal 14 15 
  
It is clear from the means and percentages that ECUSA priests are generally 
more liberal than their Presbyterian counterparts. However, for clergy in both 
denominations, the majority of respondents associate themselves with a 5, 6, or 7 on 
the ordinal scale. This suggests that these mainline clergy are generally liberal 
politically. In table 4, I include a comparison of mean preferences between Presbyterian 
and Episcopal clergy and their relevant institutional reference groups. Reference group 
preference measures are based on respondent perceptions of how liberal or 
conservative the groups are compared to their own preferences. In other words, group 
appraisals are relative to where clergy stand in terms of their own liberal or conservative 
political preferences. The reference group preference measures are derived from a 
survey item that asked respondents whether each of the three reference groups in 
question (congregants, lay leaders, and presbytery/bishop) are “more politically 
conservative/liberal than I am.” As with the clergy preference measure, responses were 
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arranged along a 1-7 scale, with “1” representing “more conservative and “7” “more 
liberal.” The table also includes the standard deviation for each mean. 
 
TABLE 4:  Arithmetic Means and Standard Deviations for Key Reference Group 
and Clergy Political Preferences 
           
1-7 Scale with “7” “Strongly liberal” PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 387) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 508) 
 





Session/Vestry Political Preferences 3.46 (1.18) 3.68 (1.03) 
Congregation/Parish Political 
Preferences 3.29 (1.21) 3.89 (1.13) 
Presbytery/Bishop Political 
Preferences 4.09 (1.74) 5.92 (1.21) 
 
Data from both clergy surveys confirm the basic findings of existing 
denominational studies as referenced in Chapters 2 and 3: clergy are generally more 
liberal than their more proximate groups, and are generally as or less liberal than those 
in their less proximate groups. Specifically, ECUSA clergy had a mean ideology of 5.18 
on the seven-point scale (with 7 representing “very liberal”), while their assessment of 
vestry ideology was 3.68, and parishioners a 3.89. ECUSA priests considered their 
bishops more liberal than themselves, with a mean assessment of 5.92. Presbyterian 
clergy had a mean self-evaluation of 4.61. They showed a mean assessment of their 
sessions’ ideology at 3.46, and their congregations’ at 3.29. PC (U.S.A.) ministers view 
their presbyteries as a bit less liberal than themselves, with a mean assessment of 4.09.  
The importance of these mean comparisons is first to show the general 
evaluations clergy give to themselves and their relevant reference groups. The second 
is to confirm that clergy tend to hold a middle ideological ground, with their more 
 83 
proximate reference groups holding more conservative preferences, and less proximate 
groups generally more liberal ones (with the slight exception of the presbyteries). In 
order to strengthen the case that these differences systematically impact clergy 
preferences, I test for the statistical significance of differences between the means. To 
do so, I run an ANOVA test. Reference group means are statistically disguisable from 
the clergy means if the “Prob > F” value produced by the test is lower than .05. As table 
5 shows, the means between reference group and clergy preferences are statistically 
significant for all test pairs save Presbyterian ministers and their session colleagues.    
 
TABLE 5:  Difference of Means Test between Clergy a nd Reference Group 
Preferences (ANOVA) 
           
Clergy Preferences  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 387) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 490) 
 F (Prob > F) F (Prob > F) 
Session/Vestry Political Preferences 1.51 (.186) 16.46 (.000) 
Congregation/Parish Political 
Preferences 3.19 (.008) 11.48 (.000) 
Presbytery/Bishop Political 
Preferences           20.23 (.000)   4.16 (.003) 
Root MSE 1.43 1.66 
Adjusted R-Squared  .29 .18 
 
Model 1, which explicitly tests hypotheses 1 and 2, includes several independent 
and control variables.  
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry: The first primary independent variable is 
seminary influence in determining clergy liberalism. This variable is taken from a survey 
 84 
item that asked respondents whether “I draw on the values and education received in 
seminary to guide my conduct as a minister/priest.” Responses were coded on a 1-7 
scale, with “1” representing “disagree strongly” and “7” “agree strongly.”   
 
Clergy Perception of Session/Vestry and Presbytery/Bishop Preferences: 
Considering the theorized importance at the end of chapter 4 of reference group 
preferences as indirect influences on clergy, it is necessary to incorporate potential 
effects from various groups of institutional importance in these models. Arguably, the 
most important are clergy perceptions of the political ideology of both the congregational 
lay leaders (representing proximate reference groups), and those in the presbytery or 
diocese to which clergy belong (representing a less proximate reference group). The 
operationalization for these variables was discussed in reference to table 3.  
Though the ANOVA test contains a separate survey item for clergy perception of 
congregation/parish ideology, lay leader and congregant preferences are found to 
correlate at .7, while the next highest correlation is .38 (most other variables correlate at 
.1 and lower). This high correlation is expected given the representative nature of 
Presbyterian and Episcopal polities. Since parishioners select local lay leaders in both 
denominations, one should anticipate a strong similarity between how clergy perceive 
parishioner and lay leader political preferences. Because lay leaders are charged with 
making local decisions on behalf of parishioners, and to avoid multicollinearity, only the 




Clergy Sex: Given that females have had a comparatively difficult time gaining 
access to the clergy ranks, and based on the work of Olson (2000) and Olson et al. 
(2005) that found female clergy to be significantly more liberal than their male 
counterparts, I include clergy sex as a control, which is coded “1” if clergy are female.  
 
Years as Clergy; Years in Current Church; Average Sunday Attendance:  I also 
use three variables to evaluate the impact of several contextual influences on the 
clergy. These are 1) the length of time clergy have been ordained ministers in their 
denominations, 2) the number of years clergy have served in their current church, and 
3) the average number of parishioners who attend Sunday morning services. It is not 
clear that any of these variables contribute to clergy liberalism. Yet they are necessary 
inclusions in the models since they provide context concerning clergy institutional 
service.   
 
Session/Vestry Preferences * Years in Church: Also incorporated is an 
interaction term that links session and vestry preferences with the number of years 
clergy have spent in their current local church. This is in an effort to tap the socialization 
over time possibility—the second of the two sociological research questions—
expressed in Durkheim (1933) and Mosca’s (1939) research. The expectation is that as 
clergy spend longer amounts of time with their proximate group colleagues, their 
political preferences will begin to take on those of the session or vestry. 
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Served in Denominational Legislature: Finally, I include a variable that connects 
clergy preferences with their experience serving, albeit temporarily, in their 
denomination’s legislature. Based on Wald (2003) and Ammerman’s (1981) findings 
that higher placed denominational elites are politically liberal, I suggest that clergy who 
have official contact with these elites through service in denominational legislatures 
have a higher likelihood of adopting liberal political preferences themselves. This 
indicator is based on a survey question that asked respondents if they previously served 
in the denominations’ legislative bodies: the General Assembly (for Presbyterians) or 
the House of Deputies (for Episcopals). Affirmative responses are coded “1.”  
The first pair of models testing hypothesis 1 and 2 are located in table 6. Since 
the dependent variable consists of an ordinal scale, I use ordered probabilistic 
regression analysis. Since probit coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as to the 
magnitude of their effect on the dependent variable, I have calculated predicted 
probabilities as measures of marginal effects using King’s Clarify program. The 
probabilities are derived as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of 
respondents being in the most liberal political preference category on the scale (a “7”). 
Probabilities are calculated only for statistically significant independent variables in each 
model, with all other variables held at their means. The baseline probability is the mean 
value for category “7” of the dependent variable (King 1989). Since these are survey 
data, I use the Huber-White estimator in calculating robust standard errors, which helps 




TABLE 6: Determining Clergy Liberalism  
           
Clergy Liberalism  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
   β (SE) PP
4 
 
 β5 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry         .137*** (.030) .14 .182*** (.041) .05 
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences    .322*** (.038) .38        -.078 (.041)  
Session/Vestry Preferences -.057 (.070)   .312** (.105) .13 
Clergy Sex      .421** (.143) .22 .191 (.137)  
Served in Denom. Legislature      .247* (.128) .05 .160 (.107) 
Years as Minister/Priest  .008 (.005)    .015*** (.004) .06 
Years in Current Church  -.0003 (.0002)  .097 (.061)  
Average Sunday Attendance  -.0004 (.0002)  -.001***(.0001) .62 
Session/Vestry * Years in Church .005 (.006)   -.033 (.016)  
Baseline Probability .117 .028 
Wald Chi2 140.12 112.56 
Prob > Chi2 .0000 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -616.057 -703.086 
 
Immediately obvious from these results is that clergy reliance on seminary to 
guide their current professional ministry is strongly and positively associated with clergy 
liberalism. The seminary coefficients in both models are signed positive, and are 
significant at .000. The predicted probabilities show that the likelihood of liberal 
preferences in clergy relying on seminary increases by .14 for Presbyterians and .05 for 
Episcopals. In addition to confirming hypothesis 1, these findings also confirm the role 
of institutions as socializing agents, which affirms the first sociological theory and 
                                            
4 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure is 
calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
5 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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research question. Given seminary’s unique role in clergy professional development, 
these results serve to enhance our understanding of seminary and its effect on the 
American clergy. As stated, no research has attempted to connect seminary influence 
with contemporary political preferences. The findings from table 6 provide this linkage.  
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the relationship between reference group and clergy 
preferences, and posits that as proximate group ideology moves to the clergy’s left, 
clergy preferences will follow suit. This relationship represents a sociological 
phenomenon based on reference group influence. Importantly, the hypothesis 
distinguishes between the influence of more and less proximate reference groups. It is 
the group closest to clergy—their lay leader colleagues—that are presumed to have 
causal influence on clergy preferences. However, and as the results in table 6 suggest, 
it is actually both the proximate and less proximate groups that have a significant effect. 
In the Presbyterian model, it is the less proximate reference group—the presbytery—
that functions as the causal force. Conversely, ECUSA priests are affected by their lay 
leader colleagues on the vestry, thereby affirming the proximate group’s importance.  
The positive and significant (at .000) coefficient for the presbytery preference 
indicator shows an increase in likelihood of .38 that as presbytery liberalism increases, 
so do clergy preferences. On the Episcopal side, the positive and significant (at .01) 
coefficient indicates an increased likelihood of .13 that greater vestry liberalism 
increases clergy liberalism. Hence, increased group liberalism begets increased clergy 
liberalism. Though they only partially comport with the hypothesized relationship 
between proximate group and clergy preferences, these findings confirm the causal and 
sociological importance of institutional reference groups in determining clergy liberalism.  
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Interestingly, the professional goals outlined in Chapter 4 anticipated the 
importance of these less proximate groups on clergy preferences. The influence of 
these less proximate groups suggests clergy pursuit of intra-institutional influence 
and/or the development of “good” denominational policy. Since Ammerman (1981) and 
Wald (2003) have identified a general overlap between the preferences of mainline 
clergy and their denominational superiors , it is not surprising that sociologically based 
influence between clergy and less proximate groups should exist.  
There are several control variables that return significance. The first is the clergy 
sex variable in the Presbyterian model. Its coefficient is positive and significant (at .01), 
and the predicted probabilities show that female clergy have an increased likelihood of 
.22 of holding liberal political preferences. This finding is in line with Olson et al.’s (2005) 
conclusion that female clergy are generally more liberal than their male counterparts 
(although the authors were not able to actually compare their results with data from 
male clergy). Without delving too much into the argument that the nature of female 
socialization leads to their increased political liberalism, it seem that such is the case 
with female Presbyterian ministers.  
 Also significant in the Presbyterian model is clergy service in the denominational 
legislature. The positive and significant  (at .01) coefficient shows that PC (U.S.A.) 
ministers with previous experience as commissioners to the General Assembly are .05 
more likely to hold liberal political preferences. I suggest that exposure to the 
denominational legislature itself represents a type of institutional socialization on clergy. 
To the extent that these legislatures are comprised of a broad array of personnel and 
issue perspectives from throughout the denomination, it is not surprising that legislative 
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service represents a liberalizing influence on clergy. Indeed, all of the controversial (and 
liberal) policies that have engulfed the PC (U.S.A.) and ECUSA in recent years have 
met with the approval of each denomination’s legislature. That service in this decision-
making body should increase clergy liberalism, at least for Presbyterians, is an 
important addition to our understanding of reference group influence on clergy 
preferences. 
Finally, two controls in the ECUSA model require comment. The first regards the 
number of years respondents have been ECUSA priests. The positive and significant 
(at. 01) coefficient shows that an increase in years as an ECUSA priest increases the 
likelihood of clergy liberalism by .06. In contrast, a higher average number of attendees 
at Sunday services decrease the likelihood of liberalism, by a huge .62 (coefficient 
significant at .000). On the surface, these findings appear contradictory. However, when 
considering that many clergy who attended seminary in the 1960s and 1970s have been 
found to be more politically liberal than their younger peers (McKinney and Finke 2002; 
Smidt 2004), it seems logical that ECUSA priests with longer tenures in the 
denomination should be more liberal. If anything, this finding may represent the indirect 
influence of seminary on ECUSA priests over and above the seminary variable itself.  
I suggest that these findings should be viewed in conjunction with the overall 
ideological differences apparent between ECUSA priests and their proximate reference 
groups in table 5. While vestries to the left of clergy are found to contribute to clergy 
liberalism, these vestries are, overall, an exception to the rule. The difference in means 
test indicates that clergy usually operate in environments in which their proximate 
reference groups hold more conservative political preferences than they do. As such, an 
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increase in exposure to these groups should, according to the basic expectations of the 
sociological theory, have a conservative effect on the political preferences of many 
ECUSA priests. Lastly, and in terms of the negative effect an increase in church 
attendance has on clergy liberalism, it might be that with an increase in attendance 
comes an increase in the size of the conservative, proximate reference groups with 
which clergy must interact. This finding is in contrast to the preceding expectation that 
an increase in parish size would contribute to increased heterogeneity in local parishes. 
When encountering larger congregations, ECUSA priests may be even more motivated 
to adopt conservative preferences as a way to better relate to these more proximate 
reference groups. 
Interestingly, while they could have been contending sociological influences on 
clergy, both seminary and reference group ideology contribute to the causal picture of 
clergy liberalism. As further evidence of the importance of both institutional influences, 
rerunning the models without the seminary variable does not make either the session or 
bishop preference indicators significant (results not shown). In addition, the 
Durkheimian theory, reflecting the influence of group preferences and expectations on a 
member’s sincerely held preferences over time, is not supported in table 6. It is unclear 
whether this non-finding is the result of clergy resistance to change brought on by group 
preferences, or is an artifact of the non-panel data collected. Future research employing 
the panel method may be better equipped to examine the Durkheimian possibility.  
Having examined some of the basic causal forces at work in determining clergy 
liberalism as a generic concept, I expand the consideration to include clergy positions 
on issues of political importance and denominational controversy. As the review of 
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Presbyterian and Episcopal controversies in chapter 3 uncovered, gay rights and 
divestment from companies doing business in Israel are the most provocative issues 
currently facing the denominations. Yet while these issues are critical, there are 
differences between them that warrant attention. Specifically, an argument can be made 
that while the PC (U.S.A.)’s divestment policy garnered a great deal of internal 
denomination and secular political attention after its proposal, the issue is far too 
complex for many clergy, and their most proximate reference groups, to possess a 
clearly formed opinion on the policy. Divestment stands in certain contrast to gay 
ordination, in which sides have been long drawn over the theological propriety of 
allowing sexually active homosexuals to serve as church officers. Opinions may have 
been especially long formed on ordination because that policy has often been cast in 
stark “yes” or “no” terms, drawing parallels to the “easy” issues Carmines and Stimson 
(1980) described in their research.  
The authors suggested that certain issues are "hard" if they require careful 
consideration of technically difficult choices. "Easy" issues, on the other hand, are those 
familiar to large portions of the mass public. Such issues may be effectively addressed 
through gut level responses. Given the inherent geo-political factors and consequences 
inherent in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is appropriate to consider 
divestment as a “hard” issue for Presbyterian clergy and their proximate reference 
groups to address. However, the issue should be less difficult for the presbytery 
reference group, as it was many presbytery officials, working in the 2004 General 
Assembly, who were responsible for crafting the divestment policy in the first place. The 
importance of the easy vs. hard distinction might manifest in the Presbyterian 
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divestment model as a non-effect concerning session influence on clergy. In contrast, 
the session would be expected to be influential in the gay ordination models. 
For reasons having to do with their relative tardiness in addressing the 
divestment issue, the easy vs. hard distinction, while still theoretically important in the 
ECUSA model, may be less useful in understanding reference group influence on clergy 
in that denomination. This is because ECUSA, and its sister mainline denominations 
considering whether or not to follow the PC (U.S.A)’s lead, were quick to distance 
themselves from the unpopular policy as early as 2005 (Clarke 2005). As such, it might 
be that reference groups have a significant effect on ECUSA clergy not because 
divestment is any easier for Episcopals to understand, but because their collective 
behavior represents an institutional response designed to avoid the type of international 
controversy that the PC (U.S.A.) incurred in 2004. 
As with the table 6 models, those in the following two tables represent direct tests 
of hypotheses 1 and 2. However, since the new dependent variables are measures of 
liberal positions clergy have on gay rights and divestment, both represent more specific 
assessments of clergy political preferences. The divestment dependent variable is taken 
from a survey item that asks respondents whether their denomination “should pursue a 
phased, selective sale (‘divestment’) of the stock it owns in multinational corporations 
whose dealings in Israel support the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.” The 
gay marriage dependent variable for ECUSA priests asks respondents whether 
“marriage between two people of the same sex should be made legal by the 
government.” Finally, the gay ordination dependent variable for PC (U.S.A.) ministers 
asks respondents whether “G-6.0106b should be repealed by the General Assembly 
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and sent to the presbyteries for ratification.” Responses to all three variables are 
arranged along a 1-7 scale, with “1” representing “disagree strongly” and “7” “agree 
strongly.” I begin first by examining clergy preferences on denominational divestment. 
 
TABLE 7: Clergy Position on Divestment  
           
Clergy Position on Divestment  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
   β (SE) PP
6 
 
 β7 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry -.025 (.031)       .091* (.039) .03  
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences       .095* (.031) .14   -.129***(.031) .06 
Session/Vestry Preferences .096 (.068)     -.153* (.063) .06  
Sex  -.099 (.136)      384** (.142) .03   
Served in Denom. Legislature    .029 (.133)     -.240* (.103) .02 
Years as Minister/Priest   -.008 (.006)     013** (.004) .05  
Years in Current Church  -.014 (.021)  -.0003 (.040)  
Average Sunday Attendance  -.0002 (.0002) -.0002 (.0001) 
Session/Vestry * Years in Church .001 (.005)   -.001 (.010)  
Baseline Probability  .013 .031 
Wald Chi2 29.10 50.43 
Prob > Chi2 .0006 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -599.586 -813.344 
  
 The results from table 7 show the Presbyterian model to be quite sparse in terms 
of explanatory power. However, this was expected given the divestment policy’s 
technical nature. Only the presbytery preference indicator is found to have a statistically 
significant effect on clergy divestment position. The positive and significant (at .05) 
                                            
6 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure is 
calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
7 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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coefficient shows that when presbyteries are to the left of clergy preferences, clergy are 
.14 more likely to support the denomination’s divestment policy. The result is a clear 
indication of reference group influence. However, and as expected on the divestment 
issue, the finding does not point to proximate reference group influence, which is the 
focus of hypothesis 2. Though this is a null finding, that presbyteries are causally 
significant bolsters the importance of this less proximate reference groups in 
determining clergy preferences.   
 The causal story is much richer on the Episcopal side. There, no fewer than six 
of the model’s nine variables return significance. Seminary continues to matter as a 
primary shaper of clergy political preferences. This confirms hypothesis 1, but is 
somewhat surprising given divestment’s technical or “hard” policy nature (recall that 
seminary was not a significant influence on Presbyterian clergy). The coefficient’s 
positive direction and significance (at .05) shows that as ECUSA priests increase their 
reliance on seminary experiences to guide their current ministry, their likelihood of 
divestment support increases by .03. Yet, in contrast to hypothesis 2, the vestry 
coefficient is signed negative and is significant (at .05), showing that vestries to the left 
of ECUSA priests reduce clergy support by .06. An effect on ECUSA clergy of the same 
magnitude and direction (though with an indicator significant at .000) is found for liberal 
ECUSA bishops.  
Taken together, these findings appear counterintuitive. After all, reference group 
liberalism should be positively related to clergy liberalism. It is here that the 
denomination’s desire to avoid controversy provides the greatest insight into these 
results. For reasons that arguably had everything to do with a rational attempt to avoid 
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the onslaught of negative publicity that the PC (U.S.A.) garnered in 2004, ECUSA, led 
by its liberal leadership, backed away from supporting divestment. It is not clear whether 
vestry liberals picked up on the denomination’s decision to avoid the controversial policy 
in 2005, but this may help to explain why liberal vestries have a dampening effect on 
clergy divestment support. Indeed, position taking on this hard issue may have been 
made easier for vestry members because they were aligning with denominational 
concerns over the policy’s controversial nature, not developing finely honed positions on 
the merits and drawbacks of the divestiture itself.  
The bishop and vestry effects are joined by the negative influence that clergy 
service in the denominational legislature has on their divestment preferences. The 
negative sign and significance (.05) of the legislature coefficient shows that clergy 
serving in that body are .02 less likely to support divestment. This would be expected for 
clergy who are likely conditioned to take a broader, denominational view of the issue 
and possible institutional fallout. However, there appears to be great personal impetus 
for divestment support among ECUSA clergy, especially as it regards seminary 
influence. Logically, clergy looking back on the values and ideals developed during their 
professional education, which took place prior to them being situated in the environment 
of denominational politics, should be more likely to support the policy.  
At the same time, other long-term socializing characteristics have a liberalizing 
effect, including clergy sex. The positive and significant (at .01) indicator shows that 
female ECUSA priests are .03 more likely to support divestment than their male 
counterparts. It is also interesting that the length of a priest’s tenure in ECUSA returns a 
positive and significant (at .01) coefficient. Priests with longer tenures in the 
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denomination are .05 more likely to support divestment. These clergy may be more 
likely to respond to the issue according to their longer settled ideological values, values 
that may effectively coincide with seminary-based influences. Another explanation may 
come from Smidt’s (2004) finding that younger clergy have trended more orthodox in 
their personal political preferences since the 1970s. Though his study does not look at 
ECUSA, it may be that longer serving clergy are indeed significantly more liberal, and 
would be more supportive of divestment, than their younger counterparts. These results 
also suggest that ECUSA clergy, via their seminary experiences, may be more willing to 
form opinions on hard issues compared to Presbyterians. Admittedly, it is not possible 
to isolate seminary influence in testing for this effect, but it would make an interesting 
topic for future research. 
I now turn to clergy positions on gay rights issues. Presbyterian respondents 
were asked about their preferences on gay ordination in their denomination. Episcopal 
priests were asked about gay marriage. Ideally, the same question would have been 
posed to both sets of respondents. However, given space constraints in the survey 
instruments, these separate indicators were used. Since gay ordination, as chapter 3 
discussed, is a hot button topic in the PC (U.S.A.), I elected to this substitute this 
question over gay marriage. Though they do not represent the same issue, both are 






TABLE 8: Clergy Position on Gay Ordination (PCUSA) and Gay Marriage (ECUSA)  
           
Clergy Position on Gay Issues  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
   β (SE) PP
8 
 
 β9 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry       .111*** (.032) .26  .052 (.045)  
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences   -.048 (.037)    .177*** (.038) .16 
Session/Vestry Preferences .088 (.071)   .109 (.083)  
Sex         -.263* (.128) .20     .130 (.127)   
Served in Denom. Legislature    -.079 (.146)  .132 (.107) 
Years as Minister/Priest    -.008 (.005)   -.011** (.004) .09  
Years in Current Church  .049 (.030)    .095 (.049)   
Average Sunday Attendance    .0004 (.0002)  .0009***(.0002) .50 
Session/Vestry * Years in Church    -.014 (.007)    -.019 (.013)  
Baseline Probability  .543 .152 
Wald Chi2 22.90 100.60 
Prob > Chi2 .0064 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -431.890 -811.885 
 
As the positive and significant (at .000) coefficient for the seminary variable 
shows, Presbyterian clergy relying on their seminary experiences to guide their current 
ministry are .26 more likely to hold liberal preferences on gay ordination. This, again, 
provides confirmation for hypothesis 1. Unfortunately, neither the Presbyterian nor the 
ECUSA model provides additional evidence for hypothesis 2. In fact, in the ECUSA 
model, it is one’s less proximate reference group—the bishop—that is found to have the 
causal importance. As would be expected with a reference group significantly more 
                                            
8 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure is 
calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
9 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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liberal than the denomination’s priests, liberal bishops are found to have a positive and 
significant (at .000) effect on priestly support for gay marriage. Priests encountering 
bishops more liberal than themselves are .16 more likely to support gay marriage. 
However, the variable with the largest positive effect on ECUSA priest preferences is 
average attendance at Sunday services. The positive and significant (at .000) coefficient 
for the attendance variable shows that higher Sunday attendance increases the 
likelihood by. 50 that priests support gay marriage.  
I suggest that this effect is based more on the relative freedom that larger 
parishes afford ECUSA priests than any groundswell for gay marriage among the 
significantly more conservative ECUSA laity. Though table 6 put in doubt the notion that 
increased parish size necessarily leads to the heterogeneity of laity preferences, it is 
arguable that larger parishes increase the laity’s inability to articulate a clearly 
discernable issue preference to clergy. Though more research is needed on the ability 
of laity in large religious communities to effectively communicate their preferences to 
clergy, this explanation seems plausible given the relative inability of larger groups to 
send clear ideological messages (Zimmerman and Just 2000). Finally, and regarding 
clergy sex, it is not clear why female clergy, who have been theorized to be more liberal 
than their male colleagues (and actually found to be so in tables 6 and 7), should be 
significantly (at .05) more conservative on gay ordination (as determined by the 
negative coefficient) than their male counterparts. Indeed, the likelihood of support for 
gay ordination is reduced by .20 for female PC (U.S.A.) ministers. A similar finding is 
returned in the ECUSA model for the length of time a priest has served in the 
denomination. Recall though that both the sex and years as a priest variables were 
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positively associated with support for divestment. What might explain the difference in 
effect as it concerns gay rights?         
I return to Carmines and Stimson’s (1980) “easy” vs. “hard” distinction to provide 
explanation. Issues pertaining to human sexuality tap an array of cultural and social 
concerns (Oldmixon 2005) that are not present in the divestment debate, thereby 
making sexuality more gut level in terms of comprehension. These easy issues may 
leave Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy more exposed to negative reactions from their 
proximate, and more conservative, reference groups. Therefore, female Presbyterian 
ministers, who Olson et al. (2005) found are predisposed to avoiding institutional 
conflict, and longer serving ECUSA priests, who may have previously encountered 
negative reactions from the laity for following their bishop’s liberal preferences on gay 
marriage, may be less likely to support gay rights because it helps to keep harmony with 
their proximate groups. This discussion opens up the possibility that clergy pursue 
strategic behavior in dealing with their reference groups, and I will explore this more 
fully in the following chapter.     
Before closing, it is worthwhile to recap this chapter’s findings. First, and in 
confirmation of the sociological institutionalism theory outlined in chapter 2, seminary 
was found to be a strong and contemporary influence on the development of political 
preferences for clergy in both denominations. Specifically, clergy reliance on their 
seminary experiences was strongly and positively related to clergy liberalism, which is 
an expected result for mainline clergy (McKinney and Finke 2002). Second, there was 
general evidence throughout the models that reference group liberalism has a positive 
effect on clergy liberalism. Though hypothesis 2 specifically posited an effect from the 
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clergy’s most proximate groups, both more and less proximate reference groups were 
found to affect liberal political preferences in clergy. That both sets of references groups 
influence clergy preferences helps to confirm chapter 4’s theoretical model. The model 
suggested that although the clergy’s proximate reference groups possess key influence 
because of their frequency of contact, less proximate groups are also important, and 
may be elevated in their causal stature by clergy pursuing goals outside of their local 
churches (Ammerman 1981; Wald 2003).  
Importantly, there was no evidence that clergy preferences move closer to their 
proximate reference groups’ over time. This relationship was suggested in the second 
sociological theory reflecting Durkheim’s (1933) research. Despite only finding 
confirmation for the first theory and the role of institutions in developing clergy political 
preferences, it is clear that these preferences are built on a sociological foundation. 
Given this, it is necessary to extend the neo-institutional analysis to include not only 
clergy political preferences, but their political behavior as well. In the following chapter, I 
examine how institutions may influence clergy political behavior, and extend the 
theoretical analysis to include the possibility that, in undertaking said behavior, clergy 
may perceive group pressures to strategically mask their sincerely held, and 









PREACHING TO THE CHOIR? SOCIOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC ROOTS OF 
CLERGY POLITICAL BEHAVIOR  
 
 What determines whether clergy take spoken liberal or conservative positions on 
key political issues? What causes them to encourage parishioners to become more 
involved in the political process, and to, as clergy, take a greater part in this process 
themselves? In this chapter, I focus empirical attention on these two basic questions by 
testing both the sociological and rational choice theories developed in chapters 2 and 4. 
This chapter is divided into two major sections. The first looks at the reasons behind 
clergy taking spoken positions on issues of political controversy in their sermons. The 
second expands the examination of clergy behavior to include five items of political 
activism, ranging from personal membership in political interest groups to the 
encouragement of increased political participation among their flocks.   
This chapter’s importance can be seen in its contrast to its predecessor. Chapter 
5 was focused exclusively on evaluating institutional influence on the creation of clergy 
preferences, with seminary and reference groups providing key explanations. The 
premise of this chapter, following rational choice expectations, is that there may be 
differences between clergy preferences and political behavior, differences that are 
steeped in clergy perception of strategic pressure from their proximate reference 
groups. Hence, in addition to including sociological items from chapter 5, chapter 6 
assesses whether strategic pressure is a key determinant of clergy behavior. In order to 
test the strategic behavior possibility, and control for the ongoing influence of 
 103 
sociological institutionalism, I introduce three new hypotheses concerning the public 
political positions that clergy take.   
 The chapter’s first hypothesis builds on the sociological findings in chapter 5, and 
takes these influences a step further by suggesting a positive relationship between 
clergy spoken positions and their sincerely held preferences. This is, in fact, the central 
finding of the extant clergy politics literature (Guth et al. 1997; Smidt et al. 2003), and 
relates back to the first sociological theory outlined in chapter 2. The empirical evidence 
presented in chapter 5 linking clergy liberal preferences with a contemporary reliance on 
seminary adds weight to the institutional socialization argument. Hence, I hypothesize 
that  
H3: As clergy political liberalism increases, so does the likelihood that they take 
liberal spoken positions on political issues. 
 Hypotheses 4 and 5 are based on chapter 5’s generally robust findings showing 
reference group preferences to exert a statistically significant influence on clergy 
liberalism. From a group socialization perspective, reference group influence represents 
approbation, identity formation, and sanction for members (Merton 1958; Verba 1961). 
Groups function as socializing agents, which pull clergy behavior into line with their 
preferences. This introduces hypothesis 4: 
 H4: As reference group liberalism increases, so does the likelihood that clergy 
take liberal spoken positions on political issues.  
The importance of group socialization notwithstanding, chapter 4 also suggested 
that clergy are rational pursuers of specific institutional goals. Therefore, clergy should 
rationally seek to maintain good relations with their proximate groups and/or avoid the 
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sanctions they may impose. In pursuing this “collegial goal,” clergy may perceive 
pressure mask their sincerely held (and statistically more liberal) political preferences. 
Masking will be detected, in part, by reference groups influencing clergy spoken 
positions in a manner opposite of clergy preferences. A second indicator of strategic 
behavior is whether clergy perceive pressure from their most proximate reference 
groups to behave strategically. This leads to hypothesis 5     
H5: As clergy perceive greater pressure from their proximate reference groups to 
behave strategically, the likelihood that clergy take liberal spoken positions on political 
issues decreases.      
 In order to test these new hypotheses, I estimate two models that use clergy 
sermons on gay rights and denominational divestment as dependent variables. The 
dependent variables in the gay rights models reflect the specific gay-centered issues 
confronting each denomination. For the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (PC (U.S.A.), it is 
the gay ordination policy; for the Episcopal Church, USA (ECUSA), it is gay marriage. 
Both dependent variables are ordinal measures that reflect three possible actions taken 
by clergy. Data were culled from two survey items. The first asked whether clergy 
preached a sermon on a controversial political topic in 2004-2005. The second asked 
the issue and position taken by the respondent in the sermon. Clergy who stated that 
they gave sermons in support of gay ordination or marriage were coded “2.” Those who 
gave sermons opposed to gay ordination or marriage were coded “0.” Since presenting 
no sermon on these issues can be characterized as a position in itself (albeit one that is 
more for than against gay rights), I code no sermon on the issues as “1.” The 
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divestment models follow this same coding procedure, with “2” reflecting support for the 
policy, “0” for opposition, and “1” for no sermon.  
Prior to discussing the results from the models themselves, I provide a frequency 
breakdown of the dependent variables in tables 9 and 10. Importantly, the highest 
percentage of clergy responded that they gave no sermon on either topic. It is not clear 
whether this finding is the result of clergy intentionally not delivering sermons on these 
issues, or if respondents simply decided to skip the question’s topic section. Since the 
majority of respondents completed survey items in close proximity to the sermon 
question, it is arguable that the lack of response in listing a controversial sermon topic is 
the result of clergy intentionally avoiding the delivery of sermons on gay rights and 
divestment. It is also arguable that failure to deliver a sermon on an issue is as much an 
example of strategic behavior as changing one’s articulated position. These will be 
important possibilities to keep in mind when analyzing the statistical results to follow. 
Since it is not entirely clear why respondents did not indicate a sermon topic, and in 
order to account for any resulting differences created by including respondents who did 
not specify gay marriage or divestment, I run each pair of models twice. The first set 
incorporates all respondents. The second uses only those who indicated the delivery of 







TABLE 9:  Frequency of Clergy Sermons on Gay Rights  (Expressed as 
Percentages) 
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 387) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 508) 
 





1 = No Sermon on Topic 46 40 
2 = Sermon For 28 29 
 
 
TABLE 10:  Frequency of Clergy Sermons on Divestmen t (Expressed as 
Percentages)  
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 387) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 508) 
 





1 = No Sermon on Topic 60 61 
2 = Sermon For 29 25 
 
 
As with the preceding models, the use of ordinal dependent variables 
necessitates ordered probabilistic regression analysis. Those models with binary 
dependent variables use probit analysis. In both cases, I follow the same procedures in 
relation to the Huber-White estimator as in chapter 5. The dependent variable category 
of interest in the first set of models, which include all respondents, is “2.” In the second 
set, which incorporates only respondents who specifically presented a sermon on gay 
rights or divestment, the variable category of interest is “1.” Predicted probabilities are 
calculated for all significant independent variables as the difference between the 
minimum and maximum value of category 2 (or 1) of the dependent variable, holding all 
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other variables at their means. For the reader’s convenience, I review each of the 
variables in the models prior to discussing the statistical results. 
 
Clergy Political Preferences: The first independent variable is a measure of 
clergy political preferences. Recall that this was the dependent variable of note in the 
chapter 5 models. The importance of including this indicator in these new models is to 
assess whether the political preferences clergy hold are an independent influence on 
their political behavior. This variable is arranged on a 1-7 scale, with “1” being “strongly 
conservative” and “7” being “strongly liberal.”  
 
Perception of Pressure to Behave Strategically: The next variable is a direct 
measure of whether clergy perceive pressure from their most proximate reference 
groups to behave strategically in taking spoken political positions. Chapter 4 lists 
several potential professional concerns that may induce this pressure perception. 
Arguably, the most important of these is clergy fear of losing influence over congregants 
and lay colleagues due to behavioral missteps. Alternatively, one might argue that 
actual removal from office would be the biggest contributor to clergy pressure. However, 
I suggest that this fear is not entirely realistic for Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy 
given that presbyteries and bishops have an equal say in clergy employment decisions. 
Concomitantly, given the role clergy play as agents of moral suasion, a perceived loss 
of influence over one’s most proximate reference groups should generate a requisite 
level of clergy sensitivity to any group pressures that exist.  
 108 
The pressure indicator is taken from a survey item that asked respondents 
whether they “feel pressured by my congregation/parish and session/vestry to take 
public positions on controversial political issues that I would not take otherwise.” The 
response categories were arranged along a 1-7 scale, with “1” representing “disagree 
strongly and “7” “agree strongly.” Importantly, the pressure indicator represents a 
measure of clergy behavior that has yet-to-be used in any portion of the religion and 
political literature. To better assess whether clergy in each denomination perceive 
strategic pressure from these groups, I provide the arithmetic means and frequency 
breakdown for this variable in table 11. 
 
 
TABLE 11:  Arithmetic Mean and Frequency Distributi on for Strategic Pressure 
(Expressed as Percentages) 
           
1-7 Scale with “7” “Strongly agree” to 
perceiving strategic pressure  
PRESBYTERIAN  
(n = 387) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 508) 
Arithmetic Mean 2.73 5.80 
“1” Strongly Disagree  39 05 
“2”  25 05 
“3” 05 01 
“4” 05 04 
“5” 10 09 
“6” 08 30 
“7” Strongly Agree 07 46 
   
As this distribution shows, the denominations are virtually the inverse of each in 
terms of perceived pressure, with ECUSA priests having a much higher rate of 
responding in the affirmative on this question than their Presbyterian counterparts. This 
may reflect the ECUSA clergy’s more protracted experience in dealing with 
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controversial political concerns (experience that might lead to heightened sensitivity to 
strategic group pressures) within their denomination, but a definitive explanation cannot 
be offered by these data. 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry: A primary independent variable carried over 
from chapter 5 is the measure of contemporary seminary influence on clergy. This 
variable is taken from a survey item that asked clergy whether “I draw on the values and 
education received in seminary to guide my conduct as a minister/priest.” Responses 
were coded on a 1-7 scale, with “1” representing “disagree strongly” and “7” “agree 
strongly.”  
 
Session/Vestry and Presbytery/Bishop Preferences: Considering the importance 
of reference group influence as a socializing effect in chapter 4’s theoretical model, it is 
important to assess the potential effects from the various groups of institutional 
importance to clergy. Arguably, the most important of these effects are clergy 
perceptions of both their congregational lay leaders’ (representing proximate reference 
groups), and presbytery or diocese’s (representing a less proximate reference group) 
political preferences. Group preference measures are based on clergy perceptions of 
how liberal or conservative these groups are compared to their own preferences. In 
other words, group appraisals are made relative to clergy ideology. The reference group 
preference measures are derived from survey items that asked respondents whether 
each of the three reference groups in question (congregants, lay leaders, and 
presbytery/bishop) are “more politically conservative/liberal than I am.” Responses were 
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arranged along a 1-7 scale, with “1” representing “more conservative” and “7” “more 
liberal.”   
 
Strategic Pressure * Session/Vestry Preferences: The next item is an interaction 
term between clergy perception of proximate reference group pressure to behave 
strategically and session/vestry political preferences. Since the causal theory concerns 
the role that group preferences and pressure play in determining clergy political 
behavior, testing for a join effect between these two variables is essential. 
 
Clergy Sex: Given that females have had a comparatively difficult time gaining 
access to the professional clergy ranks, and based on the work of Olson (2000) and 
Olson et al. (2005) that found female clergy to be significantly more liberal than their 
male counterparts, I include sex as a control variable, coded “1” if clergy are female.  
 
Years in Current Church; Years As Clergy; Average Sunday Attendance: I, again, 
include three institutional context variables: 1) the length of time clergy have been 
ordained ministers in their respective denominations, 2) the number of years clergy 
have served in their current church, and 3) the average number of parishioners who 
attend Sunday morning services. It is not clear that any of these three variables, on their 




 Served in Denominational Legislature: I also control for prior clergy service in 
their denominational legislature. Based on Wald (2003) and Ammerman’s (1981) 
findings that higher placed denominational elites hold more liberal preferences, I 
suggest that clergy who have official contact with these elites via service in the 
denominational legislature have a higher likelihood of undertaking liberal behavior. This 
indicator is based on a survey item that asked respondents whether they served 
previously in their denomination’s legislative body. These include the General Assembly 
(for the Presbyterians) and the House of Deputies (for the Episcopals). Affirmative 
responses are coded “1.”  
 
Session/Vestry Preferences * Years in Current Church: Rounding out the models 
is an interaction term that links session and vestry preferences with the years clergy 
have spent in their local church. This is in an effort to tap the socialization over time 
theory expressed in Durkheim (1933) and Mosca’s (1939) research (representing the 
second of the sociological theories outlined in chapter 2).     
 As with the gay rights and divestment models in chapter 5, these issues can be 
distinguished according to Carmines and Stimson’s (1980) “easy” vs. “hard” 
characterization. Recall that divestment is believed to represent a more technically 
difficult political issue, and, as such, clergy and their proximate reference groups may 
be less willing to form strong positions on the policy. This hesitation may spill over into 
clergy behavior in the form of reduced reference group and personal preference 
influence on the delivery of divestment-related sermons. Because of its more gut level 
nature, the opposite would be expected for the gay rights issues. 
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TABLE 12: Preached Sermon on Gay Ordination (PCUSA)  and Gay Marriage 
(ECUSA) in 2004-2005 
           
Gay Ordination/Marriage Sermon  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 454) 
   β (SE) PP
10 
 
 β11 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry -.005 (.031)  .016 (.047)  
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences   .049 (.038)    .125* (.047) .31 
Session/Vestry Preferences -.054 (.093)   -.032 (.158)  
Clergy Sex     .077 (.160)     .227 (.143)    
Served in Denom. Legislature    .137 (.150)  -.081 (.115) 
Years as Clergy  .002 (.005) .002 (.005)  
Years in Current Church  .014 (.024)  -.057 (.046)  
Average Sunday Attendance  -.0002 (.0002) -.0003 (.0002) 
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
-.497*** (.084) .52  -.243* (.107) .23 
Session/Vestry * Years in Church -.006 (.006)   .015 (.012)  
Clergy Political Preferences -.023 (.040)      .060* (.034) .12 
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
.044 (.028) -.005 (.023)  
Baseline Probability .22 .26 
Wald Chi2 104.83 25.53 
Prob > Chi2 .0000 .0125 
Log-Likelihood -336.209 -478.848 
 
 The results in table 12 confirm hypothesis 3-5, although the ECUSA model 
performs more robustly than the Presbyterian. The perception of strategic pressure 
indicator performs as expected for Presbyterian clergy. In fact, it is the only significant 
variable in that model. Its negative and significant (at .000) coefficient demonstrates that 
                                            
10 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
11 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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clergy perceiving session pressure to behave strategically were .52 less likely to deliver 
a sermon in support of gay ordination in 2004-2005. Given the magnitude of this 
variable’s effect, hypothesis 5 is robustly confirmed as it pertains to gay ordination in the 
PC (U.S.A.). A similar effect exists for this same variable regarding pro-gay marriage 
sermons in ECUSA. There, the variable’s negative signage and significance (at .05) 
demonstrates that ECUSA clergy were .23 less likely to preach a pro-gay marriage 
sermon when perceiving strategic pressure from their vestries.  
This effect is in stark contrast to the other two significant variables in the ECUSA 
model. Confirming the importance of personal preferences in determining clergy political 
behavior, the clergy preference variable is signed positive and is significant at (.05), 
which points to a positive relationship between clergy liberal preferences and their 
delivery of liberal sermons. Specifically, more liberal ECUSA clergy were .12 more likely 
to present a pro-gay marriage sermon. Reference groups are also of consequence in 
the ECUSA model, although it is the less proximate bishop, not the more proximate 
vestry, holding causal influence. In fact, bishop preferences hold the greatest magnitude 
of effect in the model, increasing the likelihood that ECUSA priests preached a pro-gay 
marriage sermon in 2004-2005 by .31. Again, given that the majority of ECUSA priests 
report not giving a gay marriage sermon at all, it might be that the positive influence 
from personal and bishop preferences is responsible for convincing clergy to support 
the policy. Table 13 looks only at those respondents specifically indicating delivery of a 





TABLE 13: Preached Sermon on Gay Ordination (PCUSA)  and Gay Marriage 
(ECUSA) in 2004-2005 (Specific responses only) 
           
Gay Ordination/Marriage Sermon  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 206) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 306) 
   β (SE) PP
12 
 
 β13 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry  -.062 (.067)  .034 (.064)  
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences   .042 (.076)     .176* (.076) .31 
Session/Vestry Preferences -.072 (.196)   -.187 (.125)  
Clergy Sex     .087 (.280)     .255 (.205)    
Served in Denom. Legislature     .606* (.286) .23 -.104 (.164) 
Years as Minister/Priest  -.001 (.010) .002 (.008)  
Years in Current Church  .034 (.040)     -.129* (.053) .66  
Average Sunday Attendance  -.0001 (.0004)   -.001* (.0003) .34 
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
     -.736*** (.127) .93  -.005* (.002) .65 
Session/Vestry * Years in Church -.018 (.013)   .069 (.025)  
Clergy Political Preferences .032 (.079) .026 (.051)  
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
  .079* (.042) .66   .160* (.079) .31  
Baseline Probability .48 .43 
Wald Chi2 89.57 21.83 
Prob > Chi2 .0000 .0395 
Log-Likelihood -84.751 -179.236 
 
 In contrast to the preceding model pair, dropping the non-specific respondents 
produces more robust results for the Presbyterian model. Specifically, and as suggested 
in hypothesis 5, the perception of strategic pressure from their proximate, and 
statistically more conservative, reference groups compelled Presbyterian clergy not to 
                                            
12 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
13 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
 115 
publicly support gay ordination in 2004-2005. The negative and significant (at .000) 
coefficient for strategic pressure demonstrates that Presbyterian ministers perceiving 
this pressure are a whopping .93 less likely to have favored gay ordination in their 
sermons. Importantly, the interaction term between strategic pressure and session 
liberalism is also significant (at .05), but is signed positively. This suggests that clergy 
who perceive strategic pressure and encounter sessions to their political left are .66 
more likely to have made a pro-gay ordination sermon in 2004-2005.  
It is difficult to overstate the importance of these joint findings. For the first time in 
the clergy politics scholarship, the messages clergy broadcast to their congregants are 
found to be dependent not on personal and sincerely held preferences, but on whether 
clergy perceive reference group pressure to behave strategically. At the same time, and 
as an example of the effect less proximate reference groups can have on clergy 
behavior, clergy having served in the Presbyterian General Assembly—the 
denominational legislature—are .23 more likely to have presented a pro-gay marriage 
sermon in 2004-2005 (coefficient significant at .05). Given that all denominational 
policies must be set by the General Assembly, and given the liberal nature of most 
national policies in mainline churches, including the PC (U.S.A.), clergy exposure to the 
denominational legislature likely represents liberal group socialization. This can be 
considered a confirmation of hypothesis 4.    
 Turning to the ECUSA model, the results are, again, much more robust than 
those in table 12. Hypothesis 4 is again confirmed, as liberal bishops have a significant 
influence over ECUSA priests delivering pro-gay marriage sermons in 2004-2005. 
Bishops more politically liberal than priests increase the likelihood of priests presenting 
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a pro-gay marriage sermon by .32 (coefficient significant at .01). In addition, and as with 
the Presbyterian model, ECUSA priests respond to strategic pressure brought on by 
their most proximate reference groups. The positive and significant (at. 05) coefficient 
for the strategic pressure variable shows that ECUSA priests who perceive strategic 
pressure from their most proximate reference group colleagues were .65 less likely to 
have delivered a pro-gay marriage sermon in 2004-2005. And, as with the Presbyterian 
model, the interaction term between strategic pressure and session liberalism is 
significant and signed positive. This means that ECUSA priests perceiving strategic 
pressure from vestries more politically liberal than themselves are .31 more likely to 
have delivered a gay marriage sermon. Taken with the strategic pressure base 
variable’s significance, the ECUSA model demonstrates that the delivery of pro-gay 
marriage sermons is largely determined by both reference group preferences and 
strategic pressure.  
Interestingly, the negative sign and significance (at .05) of the years in church 
indicator shows that ECUSA priests serving for longer periods in their parishes were .66 
less likely to have given a pro-gay marriage sermon. This effect is in-line with 
expectations concerning clergy proximity to the statistically more conservative laity and 
vestry members. Also reducing the likelihood of a pro-gay sermon is ECUSA parish 
attendance. The negative and significant (at .05) variable shows clergy serving in 
churches with more regular attendees were .34 less likely to present a pro-gay marriage 
sermon. It is not always clear what to make of the attendance control in these models. 
Since little research has been conducted on the impact of parish size on clergy political 
behavior, this issue is certainly ripe for further research.  
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 Having considered the causal influences at work in determining clergy sermons 
on gay rights issues, I now turn attention to models that address clergy sermons on 
denominational divestment. The issue has been much more problematic for the PC 
(U.S.A.) than ECUSA. This was largely due to the Presbyterians being the first to unveil 
their policy (and the first to receive worldwide condemnation from various quarters). To 
begin consideration of clergy divestment sermons, I run a pair of models that include all 
clergy admitting to preaching a controversial political sermon using the same “2-1-0” 
































TABLE 14: Clergy Divestment Sermon in 2004-2005 
           
Clergy Divestment Sermon  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 454) 
   β (SE) PP
14 
 
 β15 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry .040 (.030)    .274*** (.051) .32  
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences  -.009 (.041)    .039 (.047) 
Session/Vestry Preferences  .056 (.040)    -.103 (.158)  
Clergy Sex   -.242 (.165)     .007 (.152)    
Served in Denom. Legislature  -.188 (.155)     .194 (.121)  
Years as Minister/Priest   -.004 (.006)     .002 (.006)   
Years in Current Church  .038 (.040)  .012 (.043)  
Average Sunday Attendance  -.0002 (.0002) .0002 (.0002) 
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
   -.230** (.085) .28  -.288** (.097) .40  
Session/Vestry * Years in Church -.011 (.008)   .002 (.011)  
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
.-036 (.028) .026 (.022)  
Clergy Political Preferences     .004 (.044)     .050 (.035)  
Baseline Probability  .18 .21 
Wald Chi2 118.44 102.93 
Prob > Chi2 .0000 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -313.967 -372.928 
 
Clergy perception of strategic pressure from their most proximate reference 
groups is the dominant influence determining whether clergy gave sermons in support 
of denominational divestment in 2004-2005. In the Presbyterian model, the negative 
and significant (at .01) coefficient shows that clergy who perceive strategic pressure 
                                            
14 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
15 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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from their proximate reference groups were .28 less likely to deliver a pro-divestment 
sermon. The same effect is found for ECUSA priests perceiving strategic pressure, with 
clergy being .40 less likely to have delivered a pro-divestment sermon in those cases. 
These findings again confirm hypothesis 5—as strategic reference group pressure 
increases, liberal political behavior among clergy decreases. With the large percentage 
of clergy in both denominations giving no divestment sermon, strategic behavior might 
manifest through clergy saying nothing on the issue, rather than taking a position that 
might be the opposite of their preferences. Interestingly, seminary influence, the major 
player in the preference models from the preceding chapter, returns with causal impact 
on ECUSA clergy. The positive and highly significant (at .000) coefficient shows that 
those priests relying on their seminary experiences to guide their current ministries were 
.32 more likely to deliver a pro-divestment sermon. Table 15 examines only those clergy 






















TABLE 15: Clergy Divestment Sermon in 2004-2005 (Sp ecific responses only) 
           
Clergy Divestment Sermon  PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 207) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 163) 
   β (SE) PP
16 
 
 β17 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry -.078 (.060)    .390*** (.110) .69  
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences  .102 (.068)    -.005 (.112) 
Session/Vestry Preferences  -.187 (.183)    .023 (.212)  
Clergy Sex       -.537* (.250) .39     .171 (.306)    
Served in Denom. Legislature  -.398 (.251)     .218 (.248)  
Years as Minister/Priest   -.005 (.010)     .027* (.012) .22   
Years in Current Church  .020 (.041)  .059 (.109)  
Average Sunday Attendance  -.0001 (.0004) -.001 (.0004) 
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
   -.300** (.118) .59   -.308* (.185) .22  
Session/Vestry * Years in Church .006 (.013)   .022 (.064)  
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
-.004 (.040) -.004 (.008)  
Clergy Preferences     .109 (.079)    .141* (.080) .21  
Baseline Probability  .65 .84 
Wald Chi2 59.29 44.76 
Prob > Chi2 .0000 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -102.223 -63.800 
 
 With only specific responses included, the Presbyterian model becomes more 
robust. The strategic pressure variable maintains its significant (at .01) and negative 
effect on pro-divestment sermons, although the magnitude increases to .59. This, again, 
serves as confirmation for hypothesis 5. An added indicator of significance (at .05) is 
                                            
16 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
17 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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clergy sex. The negative coefficient shows that females were .39 less likely to give a 
pro-divestment sermon in 2004-2005. This might be evidence that female clergy wish to 
avoid controversy in their local churches, and will not present sermons on political topics 
they believe will do so. The ECUSA model is also more robust than its predecessor, and 
includes confirmation of hypothesis 5. Specifically, clergy who perceive proximate 
reference group pressure to behave strategically are .22 less likely to have presented a 
pro-divestment sermon. Returning significance from the previous divestment model is 
seminary influence. That indicator’s positive and significant (at .000) coefficient 
demonstrates that ECUSA priests relying on seminary to guide their current ministry are 
.69 more likely to have preached in support of divestment. Reinforcing this effect are 
two additional variables. First, clergy with liberal political preferences are .21 more likely 
to have presented pro-divestment sermons in 2004-2005 (variable significant at .05), a 
confirmation of hypothesis 3. Second, those with longer tenures as priests are .22 more 
likely to have been pro-divestment (significant at .05). Since these longer-serving clergy 
are generally older, this might reinforce Smidt’s (2004) finding concerning the relative 
liberalism of clergy who attended seminary prior to the 1970s. 
 The role that strategic pressure plays in determining clergy spoken positions on 
controversial political issues stands out clearly in these models. That clergy respond to 
pressure from their proximate reference groups represents two advances on the extant 
literature. First, it shows that institutional reference groups are an important influence on 
clergy political behavior. Second, it demonstrates that rational choice theory is an 
effective tool for studying religious elites. In order to broaden our understanding of these 
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institutional and strategic influences on the American clergy, I expand the examination 
by incorporating additional measures of clergy political behavior. 
 
Beyond the Sermon 
Delivering sermons is perhaps the most obvious form of clergy political behavior. 
However, sermons may be complemented by clergy undertaking activities that reinforce 
the political cues delivered in their weekly messages to the congregation. In this section, 
I examine two examples of clergy political behavior that are natural outgrowths of 
sermon delivery. Each focuses on partisan behavior. The first concerns clergy 
membership in political interest groups. While potentially less public than sermon 
political messages, interest group membership links clergy to the political or policy 
concerns that the group champions. In addition, the information that group membership 
provides clergy may function as a basis for their political sermons, even if clergy are 
less than public about their group membership. The second behavior measure 
examines clergy encouragement of their parishioners to support a political party (without 
providing specific candidate endorsements). Party encouragement is seen as a 
corollary of political sermons since these weekly messages are an obvious vehicle 
through which clergy can call their parishioners to party support.  
Recall from the preceding section examining sermons on gay rights and 
divestment that clergy reliance on seminary, personal preferences, proximate and less 
proximate reference group ideology, and their perception of proximate group pressure 
all played some statistical role in determining whether clergy preach sermons on items 
of political controversy. I expand on these findings by testing for whether this same set 
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of sociological and rational choice-based influences explain clergy political behavior on 
items that complement sermon delivery. To do so, I incorporate elements from the five 
preceding hypotheses, and posit an additional five.  
Recall that seminary is generally presumed to be a liberalizing influence on 
mainline clergy preferences (Roof and McKinney 1987), and that chapter 5 strongly 
confirmed this expectation. I build on these findings in hypothesis 6 by positing a 
connection between contemporary clergy reliance on seminary and their current political 
behavior. However, this new hypothesis deals not with seminary influence and personal 
liberalism. Instead, it examines the decision to undertake political behavior in the first 
place. Since seminary is a time of professional development, and because it heightens 
awareness of clergy efficacy as institutional elites (Charlton 1987; Calhoun-Brown 
1996), I suggest that clergy relying on their seminary experiences to guide their current 
ministries have an increased likelihood of engaging in political behavior  
H6: The undertaking of clergy political behavior reflects ongoing seminary 
influence, as indicated by reference to seminary in guiding their current ministry. 
 Hypothesis 7 focuses on more proximate sociological influences, in particular 
the ideological positions of key reference groups. As Key (1961) and Hollander (1958, 
1964) found, the role of reference groups in convincing individual actors to conform to 
group expectations is a powerful one, especially for those groups in closest proximity. 
Hence, it is again necessary to examine the effect that group ideology might have as a 
socializing influence on clergy political behavior. In chapter 5, a clergy’s colleagues—
the board of lay leaders in both the Presbyterian and Episcopal denominations—were 
suggested to have a contextual influence on clergy preferences through their general 
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ideological positions. Since evidence was found linking proximate group liberalism to 
clergy liberalism, it is important to extend the examination to clergy political behavior as 
well. As such, I suggest that   
H7: Clergy political behavior reflects increased political liberalism among their 
proximate reference groups.  
A necessary qualifier made in the previous chapter when discussing reference 
group preferences is that all preference measures are based on clergy perception. 
There is no independent measure of group preferences independent of how they are 
perceived by Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy. And, as with hypotheses 1 and 2 in 
chapter 5, hypotheses 6 and 7 are potentially contending. Both purport to have a direct 
influence on clergy political behavior, even though one sociological agent (the seminary) 
is situated in prior experience, while the proximate reference groups represent current 
contextual forces. Despite being sociological in nature, it is not clear that these different 
influences should work in tandem. In fact, there may be a crowding out effect in which 
clergy are influenced so strongly by either their seminary or proximate groups that other 
sociological actors are pushed out of the causal picture entirely. 
I continue to look at the sociological influences on clergy behavior in hypothesis 
8, and suggest a positive relationship between clergy political behavior and their 
sincerely held preferences as found by Guth et al. (1997) and Smidt et al. (2003). By 
“sociological,” I am referring to the institutional processes at work in developing a 
clergy’s sincerely held preferences throughout her/his lifetime. This is not necessarily 
the same as reference group influence, which, while representing a specific kind of 
sociological cue, may be merely one of several socialization-based influences that 
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clergy encounter. Specifically, liberal clergy preferences will have a direct and positive 
influence on clergy political behavior because strongly held preferences serve as a 
critical motivating force. This is not to suggest, however, that conservative clergy are 
any less motivated to engage in political behavior (Guth et al. 1997). The hypothesized 
relationship instead reflects the general ideological liberalism that Presbyterian and 
Episcopal clergy hold. This liberalism often places clergy to the left of their most 
proximate reference groups. As such, testing for whether and how clergy liberalism 
motivates behavior in these sociological conditions is more appropriate given the 
institutional circumstances 
 H8: As clergy political liberalism increases, so does the likelihood that clergy 
engage in political behavior. 
 Hypotheses 9 and 10 are based on the generally robust findings in chapter 5 
showing reference group preferences to exert a statistically significant influence on 
clergy liberalism. The importance of reference group influence is based in both the 
sociological and rational choice theories as defined in chapter 2. From a group 
socialization perspective, reference groups represent approbation, identity formation, 
and sanction for their members (Merton 1958; Verba 1961). As such, groups were 
shown to be socializing agents that pull clergy preferences into line with group 
preferences. If groups have this effect on clergy preferences, it is possible that they also 
serve as a motivating influence on clergy political behavior. While similar to hypothesis 
7, hypothesis 9 does not regard group liberalism as determining clergy liberalism. 
Instead, hypothesis 9 speaks to the likelihood that clergy undertake political behavior in 
general. 
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H9: As reference group liberalism increases, so does the likelihood that clergy 
engage in political behavior.  
The importance of group socialization notwithstanding, chapter 4’s theoretical 
model also situates reference group influence within a decidedly strategic dimension. 
Clergy are seen as rational pursuers of specific institutional goals. Pursuit of these 
goals, especially among one’s most proximate or “collegial” reference groups, may 
present clergy with pressure to strategically mask their sincerely held preferences. 
Given the statistical difference between clergy and proximate group preferences, clergy 
seeking good group relations may mask their sincerely held (and generally more liberal) 
preferences when interacting with their most proximate groups. I take this relationship a 
step further by suggesting that the strategic motive also suppresses clergy political 
behavior, as behavior represents the tangible manifestation of liberal preferences for the 
majority of Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy. Strategic influence will be detected in the 
models, in part, by reference group preferences holding influence on clergy behavior 
that runs the opposite of their preferences. It will also be observed through clergy 
perception of proximate reference group pressure to behave strategically. This leads to 
hypothesis 10     
H10: As clergy perceive greater pressure from their proximate reference groups 
to behave strategically, the likelihood that clergy engage in political behavior decreases.      
I use two dependent variables to test aspects of clergy political behavior that 
complement their delivery of political sermons. Both are dichotomous. The first models 
consider causal factors on clergy joining/belonging to liberal political interest groups. 
The dependent variable is coded “1” “if respondents joined or maintained membership 
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in a liberal political interest group since 2004.” Respondents indicated their membership 
status and the group(s) name in their survey responses. These were then coded on the 
basis of group liberalism. Prior to running the models, I provide a frequency distribution 
of the percentage of Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy who identify as belonging to a 
liberal political interest group. As the percentages demonstrate, a little over one third of 
the respondents in both denominations have held membership in a group since 2004. 
That the percentages are not higher suggests that they may be certain sociological 
and/or strategic effects that suppress membership. I examine this possibility in 
discussing the results from table 17. 
TABLE 16:  Frequency of Clergy Joining/Belonging to  Liberal Political Interest 
Groups in 2004-2005 (Expressed as Percentages) 
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
 


























TABLE 17: Clergy Joining/Belonging to Liberal Polit ical Interest Groups in 2004-
2005 
 
Clergy Join/Belong to Liberal Political 
Interest Groups  
PRESBYTERIAN  
(n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
   β (SE) PP
18 
 
 β19 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry .041 (.037)    .191*** (.055) .30  
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences  .024 (.048)     .304*** (.060) .37 
Session/Vestry Preferences    .408** (.139) .65        .274* (.096) .43  
Clergy Sex   .018 (.195)     -.019 (.170)    
Served in Denom. Legislature  -.059 (.162)     -.133 (.138)  
Years as Minister/Priest   .008 (.006) -.029*** (.007) .35   
Years in Current Church  .014 (.034)  -.040 (.037)  
Average Sunday Attendance   .0004 (.0002)  .0003 (.0003) 
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
  .007 (.010)   -.175** (.061) .39   
Session/Vestry * Years in Church -.008 (.010)   .002 (.015)  
Pressure * Session Vestry/ 
Preferences 
-.020 (.032) .002 (.002)  
Clergy Preferences     -.049 (.049)      .071 (.045)  
Baseline Probability  .36 .29 
Wald Chi2 30.49 50.57 
Prob > Chi2 .0024 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -230.298 -247.966 
 
 These models provide confirmation for hypotheses 6, 7, 9, and 10. Specifically, 
the positive and significant (at .000) sign for the Episcopal seminary indicator shows 
that ECUSA priests were .30 more likely to join or belong to a liberal political interest 
group when they rely on seminary to help guide their current ministry. Pointing to the 
                                            
18 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
19 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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influence of more liberal proximate reference groups on clergy behavior, a relationship 
discussed in hypothesis 7, both Presbyterian and Episcopal respondents were 
significantly more likely to join or belong to liberal interest groups in 2004-2005 when 
encountering sessions and vestries to their political left. The positive and significant (at 
.01) coefficient for Presbyterian sessions shows that clergy in that denomination were 
.65 more likely to join or belong to a liberal group, while their ECUSA counterparts were 
.43 more likely to do so (coefficient significant at .05). Yet it is not only the proximate 
reference groups that are influential. ECUSA clergy encountering bishops to their 
political left were .37 more likely to join or belong to liberal interest groups.  This finding 
reflects the relationship in hypothesis 9. And, as hypothesis 10 expected, ECUSA clergy 
perceiving strategic pressure from their most proximate reference groups were .39 less 
likely (coefficient significant at .01) to join or belong to liberal interest groups in 2004-
2005.  
Clearly, clergy interest group membership, which has potentially strong linkage to 
the delivery of political sermons, is affected by reference group influence. However, 
group membership does not necessarily take on a strong public dimension. As such, it 
will be interesting to compare the interest group results with those from clergy 
encouragement of parishioner support for a political party—certainly a very public form 
of political behavior. In this case, the dependent variable is taken from a survey item 
that asks respondents whether they “suggested to parishioners that they support a 
political party without providing a formal candidate endorsement” per IRS regulations for 
tax-exempt organizations. Because of the partisan overlap with clergy membership in 
liberal political interest groups, respondents who indicated support for the Democratic 
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Party are coded “1.” Interestingly, it appears from the frequencies in table 18 that 
advising the conservative laity to support the Democratic Party has a relatively chilling 
effect on ECUSA priests, as this activity registers the highest percentage of priests 
claiming no action on a behavior item.  
 
    TABLE 18:  Frequency of Clergy Advising Parishioner s to Support the 
Democratic Party in 2004-2005 (Expressed as Percent ages)  
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 439) 
 

































TABLE 19:  Clergy Advising Parishioners to Support the Democratic Party in 
2004-2005   
        
Clergy Advised Parishioners to 
Support the Democratic Party 
PRESBYTERIAN  
(n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 439) 
   β (SE) PP
20 
 
 β21 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Political Positions   -.018 (.036)     .069 (.054)    
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences    .169*** (.046) .37   -.067 (.052)   
Session/Vestry Preferences    -.064 (.122)      -.008 (.094)   
Clergy Sex      .038 (.179)     .252 (.167)     
Served in Denom. Legislature  .249 (.160)      .109 (.133)   
Years as Minister/Priest   -.006 (.007)    -.018** (.006) .27    
Years in Current Church  .045 (.029)      .016 (.039)   
Average Sunday Attendance    .0003 (.0002)        .00004 (.0003)  
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
 -.137 (.087)       -.065 (.059)    
Session/Vestry * Years in Church -.008 (.009)    -.025 (.020)   
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
   .051* (.029) .52      .003 (.002)   
Clergy Preferences     -.042 (.050)      .087* (.041) .18  
Baseline Probability  .41 .33 
Wald Chi2 21.04 21.19 
Prob > Chi2 .0498 .0476 
Log-Likelihood -246.105 -269.224 
 
 This pair of models provides confirmatory evidence for hypotheses 8 and 9.  
Beginning with hypothesis 8, and as would be expected of clergy with more liberal 
political preferences, the negative and significant (at .05) coefficient for the ECUSA 
preference variable shows that liberal Episcopal priests were .18 more likely to 
                                            
20 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
21 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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encourage their parishioners to support the Democratic Party in 2004-2005. The only 
countervailing effect on ECUSA clergy is the number of years spent in the 
denomination. The negative and significant (at .01) coefficient suggests that clergy with 
longer tenures were .27 less likely to call for Democratic Party support. It might be that 
these clergy have experienced negative reactions to their political behavior from 
reference groups over the years, and have pulled back in their activity. Unfortunately, it 
is not possible to say for sure given the nature of these data.  
Evidence supports hypothesis 9 on the Presbyterian side. The positive and 
significant (at. 000) coefficient shows that PC (U.S.A.) ministers serving in presbyteries 
to their political left were .37 more likely to advocate support for the Democratic Party 
among their parishioners in 2004-2005. This effect is logical given that clergy may be 
pursuing the policy and/or denominational influence goals with presbytery officials. Yet 
there is tension in the Presbyterian model. Clergy perception of strategic pressure from 
their most proximate reference groups has a negative and significant (at. 05) effect on 
clergy encouraging support for Democrats. Interestingly, the effect comes not from the 
base variable measuring strategic pressure. Instead, it is exists in the interaction term 
between the perception of strategic pressure and session preferences. This means that 
clergy who perceive strategic pressure from sessions to their political left were 
statistically more likely to encourage support of the Democratic Party in 2004-2005. In 
fact, the effect’s magnitude is the largest in this pair of models, increasing the likelihood 
by .52. This indicator registers an effect that is the exact opposite of hypothesis 10’s 
expectation, but that makes sense in light of the interaction with session liberalism. The 
conclusion drawn is that reference group preferences matter as a causal influence on 
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clergy political behavior, even when clergy are more conservative than the group. It is 
important that results from this section’s model pairs reflect sociological and strategic 
influence on partisan political behavior. This is because interest group membership and 
the encouragement of party support represent activities that enhance sermon delivery. 
Group membership provides clergy with political knowledge and resources to help them 
craft parishioner cues. At the same time, advocating political party support is a logical 
step for clergy when encouraging parishioner activism, especially if pro-gay rights 
and/or divestment sermon cues are included.   
Thus far, this chapter has examined the sociological and strategic influences on 
clergy sermonizing, their membership in liberal political interest groups, and their 
advocacy of parishioner support of the Democratic Party. In each of these preceding 
analyses, the dependent variables were focused on partisan or issue specific political 
behavior among clergy. In contrast, this chapter’s final section analyzes clergy efforts at 
promoting political behavior of a non-partisan nature.  
 
Non-Partisan Clergy Behavior 
 Zald’s (1982) work helps to flesh out why clergy can promote political behavior 
among their followers. He found that clergy are able to define their religious ministries 
along a political dimension. It is this definition, and the tone it carries in the local church, 
that provide clergy legitimacy as political elites among their followers. Coupled with 
Johnson and White’s (1967) finding that religious group members share a common 
identity shaped largely by clergy cues, and that clergy are significantly interested in 
political activities (Quinley 1974), clergy are positioned to act as significant catalysts for 
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parishioner political behavior. The extant scholarship has usually considered clergy 
encouragement of parishioner political activism to be the direct product of their political 
preferences (Nelson et al. 1973; Guth et al. 1997). Findings in this chapter reflected this 
relationship somewhat, as ECUSA clergy liberalism was found to be a significant 
predictor of their encouragement of parishioner support for the Democratic Party. Yet 
findings also pointed to the influence of strategic reference group pressure on clergy 
behavior. Because mainline clergy often interact with proximate reference groups that 
are more politically conservative than themselves, it is not clear that, controlling for 
reference group ideology, clergy are necessarily willing to encourage parishioner 
political activity. Thus, is it possible that strategic pressure might reduce the likelihood of 
clergy advocating general political participation among their followers?   
 In order to assess this possibility, and build on the findings in this and the 
preceding chapter, I generate four additional hypotheses. These test for the influence of 
seminary, clergy preferences, reference group ideology, and ideological differences 
between clergy and their parishioners on clergy encouragement of parishioner political 
activism. Hypothesis 11 focuses on seminary’s contemporary role in the process, and is 
steeped in the notion that seminary, which was found to be a strong influence on clergy 
preferences in chapter 5, will induce clergy to solicit participation among their followers. 
H11: Clergy encouragement of parishioner political participation reflects ongoing 
seminary influence, as indicated by reference to seminary in guiding their current 
ministry. 
In preceding models, clergy preferences mattered in determining the nature of 
their gay rights and divestment sermons. In those instances, liberal ECUSA clergy were 
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significantly more likely to deliver sermons supporting gay marriage and denominational 
divestment. In a related way, clergy liberalism should increase their support for 
parishioner participation since liberals were the first to call for the inclusion and 
enfranchisement of political minorities in both religious communities and secular politics 
(Levine 1981; Lewis 1998; Olson 2000). Hence, I suggest that  
H12: As clergy political liberalism increases, so does the likelihood that clergy 
encourage parishioner political behavior. 
Models in both this and the preceding chapter have demonstrated the importance 
of reference group influence on both clergy preferences and political behavior. I expand 
on these findings by positing a relationship between reference group liberalism and 
clergy support for parishioner political behavior. This relationship is based on the notion 
that liberal reference groups will reinforce clergy motives to encourage participation 
among local parishioners. 
H13: As liberalism among their reference groups increases, so does the 
likelihood that clergy encourage parishioner political behavior.  
This section’s strategic behavior hypothesis departs from the prior focus on 
group pressure in determining clergy behavior. While such pressure remains an 
important factor to consider, and is included in the models that follow, I believe that a 
more fruitful way of exploring the strategic motive is to assess whether clergy are 
moved away from their desire to encourage parishioner activism because of large 
ideological differences with their followers. I suggest that the larger the gap in 
preferences, the less likely clergy should be to encourage participation. This is because 
the ANOVA and frequency distribution results from chapter 4 suggest that a large 
 136 
ideological difference will often mean that the laity is positioned to the right of clergy 
politically. As such, clergy should be less interested in spurring political activism among 
those who would behave in ways opposite of what clergy prefer politically. 
Concomitantly, if a large preference difference exists, clergy may be inviting the wrath of 
their followers since appeals to increased participation would likely expose clergy 
(liberal) preferences. Given this, I hypothesize that    
H14: As the numerical difference between clergy and congregant ideology 
increases, the likelihood that clergy encourage parishioner political behavior decreases.      
The following pairs of models concern whether clergy, in 2004-2005, 1) started 
petitions on topics of political importance, 2) placed literature of a political nature in the 
church, and 3) encouraged parishioners to contact political leaders to express their 
views. The set of independent variables in the following three models is the same as for 
preceding models in this chapter with the exception of the added ideological difference 
indicator. The variable measures the numerical difference between clergy and reference 
group preferences. It is computed by subtracting congregational from clergy ideology. 
For example, in cases where the clergy are a “6” on the 1-7 ideological scale (with “7” 
representing “strongly liberal’), and the congregation is a “2,” the ideological difference 
variable value is “4,” which constitutes a large difference in liberalism between clergy 
and parishioners. The theoretical expectation is that higher liberal difference values will 
produce a negative effect on clergy encouragement of parishioner participation.  
The dependent variable in the first model pair asked respondents whether they 
“encouraged parishioners to contact political leaders to express their political views.” 
Affirmative responses were coded “1.” As seen in table 20, the majority of both 
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Presbyterian and Episcopal clergy elect not to encourage parishioners in this manner, 
although ECUSA priests outpace their Presbyterian counterparts nonetheless.  
 
TABLE 20:  Clergy Encouraging Parishioners to Conta ct Political Leaders in 2004-
2005 (Expressed as Percentages)  
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
 







































TABLE 21: Clergy Encouraging Parishioners to Contac t Political Leaders in 2004-
2005 
           
Encouraged Parishioners to Contact 
Political Leaders  
PRESBYTERIAN  
(n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
   β (SE) PP
22 
 
 β23 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry .068 (.042)   .269*** (.076) .13   
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences   -.163** (.054) .28      .049 (.076)  
Session/Vestry Preferences  -.104 (.145)     .344** (.135) .28  
Clergy Sex     -.428* (.234) .17      .508* (.228) .08    
Served in Denom. Legislature  .105 (.182)     .201 (.188)  
Years as Minister/Priest   .005 (.007)     -.010 (.008)   
Years in Current Church  -.026 (.033)   -.025 (.041)  
Average Sunday Attendance   .0003 (.0002)  .0001 (.0004)  
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
  -.079 (.010)  .088 (.068) 
Session/Vestry * Years in Church .008 (.010)   .005 (.020)  
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
.018 (.034) -.001 (.002)  
Clergy Preferences  -.048 (.105)    .126 (.082)  
Clergy/Congregation Ideological 
Difference 
  -.169*** (.076) .59   -.268*** (.063) .66 
Baseline Probability  .22 .07 
Wald Chi2 72.54 57.60 
Prob > Chi2 .0000 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -176.326 -124.049 
  
 The findings for hypothesis 13 are mixed. Less proximate reference groups to the 
clergy’s left do not increase their encouragement of parishioner activism in the PC 
(U.S.A.). As the negative and significant (at .01) coefficient shows, Presbyterian clergy 
                                            
22 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
23 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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serving in more liberal presbyteries were .28 less likely to encourage their parishioners 
to contact political leaders in 2004-2005. Conversely, more proximate reference groups 
to the left of ECUSA clergy had an encouraging effect on participation. ECUSA priests 
were .28 more likely (coefficient significant at .01) to encourage participation when 
encountering vestries to their political left. This effect is reinforced for ECUSA priests 
relying on seminary experiences to guide their current ministry, thereby confirming 
hypothesis 11. Those clergy were .13 more likely (coefficient significant at .000) to 
encourage participation when drawing on their seminary experiences. What might 
explain this difference in reference group effects? Though it is not possible to determine 
for sure, it might be that liberal presbyteries are concerned with how the laity’s political 
activation might impact the liberal policies they (the presbyteries) wish to pursue. In 
many instances, laity participation might translate into conservative resistance. As such, 
presbyteries may discourage clergy from seeking greater political involvement by their 
flocks.  
However, clergy serving in presbyteries to their political left have an added 
incentive in avoiding negative attention. Keeping the presbytery satisfied is especially 
important for clergy pursuing goals related to increased institutional influence and/or 
“good” denominational policy. At the same time, district level supervisors are not the 
only dampening effect on clergy political encouragement. Olson et al.’s (2005) finding 
that female clergy try to avoid inciting church controversy sheds light on why female 
Presbyterian clergy are .17 less likely (coefficient significant at .05) to encourage their 
flocks to contact political leaders. After all, for clergy to encourage the laity’s political 
involvement means that underlying political differences within local congregations might 
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be exposed, thereby contributing to the institutional conflict female clergy wish to avoid. 
That said, it is noteworthy that female ECUSA clergy have an increased likelihood of .08 
(coefficient significant at .05) of encouraging laity participation. It is not clear why this 
difference in effect exists. At the very least, it suggests that female clergy are not as risk 
averse as some of the more recent scholarship suggested (Crawford and Olson 2001; 
Olson et al. 2005). 
Finally, the ideological difference indicator in both models performs as expected, 
confirming hypothesis 14. PC (U.S.A.) clergy confronting larger liberal ideological 
differences with their laity were .59 less likely (coefficient significant at .000) to 
encourage their flocks to contact political leaders in 2004-2005. ECUSA clergy were .66 
less likely (coefficient significant at .000) to do the same. Larger preference differences 
mean clergy are more politically liberal than their followers. It stands to reason, 
therefore, that clergy may find reason to dampen their calls for activism so as not to 
activate large numbers of voters who would likely behave in ways opposite of clergy 
preferences. Coupled with the influence of strategic reference group pressure 
discovered earlier in this chapter, the finding that clergy pull back in their 
encouragement of laity political activism is an important contribution to the literature.  
To this point, the basic model of clergy political behavior centered on personal 
preferences in determining action, including calls for the laity to become more politically 
involved. Now, with the discoveries that clergy perceive pressure to strategically mask 
their preferences, and are less likely to encourage political participation when leading 
conservative parishioners, a much more nuanced view of clergy political behavior 
emerges. Clergy appear to behave as rational actors—calibrating their behavior 
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according to the contextual environments they encounter, environments that are largely 
determined by institutional variables such as reference group preferences and location. 
The sincere preferences clergy hold are not without influence, as suggested by the 
continued importance of seminary experiences. Yet clergy behavior is not the direct 
effect of a preference-based cause alone. Along the way, reference groups and 
ideological differences with their followers create incentives for clergy to deviate from 
their preferences. It will be interesting to see whether these incentives exist in the 
remaining models.      
The dependent variable in the next pair of models is based on a survey item that 
asked respondents whether they “started a petition on a matter of political importance” 
in 2004-2005, and is coded “1” if answered in the affirmative. The growing trend in these 
frequency tables appears to be that ECUSA priests are much more willing to encourage 
laity participation than their Presbyterian counterparts. This is relevant because there 
has been little comparison in the literature of ECUSA with other mainline denominations 
(see especially Guth et al. 1997). As such, that ECUSA priests are much more willing to 
generally encourage laity participation is itself an interesting finding.       
 
    TABLE 22:  Frequency of Clergy Starting a Petition on an Item of Political 
Importance in 2004-2005 (Expressed as Percentages)  
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
 










TABLE 23: Clergy Starting a Petition on an Item of Political Importance in 2004-
2005 
         
Started a Petition on Item of Political 
Importance 
PRESBYTERIAN  
(n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
   β (SE) PP
24 
 
 β25 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Current Ministry -.077 (.040)    .084 (.052)    
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences  -.076 (.050)      -.047 (.053)  
Session/Vestry Preferences  -.045 (.126)      .023 (.088)   
Clergy Sex    .119 (.209)      .124 (.163)    
Served in Denom. Legislature  .177 (.173)     -.028 (.129)  
Years as Minister/Priest   -.008 (.007)    -.011 (.006)   
Years in Current Church  .035 (.028)  -.040 (.039)  
Average Sunday Attendance  -.0001 (.0003)  .0001 (.0003) 
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
 -.072 (.086)      -.018 (.053)    
Session/Vestry * Years in Church -.009 (.009)   .008 (.015)  
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
.028 (.029)    .001 (.001)   
Clergy Preferences             -.051 (.093)      -.169** (.055) .38  
Clergy/Congregation Ideological 
Difference 
   -.145* (.066) .52  .033 (.044) 
Baseline Probability  .50 .39 
Wald Chi2 55.00 26.73 
Prob > Chi2 .000 .0135 
Log-Likelihood -194.329 -293.855 
  
 In contrast to the previous model set, these results provide a limited glimpse into 
clergy encouragement of political behavior. In the ECUSA model, only clergy 
preferences are a significant influence, albeit one that runs counter to hypothesis 12’s 
                                            
24 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
25 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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expectations. Specifically, liberal ECUSA clergy are .38 less likely (coefficient significant 
at .01) to have started a petition on a political issue. The hypothesized expectation was 
that liberal clergy would promote participation. It is not clear why this countervailing 
effect exists, but it might provide cause to reconsider the notion that personal liberalism 
encourages political participation. Certainly, the more liberal PC (U.S.A.) clergy are 
compared to their flocks, the less likely they are to have started a political petition. 
Clergy encountering a large liberal ideological difference in their congregations were .52 
less likely (coefficient significant at .05) to have started a political petition. Results from 
both denominations suggest that clergy liberalism, whether alone or in comparison to 
parishioner preferences, has a limiting influence on clergy encouragement of political 
participation. Liberalism’s effect will be something to watch in the third and final pair of 
participation models in this chapter.  
The third model pair focuses on whether clergy place political literature in their 
churches. The dependent variable is based on a survey item that asked respondents 
whether they “place literature of a political nature in public areas in the church” in 2004-
2005, and is coded “1” for affirmative responses.  
 
    TABLE 24:  Frequency of Clergy Placing Political Li terature in Public Church 
Areas in 2004-2005 (Expressed as Percentages)  
           
 PRESBYTERIAN  (n = 381) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
 











TABLE 25: Clergy Placing Political Literature in Pu blic Church Areas in 2004-2005 
           
Clergy Placed Political Literature in 
Public Church Areas  
PRESBYTERIAN  
(n = 379) 
EPISCOPAL  
(n = 458) 
   β (SE) PP
26 
 
 β27 (SE) PP 
 
Seminary Guides Political Positions  -.050 (.041)        -067 (.052)    
Presbytery/Bishop Preferences .010 (.049)     -.026 (.052) 
Session/Vestry Preferences  -.076 (.141)        .378*** (.104) .62   
Clergy Sex   -.270 (.219)        -.064 (.173)     
Served in Denom. Legislature    .856*** (.172) .33    .071 (.131)   
Years as Minister/Priest    .050*** (.008) .80       .130* (.056) .74    
Years in Current Church       .076* (.035) .62     .011 (.006)   
Average Sunday Attendance   .001*** (.0003) .63   .0007* (.0003) .42 
Perception of Session/Vestry 
Pressure to Behave Strategically 
     -.202* (.097) .39      .032 (.055)   
Session/Vestry * Years in Church     -.020 (.011)     -.032 (.019)  
Pressure * Session/Vestry 
Preferences 
      .064* (.032) .61      .006 (.002)    
Clergy Preferences      -.130 (.104)       -.120** (.056) .27  
Clergy/Congregation Ideological 
Difference 
.080 (.072)  -.156*** (.046) .58 
Baseline Probability  .43 .44 
Wald Chi2 124.26 58.04 
Prob > Chi2 .0000 .0000 
Log-Likelihood -191.726 -274.364 
 
 Table 25 provides evidence of reference group crosspressures on clergy 
placement of political literature. The most obvious example in the Presbyterian model 
concerns the role of strategic pressure and session ideology. Specifically, the negative 
                                            
26 PP represents the predicted probability for variables of statistical significance in the model. This figure 
is calculated as the difference between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variable, 
holding all other variables at their mean.   
27 * = p < .05  ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 
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sign and significance (at. 05) of the strategic pressure variable shows that Presbyterian 
clergy perceiving strategic session pressure were .39 less likely to place political 
literature in their churches in 2004-2005. Yet when sessions are politically situated the 
clergy’s left, the interaction between strategic pressure and session liberalism has the 
opposite effect. Specifically, clergy perceiving strategic pressure from more liberal 
sessions were .61 more likely (coefficient significant at .05) to place literature. A similar 
set of opposing influences is also at work on ECUSA clergy. While outright strategic 
influence was not a factor in that model, both clergy liberalism and a large liberal 
ideological difference between clergy and their parish reduced the likelihood of clergy 
placing political literature by .58 (coefficient significant at .000), confirming hypothesis 
14. However, that ECUSA clergy liberalism reduced their likelihood of placing literature 
by .27 (coefficient significant at .01) runs counter to hypothesis 12’s expectations.  
This is the second piece of evidence showing clergy liberalism to undermine 
clergy support for the laity’s general political participation. Unfortunately, these data are 
not able to explain why personal liberalism should have this effect. It might be that, 
despite liberalism’s historical importance as a catalyst for social and institutional 
change, liberal clergy are hostile to encouraging non-ideological political participation 
among their flocks. By contrast, and in confirmation of hypothesis 13, ECUSA clergy 
encountering vestries to their political left are .62 more likely (coefficient significant at 
.000) to place political literature. Though affirming the importance of reference group 
influence on clergy behavior, the disconnect between clergy preferences and vestry 
ideology is intriguing. Is it possible that clergy elect to go along with their liberal vestries 
in placing political literature despite personal ideological objections? I am not able to 
 146 
determine for sure from these results, but this is a possibility worthy of further empirical 
attention.     
The remaining variables of significance in both models perform in more expected 
ways. For instance, PC (U.S.A.) clergy with experience in the denomination’s General 
Assembly were .33 more likely (coefficient significant at .000) to place political literature 
in their churches. Legislative experience might serve to heighten clergy awareness of 
political issues in both the denomination and secular politics, thereby encouraging 
literature placement.  Concomitantly, clergy longevity plays a very significant role in the 
process. The years as clergy indicator in both models, and the years in current church 
variable on the Presbyterian side, represent positive influences on literature placement. 
The PC (U.S.A.) minister variable shows significance at .000, and increases the 
likelihood that clergy placed political literature in 2004-2005 by .80. For ECUSA clergy, 
the likelihood increases by .74 (coefficient significant at .05). The Presbyterian years in 
church variable is significant at .05, and increases the likelihood that political literature 
was placed by .62. Taken together, these findings suggest that longer tenured clergy 
are much more willing to display political literature than their younger counterparts. This 
may reflect Smidt’s (2004) contention that older clergy are more politically liberal and 
active because of their experiences in seminary, although the effect certainly does not 
carry over to the Episcopal ranks.  Finally, clergy serving in churches with higher 
attendance at Sunday services are .63 more likely in the Presbyterian model (coefficient 
significant at .000) and .42 more likely in the Episcopal (coefficient significant at .05) to 
have placed political literature in their churches in 2004-2005. This effect may be due to 
the reality of serving in larger churches where the laity’s political homogeneity may be 
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reduced, thereby lessening the possibility of strategic pressure and/or parishioner 
backlash over the types of literature displayed. 
 Results from this chapter suggest that clergy political behavior is the product of 
both socialized preferences and institutional influences. The latter exist in the form of 
reference group ideology, strategic pressure, and significant differences between clergy 
liberalism and laity conservatism. Seminary was also found to exert behavioral 
influence, thereby reinforcing the importance of this educational institution on clergy. 
This chapter’s two most provocative findings concern 1) clergy willingness to behave 
strategically in relation to perceived pressure from their most proximate institutional 
reference groups, and 2) the dampening effect differences in clergy and laity ideology 
have on the former’s political encouragement of the latter. Though religious elite 
behavior has been considered according to rational choice frameworks in the past, this 
study represents the first systematic attempt to understand how the strategic motive 
impacts American clergy across a national sample. While demonstrating that clergy are 
rational actors, results from both this and the preceding chapter show clergy behavior to 
be very much the product of socialized preferences. As such, this research reflects the 
importance of the sociological foundations of clergy preferences and behavior while 
expanding scholarly understanding of religious elites into new areas. I further situate 
these findings within the relevant literature, and explore possibilities for future research, 







Overall, results from this dissertation reinforce the importance of neo-
institutionalism in understanding clergy political behavior. Reflecting the extant 
literature’s findings, chapter 5 showed that institutions inculcate enduring and sincerely 
held political preferences in clergy. Based on results in chapter 6, institutions also 
motivate clergy to strategically engage in public political behavior. Specifically, when 
perceiving strategic pressure, clergy behave in ways contrary to their sincerely held 
preferences. At the same time, when there is a large ideological difference between 
clergy and their parishioners, the former, most often positioned to the laity’s ideological 
left, actually discourage political participation by their more conservative followers. 
Though religious elites have been the subject of countless empirical inquiries, and while 
this project is not the first to invoke rational choice principles in understanding clergy 
preferences and behavior, this is the first study to link theoretical expectations of 
strategic behavior with systematic, quantitative evidence that clergy may be strategic 
actors, even as their sincerely held preference continue to affect their behavior.   
In conducting this study, I used two neo-institutional frameworks: sociological 
institutionalism and rational choice theory. From these, I derived three basic research 
questions. First, in what ways do institutions, through their role as socializing agents, 
implant enduring and sincerely held political preferences in clergy? As the results in 
chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, it is a clergy’s experience in, and continued reliance on, 
seminary that represents a profound institutional socializing influence. While the 
literature has considered seminary’s role in developing clergy preferences, the 
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educational experience was often treated as a distant institutional encounter. The 
importance of the findings from chapters 5 and 6 is that they show seminary-based 
values to be a potent and contemporary influence on clergy political preferences and 
behavior.  
The second research question, also steeped in the sociological tradition, 
considered the influence of institutional reference groups as conduits of sincere change 
in clergy political preferences over time. Specifically, longer contact with their most 
proximate reference groups should increase the likelihood that clergy preferences 
reflect the groups’. Unfortunately, the models presented no clear evidence to answer 
this question affirmatively. I suggest that this non-finding may be the partial result of 
limitations in the data gathering techniques employed. Panel data would best assess 
any change in sincerely held clergy preferences over time. Hence, the assessment of 
this second sociological theory may still bear fruit, albeit in future research. That said, 
reference group preferences were found to be significant influences on clergy 
preference and behavior, thereby strengthening the sociological explanation overall. 
The third research question examined whether institutions shape clergy incentive 
structures such that they are compelled to strategically adopt behavior consistent not 
with their sincere political preferences, but with the preferences of their most proximate 
reference groups. Importantly, this possibility has never been assessed through 
statistical survey research. This is due, in part, to scholars overlooking the potential role 
that rational choice assumptions play in explaining clergy political behavior. Importantly,  
the most consistent indicators in the chapter 6 models were those measuring proximate 
reference group pressure on clergy to behave strategically. Though the models do not 
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show sincere clergy preferences and strategic pressure to be significant and signed 
opposite of each other, that the pressure variables should are frequently significant 
across models points to a rational choice-based explanation for clergy political behavior.  
According to the theoretical model outlined in chapter 4, it is not difficult to 
understand why this would be so. According to that model, clergy are active pursues of 
specific institutional goals. One of these goals involves maintaining good relations with 
proximate reference groups in the local church. Given the contact frequency and  
proximity clergy have to these groups, pursuit of what I termed the “collegial goal” is a 
rational undertaking for clergy. It may be that in pursuing the collegial goal, clergy 
become sensitive to the perception of group pressure to behave strategically on political 
issues. That said, evidence from the chapter 6 models suggests that clergy pursue 
goals outside of the local church as well. Their sensitivity to the preferences of less 
proximate reference groups, and the liberalizing impact that clergy service in the 
denominational legislatures had, suggests that clergy pursue intra-institutional influence 
and/or specific public policy within the national churches. Another intriguing finding was 
the dampening role that Episcopal clergy liberalism has on the encouragement of their 
parishioners to engage in the political process. Assuming that liberalism functions as a 
positive force on participation, the contrary effects in the last three models in chapter 6 
may constitute evidence of strategic behavior in ECUSA priests, although more 
research will be needed to effectively tease out this possibility.   
Overall, these results point to the merits of both the sociological and rational 
choice theories in explaining clergy political preferences and behavior. The certain 
innovation from this dissertation is testing the latter theory while confirming the former’s 
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relevance. Indeed, I do not make the argument that clergy preferences and behavior 
can be successfully understood without the empirical leverage that both theoretical 
lenses provide. This point is clearly made in several of the models where the 
sociologically-based indicators provide the greatest explanatory information. Though 
statistical testing of rational choice assumptions is a nascent addition to the study of 
clergy politics, it is important to keep in mind that both the sociological institutionalism 
and rational choice theories are derived from the same set of neo-institutional 
assumptions (Hall and Taylor 1996). Namely, institutions function as the contextual and 
structural causes of the political preferences clergy hold, and the behavior in which they 
engage.  
Importantly, while future research possibilities may be greatly expanded through 
the dual use of the sociological and rational choice lenses, certain of the theoretical 
assumptions in chapter 4 may need modification when expanding the focus beyond 
mainline clergy. For example, one must be careful not to assume general applicability of 
the three institutional goals (collegiality, institutional influence, and “good” public policy) 
to clergy in other religious traditions. The difficulty with assuming the collegial goal for 
Roman Catholic priests, for instance, becomes clear when realizing that the Catholic 
laity does not exercise institutional leadership that is in any manner on par with their 
Protestant counterparts. While Catholic priests are not necessarily interested in 
alienating their parishioners, there is no institutional mechanism that requires them to 
collaborate with the laity in determining parish policy. Hence, for all intents and 
purposes, the collegial goal, as it exists in the Presbyterian and Episcopal Churches—is 
non-existent for Catholic priests. On the other hand, and given Roman Catholicism’s 
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well-developed institutional hierarchy, a case can be made that the pursuit of 
denomination policy and influence are important goals for priests, and should be 
emphasized in neo-institutional research on the Catholic Church. At the other end of the 
institutional spectrum are those local churches that have little or no denominational 
linkage. Though they may have some type of cooperative relationship with regional or 
national organizations, these congregations have no formal connection to a set of sister 
churches or bureaucratic agencies. As such, it is not possible to sustain the relevance 
of the policy or denominational influence goals for clergy in these contexts.  
What makes the three institutional goals a fairly successful explanation for 
mainline Protestant clergy is that liberal and conservative political preferences clash at 
various institutional points. This is most clearly seen in the statistical divide between 
clergy and the laity, but exists between denominational leaders and clergy as well. In 
the absence of a preference clash between denominational actors, one or more of the 
goals might lose their explanatory power. Take away preference differences between 
reference groups and clergy, and there is little systematic reason for clergy to change 
their public positions because of group pressure or other strategic concerns. Thus, 
given the preference homogeneity between clergy and laity in evangelical Protestant 
denominations, reference group influence might not muster much explanatory power. It 
is likely no accident that the literature on contextual influences (see especially Djupe 
and Gilbert 2002, 2003, and Olson et al. 2005) focuses exclusively on the mainline 
Protestant clergy.  
Hence, there appear to be clear limitations in extending the choice theoretic 
assumptions and professional goals beyond mainline Protestantism. While this is 
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certainly disappointing, it is important to remember that American mainline 
Protestantism is second only to Roman Catholicism in terms of adherents (see footnote 
one for further discussion on this point). Hence, to the extent that this study can be 
exported to examinations of the United Methodist, Lutheran, Disciples of Christ, and 
United Church of Christ denominations (among others), a good deal will have been 
discovered about clergy in an important segment of American Christianity, which, 
despite its general signs of decline, remains a relevant topic of interest for religion and 
politics scholars.                 
    One of the ways that this dissertation could be extended within mainline 
Protestantism would be to incorporate laity perceptions in the analysis. At this point, 
almost all of what we know about clergy behavior comes from studies that rely on clergy 
perceptions. Yet perhaps the greatest assumed linkage in the religion and politics 
literature is the relationship between clergy behavior and the laity’s response. The 
inherent assumption made is that, because churches have been found to be important 
political contexts for their members (Wald et al. 1988), clergy behavior must play a 
consistent and significant role in galvanizing parishioners to undertake political 
behavior.  
Unfortunately, this connection has never been explicitly made in the research, 
and there is good reason for this. To create anything resembling a generalizable study 
of this phenomenon would take considerable resources, not the least of which would be 
the cooperation of hundreds of churches and clergy from a national random sample. 
Perhaps a more realistic study would entail a manageable number of churches across 
the country drawn from methods other than random selection. Scholars already have an 
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account of the clergy’s perception of the laity, and how those in the pew affect clergy 
political behavior. By completing the loop, scholars would have insight into whether 
directly measured laity characteristics comport with clergy perceptions of the same 
thing. The discovery of inconsistencies between clergy perception and laity reality would 
be of obvious theoretical and empirical significance. 
In whatever direction future research moves, it is clear that there is still much to 
do in understanding clergy political preferences and behavior. Through this dissertation, 
I have attempted to add institutional context to the analysis, context that opens the door 
to new research agendas in the study of clergy politics. The contextual variables 
developed here have proven useful in understanding the sociological and rational 
choice aspects of clergy and their approach to politics. I have demonstrated that an 
equally good case can be made that mainline Protestant clergy are affected by both 
sociological and rational choice motives in their political preferences and behavior. The 
existence of both conditions makes the study of clergy political behavior an exciting one, 
and suggests that clergy may act as both sincere shepherds and strategic saints.        
      
 
    






































ANONYMOUS  SURVEY  OF PC (U.S.A.) CLERGY 
 
Please answer these questions to the best of your ability . Some questions may 
appear to be similar or the same. Try to answer all  questions regardless.  
 
YOUR CONGREGATION AND SESSION: 
 




(1 = Agree Strongly   4= Neutral   7 = Disagree Strongly) 
  
5) I take the general views of my 
congregation and session into account 
when FORMING my views on a 
POLITICAL issue.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
6) I take the general views of my 
congregation and session into account 
when EXPRESSING my views on a 
POLITICAL issue.  





7) It is important for me to feel that I am 
helping to shape the POLITICAL views of 
my congregation. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
8) I will change my expressed views on a 
THEOLOGICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from my session. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
1) My congregation  is more POLITICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am. 
 1     2     3     4     5     6    7                       
 
2) My congregation  is more 
THEOLOGICALLY conservative/liberal 
than I am.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7          
 
3) My session  is more POLITICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
4) My session  is more THEOLOGICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
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9) I feel pressured by my congregation 
and session to take positions on 
controversial POLITICAL issues that I 
would not take otherwise. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
10) I feel pressured by my congregation 
and session to take positions on 
controversial THEOLOGICAL issues that 
I would not take otherwise. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
11) I will change my expressed views on 
a POLITICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from my congregation 
and session.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7 
12) I tend to agree more with the 
POLITICAL views of my congregation 
and session now than when I began my 
current call. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
 
13) I tend to agree more with the 
THEOLOGICAL views of my 
congregation and session now than 
when I began my current call. 






































14) I will change my expressed views on 
a POLITICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from my session.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7   
15) I will stop expressing certain 
POLITICAL views  (although I will not stop 
holding them) if I know expressing them 
could cost me influence over my 
congregation.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
16) I will stop expressing certain 
THEOLOGICAL views  (although I will not 
stop holding them) if I know expressing 
them could cost me influence over my 
congregation.   
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
17) Generally, my session ends up siding 
with my preferences on POLITICAL 
matters. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
18) I will stop expressing certain 
POLITICAL views (although I will not stop 
holding them) if I know expressing them 
could contribute to my removal from my 
current congregation.   
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
19) I will stop expressing certain 
THEOLOGICAL views (although I will not 
stop holding them) if I know expressing 
them could contribute to my removal 
from my current congregation.   
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
20) I will stop expressing certain 
POLITICAL views (although I will not stop 
holding them) if I know expressing them 
could contribute to a decrease in 
congregant monetary giving. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
21)  I will stop expressing certain 
THEOLOGICAL views (although I will not 
stop holding them) if I know expressing 
them could contribute to a decrease in 
congregant monetary giving. 





                      
(1=More Conservative   4= Generally the Same   7= More Liberal) 
                                                 
(1=Agree Strongly  4= Neutral   7= Disagree Strongly) 
 
24) I will change my expressed views on 
a POLITICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from ministers in my 
current presbytery. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
25) I will change my expressed views on 
a THEOLOGICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from ministers in my 
current presbytery. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 















22) My presbytery is more POLITICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
 
23) My presbytery is more 
THEOLOGICALLY conservative/liberal 
than I am.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
26) I had to publicly modify certain 
personal POLITICAL view in order to 
avoid conflict with my presbytery. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
27) I had to publicly modify certain 
personal THEOLOGICAL views in order 
to avoid conflict with my presbytery. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
28) I tend to agree/disagree more with my 
presbytery on POLITICAL issues now 
than when I became a minister. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
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YOUR GENDER and the MINISTRY:         
 
(1=Agree Strongly  4= Neutral   7= Disagree Strongly) 
 
 29) The expectations associated with my 
gender make it more difficult for me to 
express my POLITICAL views as a 
minister when I know it will create 
conflict within my congregation. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
 
 30) The expectations associated with my 
gender make it more difficult for me to 
express my THEOLOGICAL views as a     
minister when I know it will create 
conflict within my congregation.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
 31) I believe that because of my gender I 
am expected to avoid encouraging 
conflict within the PCUSA 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
 
The PCUSA:             
                                                              












32) The PUP recommendation for 
presbyteries to decide essential 
doctrines for ordination should be 
adopted.                  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
33)  The PC (U.S.A.) should pursue a 
phased, selective sale (‘divestment’) of 
the stock it owns in multinational 
corporations whose dealings in Israel 
support the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territories. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
34)  G-6.0106b should be repealed by the 
2006 General Assembly and sent to the 
presbyteries for ratification. 




YOUR THEOLOGICAL VIEWS:       
                       
(1 = Strongly Conservative   4 = Moderate   7 = Strongly Liberal) 
 
 
YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS: 
                                  














35) The theological views instilled in me 
during my home life growing up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
36) The theological views instilled in me 
during my church experiences growing 
up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     N/A 
N/A = Did not attend church growing 
up 
37) My overall theological views 
BEFORE seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
38) My overall theological views UPON 
GRADUATION from seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
39) My CURRENT overall theological 
views are  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
40) The political views instilled in me 
during my home life growing up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
41) The political views instilled in me 
during my church experiences growing 
up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     N/A 
N/A = Did not attend church growing 
up 
42) My overall political views BEFORE 
seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
43) My overall political views UPON 
GRADUATION from seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
44) My CURRENT overall political views 
are  





YOUR SEMINARY EXPERIENCES:                         






For  the following questions, please select and numerically rank the TOP THREE (in 
order from 1st to 2nd to 3rd) from the list of ten factors that you use to determine the 
following on the items below. Each factor has its own letter for you to place in the 
answer boxes. If none of the ten factors adequately capture an influence on a particular 
item, please write “other” in the particular answer box, and elaborate in writing on page 
six.  
45) I draw on the values and education received 
in seminary to guide my conduct as a minister.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
46) I decided to attend my particular seminary 
because of the recommendations of my 
presbytery at the time. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
N/A = Was not Presbyterian while 
attending seminary 
47) I decided to attend the seminary from which 
I received my M.Div. or B.D. because of the 
general theological views its faculty espoused. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7   
48) My experiences in seminary made my views 
more POLITICALLY liberal. 




    (A) Clergy  
Peers  (PCUSA 
Only) 
  (B)  Attitudes 
of Family and 
Friends         
(C)  The Media       (D) Bible 
Study and 
Prayer               
  (E) Sessions  
Attitudes         
(F) 
Congregants’ 
Attitudes             
  (G) Seminary 
Experiences        
(H)  College 
Experiences  
                         





           
 (J) Position of  
PCUSA 
National 
Leaders              
49) Personal Political 
Beliefs  
1st 2nd  3rd 
50) Personal Job 
Satisfaction  
1st 2nd 3rd 
51) Personal Self-
esteem  
1st 2nd 3rd 
52) Personal 
Theological Beliefs  
1st 2nd 3rd 
53) Sermon Topics  1st 2nd 3rd 




1st 2nd 3rd 
55) Publicly Taking a 
Position in the 
Divestment Debate 
1st 2nd 3rd 
56) Your Vote Choice 
in Session Meetings 




62) I DID THE FOLLOWING SINCE 2004(Check all that apply):   
 
Encouraged congregants to contact political leaders to express their political views    
 
Wrote letters/called political leaders to express personal political views    
 




Gave money to a political party or cause    (List party/cause: 
____________________________________________________) 
 
Gave advice to congregants on the appropriateness of being educated on political 
issues    
 
Started a petition on an issue of political importance    
 
Joined or maintained membership in a political party   (List party: 
_______________________________________________________) 
 
57) Publicly Taking a 
Position in the Debate 
over  G-6.0106b 
1st 2nd 3rd 
58)  Publicly Taking a 
Position on the PUP 
Recommendation for 
Presbyteries to 
Discern  Essential 
Ordination Standards 
1st 2nd 3rd 
59) Public Political 
Views   
1st 2nd 3rd 
60) Revising Existing 
Views on Political 
Issues  
1st 2nd 3rd 
61) Displaying Books 
and Similar 
Educational Materials 
in Your Church  
1st 2nd 3rd 
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Placed literature of a political nature in public areas in the church    
 
Joined OR maintained membership in a political interest group    (List 
group:_______________________________________________________) 
 
Suggested to congregants that they support a political party without providing a formal 
candidate endorsement    
(List party:________________________________________________________) 
 
Encouraged the congregation to develop or otherwise support a community soup  
kitchen or related organization    
 
Encouraged the congregation to develop or otherwise support a 
gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender support program    
 
Encouraged the congregation to develop or otherwise support a crisis pregnancy center 
   
 
Encouraged the congregation to develop or otherwise support ecumenical/inter-faith 
ministries with other Christian denominations and non-Christian religions      
 
63) How many years have you been a Presbyterian minister? ___________        
64) What year were you born? __________________ 
65) How many years have you served in your current call? ______________   
66) Annual salary (including allowances)?  $__________________ 
67) Do you currently serve in the same presbytery in which you were ordained? 
_________   
68) Race/ethnicity ___________________ 
69) Is your congregation in an urban area? ______________   
70) How many paid staff do you work with in your church? _____________ 
71) How many years at your longest call? ___________  
70) What is your sex? ____________  
72) Church zip code _____________ 
73) What seminary did you attend, and what year did you graduate? 
_____________________________________________      
74) Size of current church membership ___________ 
75) Average attendance at regular Sunday services _______________  





77) Have you served on a Permanent Judicial Commission? (List governing body and 
dates of service): 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
78) Please note any clarifying or expanding comments on any of the questions above. 
Such comments are a welcome addition to this study! When writing, please be sure to 























































































ANONYMOUS  SURVEY  OF ECUSA CLERGY 
 
Please answer these questions to the best of your ability . Some questions may 
appear to be similar or the same. Try to answer all  questions regardless.  
 
YOUR PARISH AND VESTRY: 
 
(1=More Conservative  4= Generally the Same  7= More Liberal) 
 
 
(1 = Agree Strongly   4= Neutral   7 = Disagree Strongly)  
 
 
5) I take the general views of my parish 
and vestry into account when FORMING 
my views on a POLITICAL issue.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
6) I take the general views of my parish 
and vestry into account when 
EXPRESSING my views on a POLITICAL 
issue.  




7) It is important for me to feel that I am 
helping to shape the POLITICAL views of 
my parish. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
8) I will change my expressed views on a 
THEOLOGICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from my vestry. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
9) I feel pressured by my parish and 
vestry to take positions on controversial 
POLITICAL issues that I would not take 
otherwise. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
1) My parish  is more POLITICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7                       
 
2) My parish  is more THEOLOGICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7          
 
3) My vestry  is more POLITICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
4) My vestry  is more THEOLOGICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
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10) I feel pressured by my parish and 
vestry to take positions on controversial 
THEOLOGICAL issues that I would not 
take otherwise. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
11) I will change my expressed views on 
a POLITICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from my parish and 
vestry.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7 
12) I tend to agree more with the 
POLITICAL views of my parish and 
vestry now than when I began my current 
call. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
 
13) I tend to agree more with the 
THEOLOGICAL views of my parish and 
vestry now than when I began my current 
call. 











































14) I will change my expressed views on 
a POLITICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from my vestry.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7   
15) I will stop expressing certain 
POLITICAL views  (although I will not stop 
holding them) if I know expressing them 
could cost me influence over my parish.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
16) I will stop expressing certain 
THEOLOGICAL views  (although I will not 
stop holding them) if I know expressing 
them could cost me influence over my 
parish.   
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
17) Generally, my vestry ends up siding 
with my preferences on POLITICAL 
matters. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
18) I will stop expressing certain 
POLITICAL views (although I will not stop 
holding them) if I know expressing them 
could contribute to my removal from my 
current parish.   
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
19) I will stop expressing certain 
THEOLOGICAL views (although I will not 
stop holding them) if I know expressing 
them could contribute to my removal 
from my current parish.   
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
20) I will stop expressing certain 
POLITICAL views (although I will not stop 
holding them) if I know expressing them 
could contribute to a decrease in 
parishioner monetary giving. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
21)  I will stop expressing certain 
THEOLOGICAL views (although I will not 
stop holding them) if I know expressing 
them could contribute to a decrease in 
parishioner monetary giving. 





YOUR DIOCESE & BISHOP: 
                      
(1=More Conservative   4= Generally the Same   7= More Liberal) 
                                                 
(1=Agree Strongly  4= Neutral   7= Disagree Strongly) 
 
24) I will change my expressed views on 
a POLITICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from priests in my 
current diocese. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
25) I will change my expressed views on 
a THEOLOGICAL issue if I encounter 
resistance to them from priests in my 
current diocese. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 















22) My bishop is more POLITICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
 
23) My bishop is more THEOLOGICALLY 
conservative/liberal than I am.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
26) I had to publicly modify certain 
personal POLITICAL view in order to 
avoid conflict with my diocese. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
27) I had to publicly modify certain 
personal THEOLOGICAL views in order 
to avoid conflict with my diocese. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
28) I tend to agree/disagree more with my 
diocese on POLITICAL issues now than 
when I became a priest. 




YOUR GENDER and the MINISTRY:         
 
(1=Agree Strongly  4= Neutral   7= Disagree Strongly) 
 
 29) The expectations associated with my 
gender make it more difficult for me to 
express my POLITICAL views as a priest 
when I know it will create conflict within 
my parish. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
 
 30) The expectations associated with my 
gender make it more difficult for me to 
express my THEOLOGICAL views as a     
priest when I know it will create conflict 
within my parish.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
 31) I believe that because of my gender I 
am expected to avoid encouraging 
conflict within the ECUSA 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
 
 
The ECUSA:             
                                                              











32)  Marriage between two people of the 
same sex should be made legal by the 
government 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
33)   The ECUSA should pursue a 
phased, selective sale (‘divestment’) of 
the stock it owns in multinational 
corporations whose dealings in Israel 
support the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territories. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
34)  The office of Bishop in the Episcopal 
Church should be open to self-affirming, 
sexually active homosexuals.  





YOUR THEOLOGICAL VIEWS:       
                       
(1 = Strongly Conservative   4 = Moderate   7 = Strongly Liberal) 
 
 
YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS: 
                                  













35) The theological views instilled in me 
during my home life growing up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
36) The theological views instilled in me 
during my church experiences growing 
up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     N/A 
N/A = Did not attend church growing 
up 
37) My overall theological views 
BEFORE seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
38) My overall theological views UPON 
GRADUATION from seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
39) My CURRENT overall theological 
views are  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
40) The political views instilled in me 
during my home life growing up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
41) The political views instilled in me 
during my church experiences growing 
up were 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     N/A 
N/A = Did not attend church growing 
up 
42) My overall political views BEFORE 
seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
43) My overall political views UPON 
GRADUATION from seminary  were  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
44) My CURRENT overall political views 
are  






YOUR SEMINARY EXPERIENCES:                         







For  the following questions, please select and numerically rank the TOP THREE (in 
order from 1st to 2nd to 3rd) from the list of ten factors that you use to determine the 
following on the items below. Each factor has its own letter for you to place in the 
answer boxes. If none of the ten factors adequately capture an influence on a particular 
item, please write “other” in the particular answer box, and elaborate in writing on page 
six.  
45) I draw on the values and education received 
in seminary to guide my conduct as a priest.  
1     2     3     4     5     6    7      
46) I decided to attend my particular seminary 
because of the recommendations of my bishop 
at the time. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7     
N/A = Was not Episcopal while 
attending seminary 
47) I decided to attend the seminary from which 
I received my M.Div. or B.D. because of the 
general theological views its faculty espoused. 
1     2     3     4     5     6    7   
48) My experiences in seminary made my views 
more POLITICALLY liberal. 




    (A) Clergy  
Peers  (ECUSA 
Only) 
  (B)  Attitudes 
of Family and 
Friends         
(C)  The Media         (D) Bible 
Study and 
Prayer               
  (E) Vestry’s  
Attitudes         
(F) Parishioners’ 
Attitudes             
  (G) Seminary 
Experiences        
(H)  College 
Experiences  
                         
   (I) Prevalent 
Attitudes of 
Priests in Your 
Diocese 
           
 (J) Position of  
ECUSA 
National 
Leaders              
49) Personal Political 
Beliefs  
1st 2nd  3rd 
50) Personal Job 
Satisfaction  
1st 2nd 3rd 
51) Personal Self-
esteem  
1st 2nd 3rd 
52) Personal 
Theological Beliefs  
1st 2nd 3rd 
53) Sermon Topics  1st 2nd 3rd 




1st 2nd 3rd 
55) Publicly Taking a 
Position in the 
Divestment Debate 
1st 2nd 3rd 
56) Your Vote Choice 
in Vestry Meetings 




62) I DID THE FOLLOWING SINCE 2004(Check all that apply):   
 
Encouraged parishioners to contact political leaders to express their political views    
 
Wrote letters/called political leaders to express personal political views    
 




Gave money to a political party or cause    (List party/cause: 
____________________________________________________) 
 
Gave advice to parishioners on the appropriateness of being educated on political 
issues    
 
Started a petition on an issue of political importance    
 
Joined or maintained membership in a political party   (List party: 
_______________________________________________________) 
 
Placed literature of a political nature in public areas in the parish    
57) Publicly Taking a 
Position in the 
Debate over Gay 
Marriage  
1st 2nd 3rd 
58) Publicly Taking a 
Position in the 
Debate over Gay 
Ordination of Bishops  
1st 2nd 3rd 
59) Public Political 
Views   
1st 2nd 3rd 
60) Revising Existing 
Views on Political 
Issues  
1st 2nd 3rd 
61) Displaying Books 
and Similar 
Educational Materials 
in Your Church  




Joined OR maintained membership in a political interest group    (List 
group:_______________________________________________________) 
 
Suggested to parishioners that they support a political party without providing a formal 
candidate endorsement    
(List party:________________________________________________________) 
 
Encouraged the parish to develop or otherwise support a community soup  
kitchen or related organization    
 
Encouraged the parish to develop or otherwise support a 
gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender support program    
 
Encouraged the parish to develop or otherwise support a crisis pregnancy center    
 
Encouraged the parish to develop or otherwise support ecumenical/inter-faith ministries 
with other Christian denominations and non-Christian religions      
 
63) How many years have you been an Episcopal priest? ___________        
64) What year were you born? __________________ 
65) How many years have you served in your current call? ______________   
66) Annual salary (including allowances)?  $__________________ 
67) Do you currently serve in the same diocese in which you were ordained? 
_________   
68) Race/ethnicity ___________________ 
69) Is your parish in an urban area? ______________   
70) How many paid staff do you work with in your parish? _____________ 
71) How many years at your longest call? ___________  
70) What is your sex? ____________  
72) Parish zip code _____________ 
73) What seminary did you attend, and what year did you graduate? 
_____________________________________________      
74) Size of current parish membership ___________ 
75) Average attendance at regular Sunday Eucharist _______________  








77) Have you served on a diocesan standing committee? (List governing body and 
dates of service): 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
78) Please note any clarifying or expanding comments on any of the questions above. 
Such comments are a welcome addition to this study! When writing, please be sure to 
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